Politics
Beyond the Russia-West Dichotomy: Georgia’s New Identity Crisis
November 19, 2024
- Sofia GavrilovaLeibniz Institute for Regional Geography, Germany
Researcher Sofia Gavrilova examines the shift in narratives seen in the recent Georgian parliamentary election, especially around the issues of Russia and the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and explains why Georgia’s traditional victim identity might be changing.
The recent parliamentary election in Georgia has been the object of significant media attention (see Russia.Post about the Georgian election here), with narratives positioning this “historic election” as a decisive moment for the nation – a choice between alignment with Russia or the West.
Not a month had passed before, on top of the mass opposition protests in Tbilisi, another scandal broke: Shalva Papuashvili, a member of parliament from Georgian Dream held a press conference featuring a map where the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia were depicted in such a faint color that they did not appear to be part of Georgia. Several days later, tensions inside Abkhazia were approaching boiling point.
Not a month had passed before, on top of the mass opposition protests in Tbilisi, another scandal broke: Shalva Papuashvili, a member of parliament from Georgian Dream held a press conference featuring a map where the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia were depicted in such a faint color that they did not appear to be part of Georgia. Several days later, tensions inside Abkhazia were approaching boiling point.
Shalva Papuashvili, an MP from Georgian Dream, pictured alongside the map that sparked a recent scandal. Source: Facebook
The destabilization in Georgia and Abkhazia are not surprising. Both the fear of possible war and the issue of the contested regions were used extensively during the election campaign.
Georgian Dream’s shift from ideology to stability
The party’s appeal to the fear of war is supposed to resonate with voters’ memories of the 2008 Russian intervention and the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.
Georgian Dream’s shift from ideology to stability
The party’s appeal to the fear of war is supposed to resonate with voters’ memories of the 2008 Russian intervention and the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.
“Through carefully crafted messaging and imagery, Georgian Dream managed to capture a sense of fear and threat, thus making the election about security and peace.”
Georgia’s position between East and West is nothing new; historically, it has been at the crossroads of empires, most notably Russian and Ottoman, while fostering strong cultural ties to Europe. This latest election, however, has stirred a unique blend of national sentiment.
As Nutsa Batiashvili, a prominent Georgian anthropologist and historian, described, Georgia’s political landscape has long been characterized by a “quest for Georgian-ness,” where identity is shaped by both traditional ties and modern alliances.
While the West-Russia divide might serve as shorthand for this dynamic, Georgian Dream’s strategic shift in messaging reflects a deeper transformation, prioritizing immediate concerns about stability over ideological alignment with either power.
Anti-Russian sentiment has been a unifying force in Georgian politics, particularly since the 2008 war with Russia, which left deep scars and a lasting Russian military presence in the breakaway Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
For years, anti-Russian rhetoric was a political rallying cry, encapsulating a national identity rooted in defiance, yet it has gradually lost its potency.
As it reframed the election, Georgian Dream relied on images from the war in Ukraine and the unresolved status of South Ossetia, paired with reminders of Russia’s looming presence.
Georgian Dream’s tactic shows a keen understanding of the public’s desire for stability, which has come to outweigh ideological commitments. Thus, the ruling party appealed to undecided voters.
The success of this approach in the long term remains uncertain, but it does mark a shift in Georgian political discourse: it indicates a broader trend beyond a simplistic Europe-Russia dichotomy, as well as a maturing political landscape in which stability and national cohesion are increasingly valued over external alignment.
The ‘third occupation’: Russian emigration and ‘influence’ in Georgia
In recent years, waves of Russian emigration into Tbilisi, first during the pandemic and later due to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, have added a new layer to Georgia’s sense of identity and (in)security.
Termed the “third occupation” by some, the influx of Russian nationals is seen by Georgians not only as an economic strain, with rising rental prices, for example, but also a cultural encroachment reminiscent of Georgia’s colonial past.
Russian “influence” has been associated with a perceived increase in the use of the Russian language in public spaces and the emergence of “Russian bubbles,” such as stores, coffee shops and bars catering primarily to Russian emigrants and serving as their gathering places.
While the debate persists over whether Georgia should align with Russia or the West, this new “Russian occupation” stirs real and imagined fears of losing sovereignty in a more insidious way, including concerns about a Russian invasion to “protect the Russian population,” as happened with the annexation of Crimea.
Evolving identity: Beyond victimhood and toward self-definition
Georgia’s national identity has long been constructed around a narrative of victimhood over centuries at the hands of foreign oppressors – from the Ottoman and Persian empires to Soviet rule and now Russian influence. This perspective has been used to unify Georgians, most recently under Mikheil Saakashvili, who shaped a resistance-oriented identity to thwart Russian expansionism.
This victim narrative is woven into Georgian culture, as evident in museum exhibits, educational curricula and public discourse, which underscore the nation’s resilience in the face of aggression.
As Nutsa Batiashvili, a prominent Georgian anthropologist and historian, described, Georgia’s political landscape has long been characterized by a “quest for Georgian-ness,” where identity is shaped by both traditional ties and modern alliances.
While the West-Russia divide might serve as shorthand for this dynamic, Georgian Dream’s strategic shift in messaging reflects a deeper transformation, prioritizing immediate concerns about stability over ideological alignment with either power.
Anti-Russian sentiment has been a unifying force in Georgian politics, particularly since the 2008 war with Russia, which left deep scars and a lasting Russian military presence in the breakaway Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
For years, anti-Russian rhetoric was a political rallying cry, encapsulating a national identity rooted in defiance, yet it has gradually lost its potency.
As it reframed the election, Georgian Dream relied on images from the war in Ukraine and the unresolved status of South Ossetia, paired with reminders of Russia’s looming presence.
Georgian Dream’s tactic shows a keen understanding of the public’s desire for stability, which has come to outweigh ideological commitments. Thus, the ruling party appealed to undecided voters.
The success of this approach in the long term remains uncertain, but it does mark a shift in Georgian political discourse: it indicates a broader trend beyond a simplistic Europe-Russia dichotomy, as well as a maturing political landscape in which stability and national cohesion are increasingly valued over external alignment.
The ‘third occupation’: Russian emigration and ‘influence’ in Georgia
In recent years, waves of Russian emigration into Tbilisi, first during the pandemic and later due to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, have added a new layer to Georgia’s sense of identity and (in)security.
Termed the “third occupation” by some, the influx of Russian nationals is seen by Georgians not only as an economic strain, with rising rental prices, for example, but also a cultural encroachment reminiscent of Georgia’s colonial past.
Russian “influence” has been associated with a perceived increase in the use of the Russian language in public spaces and the emergence of “Russian bubbles,” such as stores, coffee shops and bars catering primarily to Russian emigrants and serving as their gathering places.
While the debate persists over whether Georgia should align with Russia or the West, this new “Russian occupation” stirs real and imagined fears of losing sovereignty in a more insidious way, including concerns about a Russian invasion to “protect the Russian population,” as happened with the annexation of Crimea.
Evolving identity: Beyond victimhood and toward self-definition
Georgia’s national identity has long been constructed around a narrative of victimhood over centuries at the hands of foreign oppressors – from the Ottoman and Persian empires to Soviet rule and now Russian influence. This perspective has been used to unify Georgians, most recently under Mikheil Saakashvili, who shaped a resistance-oriented identity to thwart Russian expansionism.
This victim narrative is woven into Georgian culture, as evident in museum exhibits, educational curricula and public discourse, which underscore the nation’s resilience in the face of aggression.
“The recent narrative shift by Georgian Dream subtly calls this victim-centered identity into question.”
Road signs to the capitals of Abkhazia (Sukhumi) and South Ossetia (Tskhinvali). Photo by author
By focusing on peace rather than outright defiance, the party is challenging the long-standing paradigm that equates national identity with a shared sense of historical injustice and resistance to Russian influence.
This development highlights the budding recognition among Georgians, particularly the younger generation, that an identity defined by aspirations, instead of past grievances, may be more productive and appealing. This emerging perspective seeks to honor Georgia’s history while envisioning a future that is constructive and inclusive.
Contested regions as symbols and leverage
If you take the main road out of Tbilisi, which runs westward through Gori and Kutaisi before ending in Batumi, one of the first road signs indicates the way to the capitals of the breakaway regions. The irony is that unless you have special permission, you will not even get close to the checkpoints along the Russian occupation line, let alone past them.
However, such signs, which can be found all across western and central Georgia, constantly remind you about the frozen conflicts and the official political stance claiming that these territories belong to Georgia.
This development highlights the budding recognition among Georgians, particularly the younger generation, that an identity defined by aspirations, instead of past grievances, may be more productive and appealing. This emerging perspective seeks to honor Georgia’s history while envisioning a future that is constructive and inclusive.
Contested regions as symbols and leverage
If you take the main road out of Tbilisi, which runs westward through Gori and Kutaisi before ending in Batumi, one of the first road signs indicates the way to the capitals of the breakaway regions. The irony is that unless you have special permission, you will not even get close to the checkpoints along the Russian occupation line, let alone past them.
However, such signs, which can be found all across western and central Georgia, constantly remind you about the frozen conflicts and the official political stance claiming that these territories belong to Georgia.
A poster in a Tbilisi street. Photo by author
The breakaway Abkhazia and South Ossetia have served as focal points in Georgian politics, symbolizing both the nation’s resilience and its territorial fragility. Furthermore, for over three decades these unresolved conflicts have highlighted the struggles inherent in defining Georgian identity.
Recall that during the 2008 war, Russian troops tanks made it to Gori, just an hour from Tbilisi by car. The current ceasefire line (or “administrative boundary line,” as it is called by the UN and EU missions in the regions) is even closer to the capital.
Abkhazia and South Ossetia have captured international attention too. This included Western politicians visiting divided villages and local actors patrolling the occupation line alongside EU missions. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the issue of the breakaway regions has intensified locally, and in Georgia the country’s map with a reminder that “20% of the territory is occupied by Russia” has gone viral offline and online.
Recall that during the 2008 war, Russian troops tanks made it to Gori, just an hour from Tbilisi by car. The current ceasefire line (or “administrative boundary line,” as it is called by the UN and EU missions in the regions) is even closer to the capital.
Abkhazia and South Ossetia have captured international attention too. This included Western politicians visiting divided villages and local actors patrolling the occupation line alongside EU missions. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the issue of the breakaway regions has intensified locally, and in Georgia the country’s map with a reminder that “20% of the territory is occupied by Russia” has gone viral offline and online.
An exposition featuring support to Ukraine in the museum of the 2008 war in Ergneti, a village just 200 meters from the occupation line with South Ossetia and five kilometers from Tskhinvali. Photo by author
In the lead-up to the recent parliamentary election in Georgia, both the ruling party and the opposition wielded these regions as symbols to reinforce their respective narratives. Georgian Dream, by invoking the memory of these conflicts, emphasized its commitment to peace and positioned itself as the political force most able to prevent renewed hostilities.
Georgian Dream has not explicitly accepted the “situation on the ground” just yet. However, shortly before the election Ivanishvili stated that Georgia should apologize to the people of South Ossetia. His statement was treated by Russian officials as a positive shift in the Georgian position on the contested regions, which for years had been reduced to an unequivocal demand that they be returned to Georgia and ruled out any criticism of Tbilisi’s policy.
The dominant, uncompromising attitude toward Abkhazia and South Ossetia has been criticized by academics and analysts (see, for instance, here and here), who see it as nationalistic and dismissive of ethnic and national minorities’ concerns.
Meanwhile, opposition parties have demonstrated the hardline approach, as they view reintegration of the breakaway regions as essential to restoring Georgian sovereignty. For the opposition, normalizing the status quo by perpetuating a fractured Georgian state undermines the country’s national pride.
Georgian Dream has not explicitly accepted the “situation on the ground” just yet. However, shortly before the election Ivanishvili stated that Georgia should apologize to the people of South Ossetia. His statement was treated by Russian officials as a positive shift in the Georgian position on the contested regions, which for years had been reduced to an unequivocal demand that they be returned to Georgia and ruled out any criticism of Tbilisi’s policy.
The dominant, uncompromising attitude toward Abkhazia and South Ossetia has been criticized by academics and analysts (see, for instance, here and here), who see it as nationalistic and dismissive of ethnic and national minorities’ concerns.
Meanwhile, opposition parties have demonstrated the hardline approach, as they view reintegration of the breakaway regions as essential to restoring Georgian sovereignty. For the opposition, normalizing the status quo by perpetuating a fractured Georgian state undermines the country’s national pride.
“This divide speaks to a broader ideological divide in Georgian politics – between maintaining a pragmatic acceptance of the current reality and upholding the ideal of a fully unified Georgia.”
Toward a new Georgian identity
At their core, the debates around Georgian Dream’s peace-oriented platform, the opposition’s insistence on territorial sovereignty and the complexities associated with the latest iteration of Russian influence reflect a transformation in how Georgia perceives itself.
By moving beyond a “Russian versus Western” (or “Russian versus European”) framework, Georgia stands to gain an identity that acknowledges its past but does not confine it.
This emerging identity might become an enduring legacy of this election cycle, shaping how Georgia navigates its relationships with neighboring powers and defining its global role.
Given the divisions in Georgian society revealed by the election results, effecting such an identity shift, however, will require great effort and skill from Georgian political and public figures.
At their core, the debates around Georgian Dream’s peace-oriented platform, the opposition’s insistence on territorial sovereignty and the complexities associated with the latest iteration of Russian influence reflect a transformation in how Georgia perceives itself.
By moving beyond a “Russian versus Western” (or “Russian versus European”) framework, Georgia stands to gain an identity that acknowledges its past but does not confine it.
This emerging identity might become an enduring legacy of this election cycle, shaping how Georgia navigates its relationships with neighboring powers and defining its global role.
Given the divisions in Georgian society revealed by the election results, effecting such an identity shift, however, will require great effort and skill from Georgian political and public figures.
Share this article
Read More
