Politics
The Kremlin’s Implicit Deal with Soldiers Starting to Fall Apart
November 18, 2024
- Alexander GoltsJournalist
Journalist Alexander Golts looks at recent changes to the system of compensation for wounded soldiers, arguing that they mark the first serious signal that the Kremlin’s resources to wage its war of aggression in Ukraine are drying up.
On November 13, the Russian government, under a presidential decree signed just hours earlier, issued a resolution establishing new compensation payment amounts for injured military personnel based on the severity of the injury.
Whereas previously all injured soldiers were entitled to a payment of RUB3 million (about $30,000) regardless of the severity of the injury, now only those with wounds deemed “severe” by military medical commissions will receive that sum. Those whose injuries are considered “minor” will now receive just RUB 1 million.
For injuries not on a government list only RUB 100,000 will be paid. The government resolution refers to a list of injuries approved in 1998, which confirms the occurrence of an “insured event” for military and law enforcement personnel if an injury was sustained while on duty. Keep in mind that the list was drawn up after the First Chechen War, when the Russian government lacked the funds to take care of its soldiers. Thus, it is unsurprising that most bone fractures and gunshot wounds are classified as “minor” injuries.
Cost-cutting under the guise of fairness
The latest changes were adopted under the pretext of strengthening “social justice.” Indeed, ever since the “special military operation” in Ukraine began, Russian soldiers have complained that all the wounded – those who, for example, lost an arm or a leg and those with an injury from which they could fully recover – receive the same sums.
Ministry of Defense leaders have promised from time to time to sort things out and fix this.
Whereas previously all injured soldiers were entitled to a payment of RUB3 million (about $30,000) regardless of the severity of the injury, now only those with wounds deemed “severe” by military medical commissions will receive that sum. Those whose injuries are considered “minor” will now receive just RUB 1 million.
For injuries not on a government list only RUB 100,000 will be paid. The government resolution refers to a list of injuries approved in 1998, which confirms the occurrence of an “insured event” for military and law enforcement personnel if an injury was sustained while on duty. Keep in mind that the list was drawn up after the First Chechen War, when the Russian government lacked the funds to take care of its soldiers. Thus, it is unsurprising that most bone fractures and gunshot wounds are classified as “minor” injuries.
Cost-cutting under the guise of fairness
The latest changes were adopted under the pretext of strengthening “social justice.” Indeed, ever since the “special military operation” in Ukraine began, Russian soldiers have complained that all the wounded – those who, for example, lost an arm or a leg and those with an injury from which they could fully recover – receive the same sums.
Ministry of Defense leaders have promised from time to time to sort things out and fix this.
“However, all the complaints from soldiers were about paying more money for serious injuries, not reducing the compensation received by those who are ‘lightly wounded’.”
"Heroes of the special military operation" receiving awards at the Vishnevsky Military Hospital (Moscow, July 2024). Source: VK
The Kremlin understood perfectly well that the government resolution would have a negative impact on the morale of Russian troops, who are currently engaged in tough, bloody battles in Ukraine and in Russia’s Kursk Region. For that reason, literally the next day, Putin signed another decree raising the one-time payment for disability due to injury to RUB 4 million (from RUB 3 million).
But this trick is unlikely to fool anyone. The selfish calculations of the authorities immediately became obvious to Russian soldiers in Ukraine, who quickly began writing blog posts that the old system was not so unfair and that even before Putin’s recent decrees, compensation for the wounded still varied because of supplemental insurance payouts.For example, on top of the RUB 3 million for all injuries, insurance paid RUB 81,000 for those qualified as minor but RUB 327,000 for severe ones.
Russian soldiers are fully aware that the new decrees put them at the mercy of yet another group of bureaucrats. They have every reason to believe that if the high command gives an order, obedient medical commissions will classify almost any injury as minor. In addition, these decrees provide yet more scope for corruption. It is not hard to imagine the hell that wounded soldiers trying to get compensation will have to go through.
No amount of demagogy will hide from Russian soldiers the fact that their own government is trying to deceive them in the most vulgar way.
The breakdown of ‘deathonomics’
The arrival of a new team at the Ministry of Defense in May, headed by Andrei Belousov, gave rise to high hopes among soldiers that the new leadership would tackle the real problems of the armed forces: primarily, supplying and funding the troops. Yet there are no major achievements on either count to speak of. And now, two years and nine months after the start of the war, the Kremlin has slashed payments for wounded soldiers.
The government resolution, which will clearly make soldiers’ lives harder, was adopted a week after the minister of defense promised to develop a “fairer approach” to compensation, “so that the size of the payments corresponds to or at least reflects the severity of the injury that a person sustains.” This will certainly not be forgotten, and it will not bolster Belousov’s authority.
Why would the Kremlin risk irritating a fighting army? Calculating the exact economic effect of the changes can be done only very approximately – the Russian leadership has classified all data on the number of wounded soldiers, along with the categories of their injuries.
It is common knowledge that the number of so-called return-to-duty casualties (when a soldier is wounded but then recovers and returns to duty; RTDs) significantly exceeds the number of irrecoverable casualties (killed or seriously wounded). In World War I, this ratio was 4 to 1; in World War II, 3 to 1. If we assume RTDs are to be classified as “lightly wounded,” then for every additional million rubles spent on a disabled veteran (recall that the payment for disability due to injury is now RUB 4 million), the Kremlin will save at least RUB 8-9 million on payments for minor injuries.
But this trick is unlikely to fool anyone. The selfish calculations of the authorities immediately became obvious to Russian soldiers in Ukraine, who quickly began writing blog posts that the old system was not so unfair and that even before Putin’s recent decrees, compensation for the wounded still varied because of supplemental insurance payouts.For example, on top of the RUB 3 million for all injuries, insurance paid RUB 81,000 for those qualified as minor but RUB 327,000 for severe ones.
Russian soldiers are fully aware that the new decrees put them at the mercy of yet another group of bureaucrats. They have every reason to believe that if the high command gives an order, obedient medical commissions will classify almost any injury as minor. In addition, these decrees provide yet more scope for corruption. It is not hard to imagine the hell that wounded soldiers trying to get compensation will have to go through.
No amount of demagogy will hide from Russian soldiers the fact that their own government is trying to deceive them in the most vulgar way.
The breakdown of ‘deathonomics’
The arrival of a new team at the Ministry of Defense in May, headed by Andrei Belousov, gave rise to high hopes among soldiers that the new leadership would tackle the real problems of the armed forces: primarily, supplying and funding the troops. Yet there are no major achievements on either count to speak of. And now, two years and nine months after the start of the war, the Kremlin has slashed payments for wounded soldiers.
The government resolution, which will clearly make soldiers’ lives harder, was adopted a week after the minister of defense promised to develop a “fairer approach” to compensation, “so that the size of the payments corresponds to or at least reflects the severity of the injury that a person sustains.” This will certainly not be forgotten, and it will not bolster Belousov’s authority.
Why would the Kremlin risk irritating a fighting army? Calculating the exact economic effect of the changes can be done only very approximately – the Russian leadership has classified all data on the number of wounded soldiers, along with the categories of their injuries.
It is common knowledge that the number of so-called return-to-duty casualties (when a soldier is wounded but then recovers and returns to duty; RTDs) significantly exceeds the number of irrecoverable casualties (killed or seriously wounded). In World War I, this ratio was 4 to 1; in World War II, 3 to 1. If we assume RTDs are to be classified as “lightly wounded,” then for every additional million rubles spent on a disabled veteran (recall that the payment for disability due to injury is now RUB 4 million), the Kremlin will save at least RUB 8-9 million on payments for minor injuries.
“This move seems to indicate that the Kremlin’s financial needs are more urgent than the inevitable morale and psychological effects on the army.”
It marks the first serious signal that resources to wage the war of aggression are drying up. Until now, the Kremlin wasexceptionally generous when it came to rewarding soldiers for their service. Breaking from the Soviet tradition, it pays them over RUB 200,000 a month – a salary significantly above the average for the country.
For signing a contract with the Ministry of Defense, according to the scheme devised by the Kremlin, regions pay volunteers up to RUB 2 million. In addition, in the event of a soldier’s death, the state pays his family at least RUB 5 million. A system of other various payments to servicemen and their families has been created, as well. A fairly effective “market” economy of war has developed around all these financial flows, which economist Vyacheslav Inozemtsev has wittily called “deathonomics.” He claims that a Russian man who fights for a year and then dies in Ukraine will generate more money for his family than he could have earned in his entire life.
Until recently, “deathonomics” worked, representing a new “social contract” between the Kremlin and the Russian people. The previous, prewar “contract” stipulated that the former would provide a certain level of well-being and the latter, for their part, would not aspire to participate in decision-making, allowing Putin to do whatever he wanted, both in domestic and foreign policy.
While the Kremlin was doling out unthinkable for the Russian provinces sums to men ready to go fight in Ukraine, the majority of the country continued to live as they had before the war; in particular, well-off residents of big cities maintained their usual way of life.
This “contract” allowed the Kremlin to recruit about 30,000 volunteers a month, making it possible to keep prosecutingthe war in the form it had taken. But now the main player in this complex economy of war, apparently realizing that its financial resources are not unlimited, has shown that it might renege on its commitments. Other players in this economy, the ones risking life and limb for promised money, may now wonder whether they might be deceived again.
It is only a matter of time before the government’s decision to drastically cut payments for injuries sustained in battlebegins to weigh on volunteer numbers.
For signing a contract with the Ministry of Defense, according to the scheme devised by the Kremlin, regions pay volunteers up to RUB 2 million. In addition, in the event of a soldier’s death, the state pays his family at least RUB 5 million. A system of other various payments to servicemen and their families has been created, as well. A fairly effective “market” economy of war has developed around all these financial flows, which economist Vyacheslav Inozemtsev has wittily called “deathonomics.” He claims that a Russian man who fights for a year and then dies in Ukraine will generate more money for his family than he could have earned in his entire life.
Until recently, “deathonomics” worked, representing a new “social contract” between the Kremlin and the Russian people. The previous, prewar “contract” stipulated that the former would provide a certain level of well-being and the latter, for their part, would not aspire to participate in decision-making, allowing Putin to do whatever he wanted, both in domestic and foreign policy.
While the Kremlin was doling out unthinkable for the Russian provinces sums to men ready to go fight in Ukraine, the majority of the country continued to live as they had before the war; in particular, well-off residents of big cities maintained their usual way of life.
This “contract” allowed the Kremlin to recruit about 30,000 volunteers a month, making it possible to keep prosecutingthe war in the form it had taken. But now the main player in this complex economy of war, apparently realizing that its financial resources are not unlimited, has shown that it might renege on its commitments. Other players in this economy, the ones risking life and limb for promised money, may now wonder whether they might be deceived again.
It is only a matter of time before the government’s decision to drastically cut payments for injuries sustained in battlebegins to weigh on volunteer numbers.
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