Politics
Putin Does not Want a Ceasefire, but He Might Agree to One
December 10, 2024
-
Sergei Shelin
Journalist, independent analyst
Analyst Sergei Shelin says growing problems like inadequate army reserves, macroeconomic imbalances due to militarization and the indifference of Russians to conquests in Ukraine pose a dilemma for Putin, who increasingly faces a choice of substantially hardening his regime or pushing the pause button on the war.
The original text in Russian was published in the Moscow Times and is being republished here with some changes and the author’s permission.
According to Kommersant, “the Presidential Administration is working on the assumption that the end of the special military operation is coming and we must be prepared for it.” Given the newspaper’s cautious reputation and the topic, this is probably not fanciful.
Is Putin really pivoting toward a peace deal?
You never know
Still, let’s not put too much weight on the Kommersant story, which details a routine seminar for vice-governors, whererepresentatives of the Presidential Administration, among other things, said that “the future outcome of the special military operation should be regarded in society as a victory” and that “we need to focus on the ‘calm majority’ that will be satisfied with the achievement of the goals outlined by the president.”
The mention of a coming end to the war (victory) suggests that the Presidential Administration is seeking to insure itself against any surprises rather than that the bureaucracy is preparing for peace with Ukraine. Putin is a master of surprises, and he is unlikely to discuss such key political issues with the leadership of his Presidential Administration beforehand. But they, of course, might have sensed something themselves.
Indeed, Putin now has more reasons than before to think, if not about peace, then at least about a ceasefire.
When Putin attacked Ukraine in February 2022, he did not plan for a perpetual war. He assumed that victory would be quick and total. But when that did not happen, he learned to extract benefits from the endlessness of the conflict. The war has transformed his regime into what it is today.
Proposals for a ceasefire began to be made at the beginning of 2023. One of them was from Chinese leader Xi Jinping. But his Russian counterpart did not pay attention.
Now, Putin might consider this option, even if he ultimately decides against it. It is not just a matter of leveraging Donald Trump to push through a good deal (for Russia).
According to Kommersant, “the Presidential Administration is working on the assumption that the end of the special military operation is coming and we must be prepared for it.” Given the newspaper’s cautious reputation and the topic, this is probably not fanciful.
Is Putin really pivoting toward a peace deal?
You never know
Still, let’s not put too much weight on the Kommersant story, which details a routine seminar for vice-governors, whererepresentatives of the Presidential Administration, among other things, said that “the future outcome of the special military operation should be regarded in society as a victory” and that “we need to focus on the ‘calm majority’ that will be satisfied with the achievement of the goals outlined by the president.”
The mention of a coming end to the war (victory) suggests that the Presidential Administration is seeking to insure itself against any surprises rather than that the bureaucracy is preparing for peace with Ukraine. Putin is a master of surprises, and he is unlikely to discuss such key political issues with the leadership of his Presidential Administration beforehand. But they, of course, might have sensed something themselves.
Indeed, Putin now has more reasons than before to think, if not about peace, then at least about a ceasefire.
When Putin attacked Ukraine in February 2022, he did not plan for a perpetual war. He assumed that victory would be quick and total. But when that did not happen, he learned to extract benefits from the endlessness of the conflict. The war has transformed his regime into what it is today.
Proposals for a ceasefire began to be made at the beginning of 2023. One of them was from Chinese leader Xi Jinping. But his Russian counterpart did not pay attention.
Now, Putin might consider this option, even if he ultimately decides against it. It is not just a matter of leveraging Donald Trump to push through a good deal (for Russia).
“There are also three domestic problems that should make Putin think about calling a stop to the war.”
Putin meeting with wounded soldiers. June 2023. Source: VK
Mobilization equals panic
As of end-November, the BBC Russian service and Mediazona have established the names of 81,000 Russian soldiers killed in Ukraine. Just in the last couple weeks of the month, 2,644 new names were added.
The method used by the BBC and Mediazona to arrive at their estimates admittedly understates the number of those killed in action, likely by about half. Further, if we assume that there are twice as many seriously wounded as those killed, then overall monthly losses of Russian troops come to approximately 30,000.
Meanwhile, in a recently published article by Colonel General Ivan Buvaltsev, who is the chief of training in the Russian army, it is said that 300,000 contract soldiers have undergone (probably since the beginning of 2024) combat training for the war. That is, the inflow of soldiers is approximately equal to the outflow.
This hardly suits the Russian authorities. For ultimate success in the war, the fighting contingent needs to be expanded.The acute shortage of reserves was made apparent in August, when the Ukrainian army marched into Kursk Region.
Yet the possibilities for boosting the number of volunteers by further raising bonuses and pay have basically beenexhausted. This means that in the coming months the Kremlin will have to either freeze the war or call up reservists again and throw conscripts into combat. It has been preparing for the latter scenario for a long time, and if necessary, the authorities will not act as bluntly as in the autumn of 2022. Nevertheless, Russians are very afraid of mobilization. Even in hidden forms, it will almost certainly cause panic.
The regime seems to be hesitating and has yet to decide on calling another mobilization.
Belt-tightening is risky
As of end-November, the BBC Russian service and Mediazona have established the names of 81,000 Russian soldiers killed in Ukraine. Just in the last couple weeks of the month, 2,644 new names were added.
The method used by the BBC and Mediazona to arrive at their estimates admittedly understates the number of those killed in action, likely by about half. Further, if we assume that there are twice as many seriously wounded as those killed, then overall monthly losses of Russian troops come to approximately 30,000.
Meanwhile, in a recently published article by Colonel General Ivan Buvaltsev, who is the chief of training in the Russian army, it is said that 300,000 contract soldiers have undergone (probably since the beginning of 2024) combat training for the war. That is, the inflow of soldiers is approximately equal to the outflow.
This hardly suits the Russian authorities. For ultimate success in the war, the fighting contingent needs to be expanded.The acute shortage of reserves was made apparent in August, when the Ukrainian army marched into Kursk Region.
Yet the possibilities for boosting the number of volunteers by further raising bonuses and pay have basically beenexhausted. This means that in the coming months the Kremlin will have to either freeze the war or call up reservists again and throw conscripts into combat. It has been preparing for the latter scenario for a long time, and if necessary, the authorities will not act as bluntly as in the autumn of 2022. Nevertheless, Russians are very afraid of mobilization. Even in hidden forms, it will almost certainly cause panic.
The regime seems to be hesitating and has yet to decide on calling another mobilization.
Belt-tightening is risky
“The record growth in fiscal spending on the military (to RUB 13.5 trillion in 2025 – officially) requires a decline in social expenditures on the same scale.”
A Russian volunteer weaving a camouflage net. Minusinsk, Krasnoyarsk Region, September 2023. Source: Dzen
And, technically, that has already begun.
“Previously [in 2022-24],for various reasons, they had enough money for everything. Now, that story is ending,” says economist Andrei Yakovlev. “The adopted budget shows that for the first time during Putin’s rule, the budget includes a nominal reduction in spending on social policy. Thus, an open signal is being sent that guns will be the priority over butter.”
But the regime is only sticking a toe in the water. It has yet to abandon its usual rhetoric about the well-being of the people and is not forcing rapid belt-tightening.
According to Rosstat, real incomes are now 8.6% higher than a year ago. And though this is largely fiction, and a large part of these increased incomes are handed right back to the government in the form of savings parked at banks, the regime has not put in place serious measures aimed at reducing consumption.
Meanwhile, the growth in Russia’s GDP that Putin boasts about merely reflects higher military-related output. “It is military production that is now the driving force of industry and the economy as a whole,” the Telegram channel MMI muses. “There is no doubt that the growth in military production will continue.”
The militarization of the economy means that the production of goods for the civilian sector, along with services, is stagnating at best. But wages are rising rapidly, and the old methods of correcting financial imbalances have ceased to work.
Despite desperate efforts by the Central Bank, consumer price inflation is accelerating. By early December, it had risen to 8.8% year over year and 13.0% on a seasonally adjusted annualized basis (SAAR).
The government has proven unable to bring rising prices to heel. It would be easier to bring citizens to heel.
“Previously [in 2022-24],for various reasons, they had enough money for everything. Now, that story is ending,” says economist Andrei Yakovlev. “The adopted budget shows that for the first time during Putin’s rule, the budget includes a nominal reduction in spending on social policy. Thus, an open signal is being sent that guns will be the priority over butter.”
But the regime is only sticking a toe in the water. It has yet to abandon its usual rhetoric about the well-being of the people and is not forcing rapid belt-tightening.
According to Rosstat, real incomes are now 8.6% higher than a year ago. And though this is largely fiction, and a large part of these increased incomes are handed right back to the government in the form of savings parked at banks, the regime has not put in place serious measures aimed at reducing consumption.
Meanwhile, the growth in Russia’s GDP that Putin boasts about merely reflects higher military-related output. “It is military production that is now the driving force of industry and the economy as a whole,” the Telegram channel MMI muses. “There is no doubt that the growth in military production will continue.”
The militarization of the economy means that the production of goods for the civilian sector, along with services, is stagnating at best. But wages are rising rapidly, and the old methods of correcting financial imbalances have ceased to work.
Despite desperate efforts by the Central Bank, consumer price inflation is accelerating. By early December, it had risen to 8.8% year over year and 13.0% on a seasonally adjusted annualized basis (SAAR).
The government has proven unable to bring rising prices to heel. It would be easier to bring citizens to heel.
“The authorities are entirely capable of making ends meet financially even with the current level of militarization in the economy. To do this, they just need to lower Russian civilians’ standard of living.”
A sign with instructions on how to become a contract soldier for the Russian army. Oktyabrsky, Bashkortostan. Source: VK
And to do that, they need to administratively limit income growth, weaken the ruble and speed up inflation further.
But that would mean a sharp turn from the current policy, and Putin does not like risky steps. A ceasefire would help avoid these troubles or at least kick the can down the road.
Moreover, judging by recent polls (more below), Russians also favor peace talks.
‘What are we fighting for’?
A study in several of Russia’s regions, conducted by the Public Sociology Laboratory independent research group through the participant observation method, showed that the “calm majority” that the Presidential Administration wants officials to focus on is evolving in a way that is unexpected for the very Presidential Administration.
“People, on the one hand, have become more critical of the war but, on the other hand, more patriotic,” sociologist Oleg Zhuravlev says of the results of the study. He continues:
People who are rather loyal to Putin, nevertheless, constantly criticize the war. They ask, “what are we fighting for?” or “how long can they fight?” …
The Kremlin says that Ukraine is not a real state, that there is no such separate nation as Ukrainians. But this imperialist ideology has not taken root. The patriotic, nationalist discourse has developed more. People live in a world of nation-states, and national borders are common sense for them. They say: “why spend money on Mariupol? Better to spend it here in Russia.” …
There is greater basic nationalism, but this is not the nationalism of Putin. Russians do not need the so-called new territories.
Let’s not exaggerate the emerging gap between Putin’s nationalism and the supposedly more restrained popular nationalism. But it is a fact that the masses are beginning to tire of this war of aggression.
Russian Field’s November wave of surveys asking about the “special military operation” revealed that 53% of Russians support moving to peace talks, versus 36% who do not. This has flipped from the first months of the conflict (at that point, 35% were for negotiations and 54% for more war), since which time the share of those who want peace has risen almost continuously and today clearly predominates.
Typically, peace talks are favored by young and middle-aged people, as well as workers on the civilian side of the economy (in industries like retail, IT and health care), while a continuation of the war is preferred by those benefitting from it (for example, industrial workers) and pensioners, who are most susceptible to television propaganda.
But that would mean a sharp turn from the current policy, and Putin does not like risky steps. A ceasefire would help avoid these troubles or at least kick the can down the road.
Moreover, judging by recent polls (more below), Russians also favor peace talks.
‘What are we fighting for’?
A study in several of Russia’s regions, conducted by the Public Sociology Laboratory independent research group through the participant observation method, showed that the “calm majority” that the Presidential Administration wants officials to focus on is evolving in a way that is unexpected for the very Presidential Administration.
“People, on the one hand, have become more critical of the war but, on the other hand, more patriotic,” sociologist Oleg Zhuravlev says of the results of the study. He continues:
People who are rather loyal to Putin, nevertheless, constantly criticize the war. They ask, “what are we fighting for?” or “how long can they fight?” …
The Kremlin says that Ukraine is not a real state, that there is no such separate nation as Ukrainians. But this imperialist ideology has not taken root. The patriotic, nationalist discourse has developed more. People live in a world of nation-states, and national borders are common sense for them. They say: “why spend money on Mariupol? Better to spend it here in Russia.” …
There is greater basic nationalism, but this is not the nationalism of Putin. Russians do not need the so-called new territories.
Let’s not exaggerate the emerging gap between Putin’s nationalism and the supposedly more restrained popular nationalism. But it is a fact that the masses are beginning to tire of this war of aggression.
Russian Field’s November wave of surveys asking about the “special military operation” revealed that 53% of Russians support moving to peace talks, versus 36% who do not. This has flipped from the first months of the conflict (at that point, 35% were for negotiations and 54% for more war), since which time the share of those who want peace has risen almost continuously and today clearly predominates.
Typically, peace talks are favored by young and middle-aged people, as well as workers on the civilian side of the economy (in industries like retail, IT and health care), while a continuation of the war is preferred by those benefitting from it (for example, industrial workers) and pensioners, who are most susceptible to television propaganda.
“War fatigue, even if temporary, is now widespread.”
The overwhelming majority of those polled by Russian Field said they would support a move by Putin to sign a “peace agreement as soon as tomorrow and stop the military operation” (79% for versus 13% against).
These sentiments – the third factor that Putin must take into account as he weighs how to proceed further – could possibly be dispelled, but to do so, the state machine would have to bring a lot of pressure to bear on Russians.
Putin’s power is not checked by anything. He can completely ignore the anxiety of officials and the war fatigue of his subjects. Russia’s resources allow it to prosecute the war for a long time still. The conflict has strengthened the regime built by Putin, and it is hard to imagine that he would decide to stop it without having achieved many of its initial goals.
Yet there are several factors at work that can be overcome only by seriously hardening the regime and through great managerial efforts. Experience shows that Putin does not like sharp turns.
So now he looks poised to try to find a middle way between war and peace – if all else fails, he might even sign a peace agreement.
These sentiments – the third factor that Putin must take into account as he weighs how to proceed further – could possibly be dispelled, but to do so, the state machine would have to bring a lot of pressure to bear on Russians.
Putin’s power is not checked by anything. He can completely ignore the anxiety of officials and the war fatigue of his subjects. Russia’s resources allow it to prosecute the war for a long time still. The conflict has strengthened the regime built by Putin, and it is hard to imagine that he would decide to stop it without having achieved many of its initial goals.
Yet there are several factors at work that can be overcome only by seriously hardening the regime and through great managerial efforts. Experience shows that Putin does not like sharp turns.
So now he looks poised to try to find a middle way between war and peace – if all else fails, he might even sign a peace agreement.
Share this article
Read More
