Politics
‘Official Yerevan Believes the Pre-2020 Format of Russia-Armenia Relations Did Not Pay Off’
July 4, 2025
- Alexander IskandaryanDirector, Caucasus Institute (Yerevan)
In an interview with RBC at the Primakov Readings international affairs forum, political scientist Alexander Iskandaryan discusses the ongoing conflict between the Armenian government and the national Church, the unlikelihood of an Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement, and the current role of Russia in the South Caucasus.
The original interview in Russian was published by RBC and is being republished here with their permission. Minor changes have been coordinated with the author.
The 2018 revolution in Armenia. Picture taken in Republic Square, Yerevan, April 2018. Source: Wiki Commons
Recently, Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan and his associates in the Holy Struggle opposition movement were arrested on terrorism charges. They are accused of plotting to overthrow the government. How political is this case?
The cases of Archbishop Bagrat and [Russian-Armenian billionaire] Samvel Karapetyan cannot not be political. Archbishop Bagrat positions himself as a person who is active in political affairs. There is political logic in his persecution, as in the conflict between the government and the Church in general.
After the 2018 revolution, new leaders gradually replaced the old ones in the executive, legislative and judicial branches, in the army and even in Nagorno-Karabakh. The Church remained the only institution not subordinate to the state, and the government has been clashing with it since 2018.
There is a year left before the next parliamentary election, and the approval ratings of the ruling party are quite low. It does not perceive the opposition as a serious threat, but there are concerns that the Church, being an independent entity, could set in motion an opposition wave from outside of the standard political spectrum, because it currently has the highest ratings in Armenia.
The cases of Archbishop Bagrat and [Russian-Armenian billionaire] Samvel Karapetyan cannot not be political. Archbishop Bagrat positions himself as a person who is active in political affairs. There is political logic in his persecution, as in the conflict between the government and the Church in general.
After the 2018 revolution, new leaders gradually replaced the old ones in the executive, legislative and judicial branches, in the army and even in Nagorno-Karabakh. The Church remained the only institution not subordinate to the state, and the government has been clashing with it since 2018.
There is a year left before the next parliamentary election, and the approval ratings of the ruling party are quite low. It does not perceive the opposition as a serious threat, but there are concerns that the Church, being an independent entity, could set in motion an opposition wave from outside of the standard political spectrum, because it currently has the highest ratings in Armenia.
Protests in Yerevan against the terms of a ceasefire agreement with Azerbaijan. November 2020. Source: Wiki Commons
Would it not be better, in that case, for the government not to fight the Church, but to work with it?
This is how things were at the beginning. Overall, the political elites maintained restraint relative to the Church. But now we see more and more confrontational statements directed at the Church.
What do you expect in the 2026 parliamentary election?
The situation is very fluid. If the election were tomorrow, the government would get through it, albeit with losses.
This is how things were at the beginning. Overall, the political elites maintained restraint relative to the Church. But now we see more and more confrontational statements directed at the Church.
What do you expect in the 2026 parliamentary election?
The situation is very fluid. If the election were tomorrow, the government would get through it, albeit with losses.
“What competitors does Nikol Pashinyan have currently? There are none. But the ruling party itself has low approval ratings.”
Celebrations in Baku after the ceasefire agreement. November 2020. Source: Wiki Commons
This is a typical situation for Armenia: the country lived from 1992 to 2018 in an environment of low legitimacy for the government and for the opposition.
Then there was postrevolutionary euphoria, but now we have returned to the traditional dynamic. This system cannot be called stable in any case. We see how turbulent everything is.
How do you assess the state of Russia-Armenia relations?
There is a certain crisis in the relationship. It has been going on since 2020, starting after the so-called Second Karabakh War. This crisis is attributable mostly to the issue of security, which is now the main priority for Armenia. Official Yerevan believes the format of Russia-Armenia relations before 2020 did not pay off. Armenia did not receive security in the form it expected.
There was a defeat in the war, then in 2023 there was the deportation of Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh. We cannot ignore the start of the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022, which has changed Russia’s attitude to the post-Soviet space in general and to Armenia in particular.
This crisis should not be downplayed, as it affects the internal discourse in Armenia, like on Russia, and domestic politics. At the same time, it should not be exaggerated.
Of course, there is no break in relations. Armenia is still a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union, and there is still a Russian military base in Armenia. The problem is that all this is barely functional. Armenia is hardly involved in the running of the CSTO, does not finance its activities and does not go to meetings. The same is true of the Russian base – it is largely inoperative.
There are issues everywhere.
Then there was postrevolutionary euphoria, but now we have returned to the traditional dynamic. This system cannot be called stable in any case. We see how turbulent everything is.
How do you assess the state of Russia-Armenia relations?
There is a certain crisis in the relationship. It has been going on since 2020, starting after the so-called Second Karabakh War. This crisis is attributable mostly to the issue of security, which is now the main priority for Armenia. Official Yerevan believes the format of Russia-Armenia relations before 2020 did not pay off. Armenia did not receive security in the form it expected.
There was a defeat in the war, then in 2023 there was the deportation of Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh. We cannot ignore the start of the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022, which has changed Russia’s attitude to the post-Soviet space in general and to Armenia in particular.
This crisis should not be downplayed, as it affects the internal discourse in Armenia, like on Russia, and domestic politics. At the same time, it should not be exaggerated.
Of course, there is no break in relations. Armenia is still a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union, and there is still a Russian military base in Armenia. The problem is that all this is barely functional. Armenia is hardly involved in the running of the CSTO, does not finance its activities and does not go to meetings. The same is true of the Russian base – it is largely inoperative.
There are issues everywhere.
“Moscow and Yerevan share a basic understanding of how to have decent relations, but at the same time each side is constantly voicing dissatisfaction.”
In November 2020, because of the Second Karabakh War, part of the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh came under Azerbaijani control. In September 2023, the Azerbaijani army took over the entire region. In the course of two weeks, more than 100,000 Armenians fled – the entire population of the unrecognized Republic of Artsakh, which had ceased to exist by end-September. Baku declared that the Armenians could stay – but they would need to take Azerbaijani citizenship and go through a registration process.
The institutions that you have mentioned, that acted as a backstop to Russia-Armenia relations, at what point did they begin to degrade?
Perhaps, since 2020. There was an asymmetry between the expectations of the Armenian side and reality. In the Armenian public consciousness, the security of Armenia and the security of Nagorno-Karabakh were one: if Nagorno-Karabakh is attacked, then Armenia is attacked.
Armenian society sees the 2020 war as its own war and thinks that Russia, as a member of the CSTO, was supposed to provide general security [for Armenia].
In Moscow’s view, things were completely different: it had obligations to the Republic of Armenia, not to the Republic of Artsakh, meaning the security of Armenia and the security Nagorno-Karabakh were two separate issues.
But after 2020, the escalations actually took place on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border. There were requests for a reaction by the CSTO, which never materialized.
After 2020, more legal ambiguity arose with the trilateral statement signed by Pashinyan, Aliyev and Putin. Then 2023 happened, when, despite the presence of Russian peacekeepers and their obligations, legally nothing was done – even though Azerbaijan acted rather ruthlessly in relation to the Russian peacekeepers, six of whom died.
I think that were it not for 2022, there would not have been 2023 – Azerbaijan would not have dared to undertake this kind of operation.
In your view, has Russia’s role in the South Caucasus weakened?
Without a doubt.
The institutions that you have mentioned, that acted as a backstop to Russia-Armenia relations, at what point did they begin to degrade?
Perhaps, since 2020. There was an asymmetry between the expectations of the Armenian side and reality. In the Armenian public consciousness, the security of Armenia and the security of Nagorno-Karabakh were one: if Nagorno-Karabakh is attacked, then Armenia is attacked.
Armenian society sees the 2020 war as its own war and thinks that Russia, as a member of the CSTO, was supposed to provide general security [for Armenia].
In Moscow’s view, things were completely different: it had obligations to the Republic of Armenia, not to the Republic of Artsakh, meaning the security of Armenia and the security Nagorno-Karabakh were two separate issues.
But after 2020, the escalations actually took place on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border. There were requests for a reaction by the CSTO, which never materialized.
After 2020, more legal ambiguity arose with the trilateral statement signed by Pashinyan, Aliyev and Putin. Then 2023 happened, when, despite the presence of Russian peacekeepers and their obligations, legally nothing was done – even though Azerbaijan acted rather ruthlessly in relation to the Russian peacekeepers, six of whom died.
I think that were it not for 2022, there would not have been 2023 – Azerbaijan would not have dared to undertake this kind of operation.
In your view, has Russia’s role in the South Caucasus weakened?
Without a doubt.
“Figuratively speaking, Aliyev now has not one phone on his desk, but two. And the question is, which one is bigger and louder – the one to Moscow or the one to Ankara?”
Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh seeking refuge from attacks by the Azerbaijani army. September 2023. Source: Wiki Commons
Of course, it was Azerbaijan that fought in 2020, but it did so with the unconditional support of Turkey, and not just rhetorical, but real support – equipment and training. In the end, Russia’s ally lost, and Turkey’s ally won. How can this not weaken Russia’s position in terms of regional security?
In general, Azerbaijan is oriented less toward Moscow in the security sphere. Armenia is the same now too – for example, it buys weapons from the French and Indians, which is understandable considering that Russia itself needs weapons now. Previously, about 90% of weapons came from Russia, but since they are no longer available, other sources are sought.
After 2020, when there were clashes right on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border and Armenian towns such as Jermuk and Goris were shelled, Yerevan demanded the CSTO condemn Baku. The organization later stated that its responsibility was limited to Armenian sovereign territory within formal state borders, i.e., it is all a matter of delimitation and demarcation with Azerbaijan. How do you take this statement?
I take it with humor. The implication is: if the Azerbaijanis capture Yerevan, nothing will happen either, because the border has not been defined. And have all the countries that have bilateral agreements delimited and demarcated their borders? Our border with Georgia, with which we have excellent relations, is two thirds delimited; the process is ongoing. Georgia’s border with Azerbaijan is also not defined. Are all of Russia’s borders delimited and demarcated? Of course not.
Even the Azerbaijanis do not say Jermuk is part of Azerbaijan.
What then dictates the CSTO position?
Let’s understand what the CSTO is. Sometimes journalists compare it with NATO, which, in my view, reveals a complete lack of competence. Unlike NATO, the CSTO has one country that is larger than all the other members combined in all respects: territory, population, economy, military potential, nuclear weapons.
The US, of course, exceeds the capabilities of all other NATO members, but there are two more nuclear states (the UK and France), there are countries with powerful armies (Turkey and France) and so on. These organizations cannot be compared; they are structurally different.
If you think about what unites the CSTO countries, you come to the conclusion that there is practically nothing. What common threats, risks and interests do Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, Kyrgyzstan and Belarus have? So I would call the CSTO a wheel without a rim: there is a center from which the spokes diverge, let’s call them Moscow-Yerevan, Moscow-Minsk, Moscow-Bishkek, etc., but there is no rim to unite them. The CSTO is a framework, a format for relations with Russia.
In Armenia, the expectations [of support] were not from the CSTO, but from Russia. And Russia did not live up to these expectations.
Since 2023, the Armenian leadership has preferred the civilian EU monitoring mission to the mission proposed by the CSTO. Overall, Yerevan has been more actively building relations with Brussels in recent years. Is it fair to say that Armenia is turning away from Russia and toward the West?
I do not use such expressions in principle. It is as if we are in a store where Russia and Europe are on the shelf, you take one, but not the other. It does not happen like that. Armenia has always had relations with the EU: it participated in the European Neighborhood Policy, and there is an Armenia-EU Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement.
For decades, Armenia’s foreign policy concept has been based on “complementarity” – not to cut off, but to build ties to the extent possible, and to interact with all countries and actors. Even the current dialogue with the EU is called by the Armenian leadership diversification, not a turn or pivot.
It is unimaginable that Armenia would break off relations with Russia. What would take the place of Upper Lars? This is the border crossing between Georgia and Russia through which flows a huge portion of Armenian exports to Russia – one of the main consumers of Armenian agricultural products.
In general, Azerbaijan is oriented less toward Moscow in the security sphere. Armenia is the same now too – for example, it buys weapons from the French and Indians, which is understandable considering that Russia itself needs weapons now. Previously, about 90% of weapons came from Russia, but since they are no longer available, other sources are sought.
After 2020, when there were clashes right on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border and Armenian towns such as Jermuk and Goris were shelled, Yerevan demanded the CSTO condemn Baku. The organization later stated that its responsibility was limited to Armenian sovereign territory within formal state borders, i.e., it is all a matter of delimitation and demarcation with Azerbaijan. How do you take this statement?
I take it with humor. The implication is: if the Azerbaijanis capture Yerevan, nothing will happen either, because the border has not been defined. And have all the countries that have bilateral agreements delimited and demarcated their borders? Our border with Georgia, with which we have excellent relations, is two thirds delimited; the process is ongoing. Georgia’s border with Azerbaijan is also not defined. Are all of Russia’s borders delimited and demarcated? Of course not.
Even the Azerbaijanis do not say Jermuk is part of Azerbaijan.
What then dictates the CSTO position?
Let’s understand what the CSTO is. Sometimes journalists compare it with NATO, which, in my view, reveals a complete lack of competence. Unlike NATO, the CSTO has one country that is larger than all the other members combined in all respects: territory, population, economy, military potential, nuclear weapons.
The US, of course, exceeds the capabilities of all other NATO members, but there are two more nuclear states (the UK and France), there are countries with powerful armies (Turkey and France) and so on. These organizations cannot be compared; they are structurally different.
If you think about what unites the CSTO countries, you come to the conclusion that there is practically nothing. What common threats, risks and interests do Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, Kyrgyzstan and Belarus have? So I would call the CSTO a wheel without a rim: there is a center from which the spokes diverge, let’s call them Moscow-Yerevan, Moscow-Minsk, Moscow-Bishkek, etc., but there is no rim to unite them. The CSTO is a framework, a format for relations with Russia.
In Armenia, the expectations [of support] were not from the CSTO, but from Russia. And Russia did not live up to these expectations.
Since 2023, the Armenian leadership has preferred the civilian EU monitoring mission to the mission proposed by the CSTO. Overall, Yerevan has been more actively building relations with Brussels in recent years. Is it fair to say that Armenia is turning away from Russia and toward the West?
I do not use such expressions in principle. It is as if we are in a store where Russia and Europe are on the shelf, you take one, but not the other. It does not happen like that. Armenia has always had relations with the EU: it participated in the European Neighborhood Policy, and there is an Armenia-EU Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement.
For decades, Armenia’s foreign policy concept has been based on “complementarity” – not to cut off, but to build ties to the extent possible, and to interact with all countries and actors. Even the current dialogue with the EU is called by the Armenian leadership diversification, not a turn or pivot.
It is unimaginable that Armenia would break off relations with Russia. What would take the place of Upper Lars? This is the border crossing between Georgia and Russia through which flows a huge portion of Armenian exports to Russia – one of the main consumers of Armenian agricultural products.
“Still, when you need weapons and you cannot get them from Russia, you go to India and France, forget geography.”
Negotiations for a visa-free regime with the EU represent a wonderful prospect for Armenian citizens, who would be able to travel to Europe much easier. We also have relations with Iran – this is 30% of our exports and imports. And we have excellent relations with Georgia. So to improve Russia-Armenia relations, you surely do not need to worsen Europe-Armenia relations.
You mentioned the EU monitoring mission in Armenia. It is about 200 unarmed people who go along the border, record what is happening there and report back to Brussels. These are classified reports, and neither Yerevan nor Baku knows what is in them.
Then why does Armenia need this mission?
Since it started, the number of incidents involving weapons on the border has sharply decreased. Even though Azerbaijan was against the mission and has not allowed it on Azerbaijani territory, Baku seems to consider it important that Brussels knows who is shooting. The importance of the EU mission should not be exaggerated, nor should it be perceived as a way of ensuring security. It would be quite right to see it as one of the mechanisms in action to stop people from dying in the border areas.
This year, Armenia passed a law enshrining its aspirations for EU membership. Why?
Let’s be real: no such laws can influence the entry of countries into the EU in principle. There are the Copenhagen criteria that must be met to begin accession negotiations. This law is about domestic politics, not foreign policy.
Is there a big demand in Armenian society to join the EU?
Yes. Generally speaking, people live by myths. The current one is that the West will help us.
And the Armenian leadership reinforces this myth?
For sure. Because the Armenian leadership needs to be reelected. If there is an idea that is supported by the majority of the country, then why not use it?
Given Russia’s strained relations with the EU, this rhetoric is bound to irritate the Russian leadership.
I do not think so. Everyone understands things perfectly well there.
So, in your view, Moscow does not feel like it is losing a partner?
You used the right word – “irritation.” There is probably irritation.
This year, Armenia and Azerbaijan simultaneously declared that a peace agreement was ready to be signed. What do you know about its content? What sort of document has been agreed to?
None. I do not think we are talking about signing a document. The devil is in the details. It was reported the agreement has 17 points, and we know there are Azerbaijani demands that are not included in the document – some other postulates need to be agreed on before signing. Judging by how the process is going, there is no prospect of signing.
Theoretically, I can imagine how Azerbaijan would need and benefit from an agreement with Armenia. But this will not lead to peace, because peace and a peace agreement, peace and the absence of war are different things. If something is signed, it will most likely be some kind of memorandum. Azerbaijan does not need peace – it needs a weak Armenia.
You mentioned the EU monitoring mission in Armenia. It is about 200 unarmed people who go along the border, record what is happening there and report back to Brussels. These are classified reports, and neither Yerevan nor Baku knows what is in them.
Then why does Armenia need this mission?
Since it started, the number of incidents involving weapons on the border has sharply decreased. Even though Azerbaijan was against the mission and has not allowed it on Azerbaijani territory, Baku seems to consider it important that Brussels knows who is shooting. The importance of the EU mission should not be exaggerated, nor should it be perceived as a way of ensuring security. It would be quite right to see it as one of the mechanisms in action to stop people from dying in the border areas.
This year, Armenia passed a law enshrining its aspirations for EU membership. Why?
Let’s be real: no such laws can influence the entry of countries into the EU in principle. There are the Copenhagen criteria that must be met to begin accession negotiations. This law is about domestic politics, not foreign policy.
Is there a big demand in Armenian society to join the EU?
Yes. Generally speaking, people live by myths. The current one is that the West will help us.
And the Armenian leadership reinforces this myth?
For sure. Because the Armenian leadership needs to be reelected. If there is an idea that is supported by the majority of the country, then why not use it?
Given Russia’s strained relations with the EU, this rhetoric is bound to irritate the Russian leadership.
I do not think so. Everyone understands things perfectly well there.
So, in your view, Moscow does not feel like it is losing a partner?
You used the right word – “irritation.” There is probably irritation.
This year, Armenia and Azerbaijan simultaneously declared that a peace agreement was ready to be signed. What do you know about its content? What sort of document has been agreed to?
None. I do not think we are talking about signing a document. The devil is in the details. It was reported the agreement has 17 points, and we know there are Azerbaijani demands that are not included in the document – some other postulates need to be agreed on before signing. Judging by how the process is going, there is no prospect of signing.
Theoretically, I can imagine how Azerbaijan would need and benefit from an agreement with Armenia. But this will not lead to peace, because peace and a peace agreement, peace and the absence of war are different things. If something is signed, it will most likely be some kind of memorandum. Azerbaijan does not need peace – it needs a weak Armenia.
“Yerevan’s motivation for peace is clear: we are weaker than Azerbaijan, the military mechanism for ensuring security does not work, and Azerbaijan, meanwhile, continues to arm itself, its army is stronger.”
Pashinyan and Erdogan meeting at the UN General Assembly. June 2025. Source: Primeminister.am
So security by force of arms must be replaced by a political form of security – an agreement that would remove the risks. The logic is shaky, but understandable.
Now Baku’s logic: there is no one in Azerbaijan who thinks the Armenians will attack and take Nagorno-Karabakh. And if there are no risks, then why make peace? So peace is not an end, but a means of pressure by putting forward new demands, which can go on indefinitely.
Pashinyan has made several concessions to Azerbaijan and Turkey: he has agreed to recognize Azerbaijani sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh and said that international recognition of the Armenian genocide in the Ottoman Empire was no longer a top priority for Yerevan. How do you assess this policy of concessions and how are voters reacting to it?
We will see how voters react in a year in the parliamentary election. But in general, the country does not like it. How do I feel about it? You do not have to be a rocket scientist to see that such a policy does not produce results. It is impossible to achieve greater security through concessions; they lead to less power (resurs), not more.
The idea that you give something away and then a red line appears where the other side stops and will not push any further is, in my view, flawed. The red line will not stop moving. So this strategy does not work, and I think such a policy is wrong.
What could be an alternative policy?
Who told you there is an alternative? Maybe theoretically, but hardly in reality. What is needed is an increase in agency, a strengthening of state institutions, a strengthening of security, to work with various allies so political forms of security are strengthened alongside military ones, and to reform both the army and the bureaucracy. In other words, to acquire more power (resurs). I am not saying this is not being done at all, but not enough is being done.
Now Baku’s logic: there is no one in Azerbaijan who thinks the Armenians will attack and take Nagorno-Karabakh. And if there are no risks, then why make peace? So peace is not an end, but a means of pressure by putting forward new demands, which can go on indefinitely.
Pashinyan has made several concessions to Azerbaijan and Turkey: he has agreed to recognize Azerbaijani sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh and said that international recognition of the Armenian genocide in the Ottoman Empire was no longer a top priority for Yerevan. How do you assess this policy of concessions and how are voters reacting to it?
We will see how voters react in a year in the parliamentary election. But in general, the country does not like it. How do I feel about it? You do not have to be a rocket scientist to see that such a policy does not produce results. It is impossible to achieve greater security through concessions; they lead to less power (resurs), not more.
The idea that you give something away and then a red line appears where the other side stops and will not push any further is, in my view, flawed. The red line will not stop moving. So this strategy does not work, and I think such a policy is wrong.
What could be an alternative policy?
Who told you there is an alternative? Maybe theoretically, but hardly in reality. What is needed is an increase in agency, a strengthening of state institutions, a strengthening of security, to work with various allies so political forms of security are strengthened alongside military ones, and to reform both the army and the bureaucracy. In other words, to acquire more power (resurs). I am not saying this is not being done at all, but not enough is being done.
Share this article
Read More
