Russia's Arctic strategy has long been a subject of interest due to the region's significant contributions to the country's GDP and exports. Despite housing only 1.3% of Russia's population, the Arctic generates 10-15% of the national GDP and 25% of exports, a share expected to grow. The Arctic is also crucial for Russia's natural resource extraction, with the region accounting for 80% of its natural gas and 17% of its oil production in 2020.

Estimates suggest that Russia's Arctic continental shelf holds over 85 trillion cubic meters of undiscovered natural gas and 17.3 billion tons of oil, representing a significant portion of the country's untapped hydrocarbons.

Given the Arctic's importance to Russia's economy and its role in financing the war in Ukraine, the region has been a target of Western sanctions. In response, Russia has sought to diversify its partnerships, moving beyond European clients and investors. After the annexation of Crimea in 2014, China emerged as Russia's preferred Arctic partner.

However, this shift was not solely due to political alignment but also pressure from Russian energy conglomerates like Rosneft, which anticipated declining demand in European markets and sought to capitalize on East Asian growth.

China's involvement in the Arctic grew significantly after its admission to the Arctic Council as an observer in 2013. This cooperation deepened following the Crimea annexation, with announcements of substantial Chinese investments in Russian Arctic energy projects and port infrastructure. By 2018, China sought to establish itself as a ‘near-Arctic state,’bolstering its ambitions with material investments in the region.

However, the narrative of a Sino-Russian Arctic alliance is overly simplistic. The relationship has been more of a tacit regional entente, with clear limitations. This was evident when Western sanctions led to a reduction in Chinese investments in the Russian Arctic post-2022, with Chinese companies hesitant to fill the void left by Western investors due to fears of secondary U.S. sanctions and a reassessment of political risks.

Countries like India and Turkey have become new markets for Arctic oil and gas, while the UAE, Azerbaijan, Vietnam, and other non-Arctic states have engaged in scientific and logistical cooperation.

As Russia navigates this complex landscape, it continues to pivot away from the West while maintaining its strategic ties with China and opening the Arctic to a wider range of international partners. This multifaceted approach underscores the evolving dynamics of Arctic geopolitics and highlights the need for continued scrutiny of Russia's strategy in the region.

India, in particular, has emerged as a key partner in Russia's Arctic strategy. As the world's third-largest consumer of hydrocarbons, India's demand is expected to grow until 2050, making it an attractive market for Russian Arctic resources. The relationship between Russia and India in the Arctic is not limited to energy cooperation. India faces significant challenges in food security and water supply due to climate change, which has led to discussions about using Russian Arctic lands for agriculture. Talks have been ongoing since 2019 about implementing special migration regimes to send Indian laborers to the Russian Far East and Arctic for food production, making use of potentially arable Arctic lands.

This shift has not only economic but also symbolic implications, as Russia seeks to broaden its Arctic partnerships and leverage its relationships with India and China to extract concessions from Western Arctic states. For example, Russia has been less receptive than expected to efforts by Norway, which currently holds the rotating Arctic Council presidency, to cautiously resume some cooperation among the Arctic states. In contrast, Russia has been uncharacteristically enthusiastic about the participation of non-Arctic states, especially India, in regional affairs.