SOCIETY
‘Traditional Values’ for
Russian Young
Russian Young
October 1, 2024
-
Ella RossmanSchool of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London
PhD candidate Ella Rossman outlines the new “Family Studies” course in Russian schools, which marks the first successful attempt in the history of post-Soviet Russia to introduce a school subject on the family and traditional values nationwide. Interestingly, the curriculum avoids discussion of sexual life and sexuality.
Vladimir Putin at the first-day "Conversation about Important Things" class, September 1, 2023. Source: Kremlin.ru
In August, the Institute for Strategy of Education Development, subordinate to the Ministry of Science and Higher Education, released a so-called working program for the course “Family Studies” (semyevedeniye). Starting this academic year, it will be taught to Russian secondary school students in grades five through nine, targeting children aged 11-15. It is coeducational, with both boys and girls studying together. A similar course will also be set up in high schools (grades ten and eleven), but its curriculum has yet to be published.
Officially, Family Studies is considered an extracurricular activity, meaning that, technically, it is not mandatory – according to Articles 34 and 44 of the Federal Law on Education, schools and parents have the discretion to decide whether students should attend extracurricular activities.
Nevertheless, a 2015 letter from the Ministry of Science and Higher Education emphasized that such activities should be considered a vital component of the core curriculum. In practice, some schools tend to treat such ideological subjects as mandatory. The experience with the technically optional “Conversations about Important Things” (Russia.Post wrote about it here) showed that administrators and teachers can disregard legal regulations, penalizing students for skipping and pressuring parents who try to take their children out of such events.
Indoctrination and gender in Russian education
“Patriotic” indoctrination had been working its way into Russian education since the intensification of authoritarian tendencies in the country in the early 2010s, permeating primary, secondary and higher education, even reaching kindergartens. The practice has intensified since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
State-controlled programs and organizations are supposed to spread among children and young people core values like fervent militaristic patriotism, devotion to the state and the Orthodox church, a belief in Russia’s unique cultural and spiritual path, and strong anti-Western sentiment, with the West to be seen as hostile to Russian traditions and intent on their destruction.
Officially, Family Studies is considered an extracurricular activity, meaning that, technically, it is not mandatory – according to Articles 34 and 44 of the Federal Law on Education, schools and parents have the discretion to decide whether students should attend extracurricular activities.
Nevertheless, a 2015 letter from the Ministry of Science and Higher Education emphasized that such activities should be considered a vital component of the core curriculum. In practice, some schools tend to treat such ideological subjects as mandatory. The experience with the technically optional “Conversations about Important Things” (Russia.Post wrote about it here) showed that administrators and teachers can disregard legal regulations, penalizing students for skipping and pressuring parents who try to take their children out of such events.
Indoctrination and gender in Russian education
“Patriotic” indoctrination had been working its way into Russian education since the intensification of authoritarian tendencies in the country in the early 2010s, permeating primary, secondary and higher education, even reaching kindergartens. The practice has intensified since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
State-controlled programs and organizations are supposed to spread among children and young people core values like fervent militaristic patriotism, devotion to the state and the Orthodox church, a belief in Russia’s unique cultural and spiritual path, and strong anti-Western sentiment, with the West to be seen as hostile to Russian traditions and intent on their destruction.
“A neo-traditional ideology on gender and sexuality has increasingly influenced school curricula, leading in the late 2010s to the first attempts to establish a somewhat traditionalist version of sex education.”
The first awarding of the honorary title "mother heroine" in the USSR. October 27, 1944. Source: VK
In post-Soviet Russia, sex education has a complicated history, marked by a rollercoaster of shifting attitudes and intense debates, sometimes veering into moral panic. Nevertheless, various forms of sex education have existed in Russian schools since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The turn to “traditional values” at the state level in the 2010s led to more systematic indoctrination into schools. For a long time, this turn did not mean any formal and centralized version of teaching these values to Russian children, however.
The situation has changed drastically just in the last few years. In 2021, topics related to family values were added to the curriculum for “Social Science,” which is a mandatory secondary school course. In the same year, some Russian schools also introduced an experimental subject, “Moral Foundations of Family Life,” based on a textbook written by priest Dmitri Moiseev and nun Nina Krygina.
In November 2023, Nina Ostanina, chair of the Duma Committee on Family Protection, Fatherhood, Motherhood and Childhood, announced the introduction of the centralized course on family matters for the 2024/25 academic year, developed by a working group led by United Russia Duma Deputy Tatyana Larionova. This is the first successful attempt to establish a nationwide subject focused on family and traditional values in the history of post-Soviet Russia.
Highlights of the Family Studies program
The program, published by the Institute for Strategy of Education Development, offers a mix of ideological cliches and practical advice.
Its objectives align closely with “traditional values,” which are frequently mentioned throughout the text, written in dense bureaucratic language. It seeks to “form in the younger generation a commitment to traditional Russian spiritual and moral values,” such as “the value of a strong family with many children,” described as “the cornerstone of civic identity.”
The program advocates fostering a “healthy family atmosphere” and “conflict-free relationships” at home and school. It addresses the “demographic problems of the Russian Federation,” claiming that the values promoted in the course will help solve them by encouraging young people to create families and give birth to more children.
Three cornerstone values promoted in it are “marriage” (brachnost’), “having many children” (mnogodetnost’) and “chastity” (tselomudriye).
In line with state documents, as well as Vladimir Putin’s repeatedly made statements, the program emphasizes the importance of developing a single “civic and social identity as citizens of Russia,” as well as Russia as a “multicultural” and “multi-confessional” society, meaning classroom discussions should include regional differences and local customs.
The authors rely on modern pedagogical trends and active learning strategies, such as discussions and collaborative digital encyclopedia projects. Nevertheless, they are combined with Soviet-style indoctrination, an authoritative teaching style and a hierarchical classroom structure.
Besides the ideological aspects, the program includes significant sections on practical matters, such as family finances (e.g., budgeting, borrowing and investing) and legal issues (e.g., the Constitution, Family Code and commissioner for children’s rights).
It also covers state support for families, including family capital, preferential mortgages and the Stalin-era “mother heroine” award – the honorary title introduced in 1944 for women raising 10 or more children, which was abandoned after the collapse of the Soviet Union and reintroduced by presidential decree in August 2022. The preferential mortgage program for families with small children was, however, limited in the summer of 2024, as Russian banks struggled to afford it. So, it seems that the Family Studies curriculum will have been revised before even being implemented.
The turn to “traditional values” at the state level in the 2010s led to more systematic indoctrination into schools. For a long time, this turn did not mean any formal and centralized version of teaching these values to Russian children, however.
The situation has changed drastically just in the last few years. In 2021, topics related to family values were added to the curriculum for “Social Science,” which is a mandatory secondary school course. In the same year, some Russian schools also introduced an experimental subject, “Moral Foundations of Family Life,” based on a textbook written by priest Dmitri Moiseev and nun Nina Krygina.
In November 2023, Nina Ostanina, chair of the Duma Committee on Family Protection, Fatherhood, Motherhood and Childhood, announced the introduction of the centralized course on family matters for the 2024/25 academic year, developed by a working group led by United Russia Duma Deputy Tatyana Larionova. This is the first successful attempt to establish a nationwide subject focused on family and traditional values in the history of post-Soviet Russia.
Highlights of the Family Studies program
The program, published by the Institute for Strategy of Education Development, offers a mix of ideological cliches and practical advice.
Its objectives align closely with “traditional values,” which are frequently mentioned throughout the text, written in dense bureaucratic language. It seeks to “form in the younger generation a commitment to traditional Russian spiritual and moral values,” such as “the value of a strong family with many children,” described as “the cornerstone of civic identity.”
The program advocates fostering a “healthy family atmosphere” and “conflict-free relationships” at home and school. It addresses the “demographic problems of the Russian Federation,” claiming that the values promoted in the course will help solve them by encouraging young people to create families and give birth to more children.
Three cornerstone values promoted in it are “marriage” (brachnost’), “having many children” (mnogodetnost’) and “chastity” (tselomudriye).
In line with state documents, as well as Vladimir Putin’s repeatedly made statements, the program emphasizes the importance of developing a single “civic and social identity as citizens of Russia,” as well as Russia as a “multicultural” and “multi-confessional” society, meaning classroom discussions should include regional differences and local customs.
The authors rely on modern pedagogical trends and active learning strategies, such as discussions and collaborative digital encyclopedia projects. Nevertheless, they are combined with Soviet-style indoctrination, an authoritative teaching style and a hierarchical classroom structure.
Besides the ideological aspects, the program includes significant sections on practical matters, such as family finances (e.g., budgeting, borrowing and investing) and legal issues (e.g., the Constitution, Family Code and commissioner for children’s rights).
It also covers state support for families, including family capital, preferential mortgages and the Stalin-era “mother heroine” award – the honorary title introduced in 1944 for women raising 10 or more children, which was abandoned after the collapse of the Soviet Union and reintroduced by presidential decree in August 2022. The preferential mortgage program for families with small children was, however, limited in the summer of 2024, as Russian banks struggled to afford it. So, it seems that the Family Studies curriculum will have been revised before even being implemented.
“For a course that bills itself as being primarily about values, Family Studies devotes a surprising amount of attention to family property transactions and inheritance rights.”
By decree of President Putin, a woman from Voronezh Region was named a "mother heroine" in July 2024. Laureates are entitled to a one-time one-million-ruble prize. Many dozens of women have been awarded the title since its reintroduction in 2022. Source: VK
Interestingly, it champions the “equal rights of husband and wife in financial decision-making” and seeks to enlighten children on the historical shifts in family dynamics, weaving in a somewhat feminist perspective. Meanwhile, the course does not discuss sexual life and sexuality in any way.
Neo-traditionalism or a return to late-Soviet gender ideology?
The program bears a strong resemblance to the Soviet-era sex education curriculum, “Ethics and Psychology of Family Life,” which was introduced in secondary schools in the 1980s as a mandatory subject. Developed mainly by pedagogical specialists, the curriculum diverged from the approaches of Soviet doctors and sociologists, who had been attempting to create their own version of sex education since the 1960s.
Late-Soviet specialists in pedagogy, as well as school education officials, were primarily concerned with “communist morality,” so the course they created focused less on sexuality and health and more on ideological principles and values, including promotion of early marriage and large families. The teachers’ guide for the course recommended drawing on classic Russian and Soviet literature to address these topics and downplayed biological and medical aspects in favor of moral education.
Much like its Soviet predecessor, Family Studies takes a historical, literary and pedagogical approach to family issues rather than focusing on the body and sexuality. Thirty-four academic hours are allocated for the whole course, just like Ethics and Psychology of Family Life.
The new program retains elements of Soviet official language on gender equality, discussing topics such as “equality of spouses in family life,” together with the more traditional stance on the roles of men and women in the family. It even refers to the family as “the basic unit of society,” echoing Friedrich Engels’ definition that was commonly used in Soviet ideological texts, albeit without mentioning his name. It emphasizes the family’s core role within the state – an idea central to Soviet ideology from the 1930s.
The new Russian course diverges from its Soviet counterpart by placing a much stronger emphasis on the “multigenerational family” (mnogopokolennaya semya) and family lineage. Students are now encouraged to explore their genealogy and traditions passed down through generations. The focus on the material and financial aspects of family life also marks a shift from the Soviet model.
Neo-traditionalism or a return to late-Soviet gender ideology?
The program bears a strong resemblance to the Soviet-era sex education curriculum, “Ethics and Psychology of Family Life,” which was introduced in secondary schools in the 1980s as a mandatory subject. Developed mainly by pedagogical specialists, the curriculum diverged from the approaches of Soviet doctors and sociologists, who had been attempting to create their own version of sex education since the 1960s.
Late-Soviet specialists in pedagogy, as well as school education officials, were primarily concerned with “communist morality,” so the course they created focused less on sexuality and health and more on ideological principles and values, including promotion of early marriage and large families. The teachers’ guide for the course recommended drawing on classic Russian and Soviet literature to address these topics and downplayed biological and medical aspects in favor of moral education.
Much like its Soviet predecessor, Family Studies takes a historical, literary and pedagogical approach to family issues rather than focusing on the body and sexuality. Thirty-four academic hours are allocated for the whole course, just like Ethics and Psychology of Family Life.
The new program retains elements of Soviet official language on gender equality, discussing topics such as “equality of spouses in family life,” together with the more traditional stance on the roles of men and women in the family. It even refers to the family as “the basic unit of society,” echoing Friedrich Engels’ definition that was commonly used in Soviet ideological texts, albeit without mentioning his name. It emphasizes the family’s core role within the state – an idea central to Soviet ideology from the 1930s.
The new Russian course diverges from its Soviet counterpart by placing a much stronger emphasis on the “multigenerational family” (mnogopokolennaya semya) and family lineage. Students are now encouraged to explore their genealogy and traditions passed down through generations. The focus on the material and financial aspects of family life also marks a shift from the Soviet model.
“The course thus presents a blend of Bolshevik idea on gender equality, the late-Soviet approach to sex education and neo-traditional rhetoric.”
How the course will be implemented
For several reasons, the way the course is put into practice will vary. In November 2023, Ostanina announced the upcoming publication of a single Family Studies textbook for classes, though it has yet to be released. For now, teachers have to rely on a “working program,” which, much like the Soviet methodological recommendations for Ethics and Psychology of Family Life, is generic and leaves many decisions up to the teacher and school.
Some Russian teachers have already commented that their schools decided to ignore the course: though it is listed on the official schedule, no actual classes are being held. For those who will teach the class, implicitly embedded in the program are ways to shift from vague ideological cliches to more concrete, practical issues related to finance and material well-being, or, on the contrary, more abstract discussions about history of family structures and the representation of families in literature and the arts.
The ideological component of the new course remains obscure and outdated. Their peers who took Ethics and Psychology of Family Life in the 1980s recall that even in the ideologically controlled Soviet environment, students largely ignored or made fun of its content. Even amid intensifying internet censorship, today’s teenagers have access to a broader range of perspectives on sexuality and family life. In this context, it’s hard to see how the new Family Studies course will affect Russian students’ worldview and life choices.
For several reasons, the way the course is put into practice will vary. In November 2023, Ostanina announced the upcoming publication of a single Family Studies textbook for classes, though it has yet to be released. For now, teachers have to rely on a “working program,” which, much like the Soviet methodological recommendations for Ethics and Psychology of Family Life, is generic and leaves many decisions up to the teacher and school.
Some Russian teachers have already commented that their schools decided to ignore the course: though it is listed on the official schedule, no actual classes are being held. For those who will teach the class, implicitly embedded in the program are ways to shift from vague ideological cliches to more concrete, practical issues related to finance and material well-being, or, on the contrary, more abstract discussions about history of family structures and the representation of families in literature and the arts.
The ideological component of the new course remains obscure and outdated. Their peers who took Ethics and Psychology of Family Life in the 1980s recall that even in the ideologically controlled Soviet environment, students largely ignored or made fun of its content. Even amid intensifying internet censorship, today’s teenagers have access to a broader range of perspectives on sexuality and family life. In this context, it’s hard to see how the new Family Studies course will affect Russian students’ worldview and life choices.
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