SOCIETY
Maximal Control: Inside Russia’s New State-Backed Messenger
August 5, 2025
- Yuriy Marin
Digital Media Producer and Journalist
Journalist Yuriy Marin examines the recent effort to create an entirely new messenger in Russia. The Kremlin, he argues, intends it to be a pillar of Russia’s digital sovereignty.
In July, Russian officials and pro-government media announced the imminent blocking of WhatsApp, one of the few Western digital services that had until now operated with relative freedom in the country. The main public advocate of the proposed ban was Duma MP Anton Gorelkin, who also chairs the board of the Regional Public Center for Internet Technologies. In mid-July, he said that WhatsApp should prepare to exit the Russian market. He was supported by fellow MP Alexei Nemkin, who argued that WhatsApp’s presence in Russia’s digital space posed a threat to national security.
At the same time, WhatsApp itself has not given any discernible reason for this sudden shift in the official position toward it. Its parent company, the US-based Meta, was declared an “extremist” organization by a Russian court back in 2022. Following the ruling, both Facebook and Instagram were blocked in Russia, but the decision did not extend to WhatsApp. In fact, during the court proceedings, a representative of the Prosecutor General’s Office explicitly stated that WhatsApp would not be affected.
At the same time, WhatsApp itself has not given any discernible reason for this sudden shift in the official position toward it. Its parent company, the US-based Meta, was declared an “extremist” organization by a Russian court back in 2022. Following the ruling, both Facebook and Instagram were blocked in Russia, but the decision did not extend to WhatsApp. In fact, during the court proceedings, a representative of the Prosecutor General’s Office explicitly stated that WhatsApp would not be affected.
Valya Karnaval, a Russian video blogger and TikTok personality, advertising the new Russian messenger Max. The lines read: “I’m shocked. With Max, calls feel like real-life conversations — perfect connection even on the move and in the elevator.” Source: Telegram
The crucial context was the passage of a bill in June on creating a national messenger, as well as the government’s designation of VK Group as the operator of the messenger. Max, the company’s app, largely replicates WhatsApp’s functionality.
Immediately afterward, a sweeping promotional campaign for Max was launched. Prominent Russian influencers and celebrities, including figure skater Kamila Valieva, took part, highlighting the app’s features and encouraging the public to install it. By end-June, VK Group reported that Max had surpassed one million registered users.
All this even though there has been an alternative – Telegram. Popular among Russians and unaffiliated with US tech firms, Telegram has long been a major phenomenon both in Russia and globally.
A dangerous balance
Telegram occupies a singular position in Russia’s digital landscape. The service established itself as a platform free from government control during the highly publicized takeover of the VKontakte social network by pro-Kremlin businessman Alisher Usmanov and again during Roskomnadzor’s failed attempt to block Telegram between 2018 and 2020. In response to the latter, the Telegram team implemented proxy server technology that allowed users to bypass blocks via major cloud providers like Google, Amazon and Microsoft. When the authorities tried to restrict access by blocking IP addresses, they inadvertently disrupted critical infrastructure, including payment terminals.
Immediately afterward, a sweeping promotional campaign for Max was launched. Prominent Russian influencers and celebrities, including figure skater Kamila Valieva, took part, highlighting the app’s features and encouraging the public to install it. By end-June, VK Group reported that Max had surpassed one million registered users.
All this even though there has been an alternative – Telegram. Popular among Russians and unaffiliated with US tech firms, Telegram has long been a major phenomenon both in Russia and globally.
A dangerous balance
Telegram occupies a singular position in Russia’s digital landscape. The service established itself as a platform free from government control during the highly publicized takeover of the VKontakte social network by pro-Kremlin businessman Alisher Usmanov and again during Roskomnadzor’s failed attempt to block Telegram between 2018 and 2020. In response to the latter, the Telegram team implemented proxy server technology that allowed users to bypass blocks via major cloud providers like Google, Amazon and Microsoft. When the authorities tried to restrict access by blocking IP addresses, they inadvertently disrupted critical infrastructure, including payment terminals.
“Already at that time, however, the writing was on the wall that one day the Kremlin would find a way to shut down Telegram, and the Telegram leadership preferred to cut a deal. Since then, the messenger has operated without restrictions.”
Pavel Durov, a co-founder of the Telegram messaging service and the social network VK, was arrested in France on 24 August 2024 . He was barred from leaving France, and was placed under judicial supervision.Starting in July, he was permitted to leave France for up to two weeks at a time. Source: Wiki Commons
On the one hand, Telegram has become one of the primary tools for circumventing censorship in Russia. On the other hand, it is now deeply embedded in official communications: government agencies, law enforcement, state media and even regional governors all use the platform.
Though Telegram’s founder Pavel Durov publicly denies any ties to Russia, he remains strongly associated with the country, while also being part of the global tech elite.
This balance was upended in summer 2024. Durov was detained at the Nice airport and held in custody for several days. The official reason given was his refusal to cooperate with French law enforcement in investigations related to extremism and illegal content. In a later interview, however, Durov claimed that French intelligence had pressured him to cooperate in order to censor “conservative voices in Romania.”
Following the incident, Telegram began to change. In several countries, sensitive features were disabled, moderation policies tightened and the complaint handling system beefed up. Reports emerged indicating that some user data had been shared in response to requests from European authorities.
These events were cause for concern in the Kremlin. If Durov could be pressured in Paris, it stood to reason that Telegram, previously seen as at least a neutral player in the Russian communications ecosystem, could be turned into a hostile one. Given the app’s significant role in shaping public discourse in Russia, officials likely viewed this as a direct threat to Russia’s digital sovereignty.
Just six days after Durov’s arrest, a new company was registered: OOO Mnogo soobshcheniy (“Many Messages”). This is where Max, the new state-backed messaging service, comes from.
What should a national messenger look like?
Still, the dispute between Telegram’s founder and the French government was merely an additional pretext for a long-awaited move: blocking WhatsApp in Russia. Whereas previously Durov’s platform was seen as a natural substitute for Meta’s messenger, now from the Kremlin’s standpoint, an acceptable level of information security could be achieved only through a fully controlled product.
Over the course of the three and a half years of escalating confrontation with the West amid the war in Ukraine, the Kremlin has succeeded in driving out most foreign internet services. In addition to Facebook and Instagram, access to X (formerly Twitter), Viber and Google’s AdSense online advertising platform, among many others, has been restricted. The most recent high-profile target was YouTube, another Google company.
Though Telegram’s founder Pavel Durov publicly denies any ties to Russia, he remains strongly associated with the country, while also being part of the global tech elite.
This balance was upended in summer 2024. Durov was detained at the Nice airport and held in custody for several days. The official reason given was his refusal to cooperate with French law enforcement in investigations related to extremism and illegal content. In a later interview, however, Durov claimed that French intelligence had pressured him to cooperate in order to censor “conservative voices in Romania.”
Following the incident, Telegram began to change. In several countries, sensitive features were disabled, moderation policies tightened and the complaint handling system beefed up. Reports emerged indicating that some user data had been shared in response to requests from European authorities.
These events were cause for concern in the Kremlin. If Durov could be pressured in Paris, it stood to reason that Telegram, previously seen as at least a neutral player in the Russian communications ecosystem, could be turned into a hostile one. Given the app’s significant role in shaping public discourse in Russia, officials likely viewed this as a direct threat to Russia’s digital sovereignty.
Just six days after Durov’s arrest, a new company was registered: OOO Mnogo soobshcheniy (“Many Messages”). This is where Max, the new state-backed messaging service, comes from.
What should a national messenger look like?
Still, the dispute between Telegram’s founder and the French government was merely an additional pretext for a long-awaited move: blocking WhatsApp in Russia. Whereas previously Durov’s platform was seen as a natural substitute for Meta’s messenger, now from the Kremlin’s standpoint, an acceptable level of information security could be achieved only through a fully controlled product.
Over the course of the three and a half years of escalating confrontation with the West amid the war in Ukraine, the Kremlin has succeeded in driving out most foreign internet services. In addition to Facebook and Instagram, access to X (formerly Twitter), Viber and Google’s AdSense online advertising platform, among many others, has been restricted. The most recent high-profile target was YouTube, another Google company.
“At the same time, government agencies have taken a measured approach to implementing these restrictions by first offering Russians a domestic alternative. This is the template being used to replace WhatsApp with Max.”
WhatsApp is used by approximately 80% of the population in Russia, which makes it the country’s most popular messenger. It is particularly beloved by older Russians, who appreciate its group chat feature.
The app has become the default tool for communication among residents of small towns and apartment blocks, parent-teacher groups, ethnic communities and more. These groups can be quite large and, because they are not public, are largely unreachable for Russian authorities, who seek to exert maximum control over the information landscape. Ironically, it is this audience that forms the backbone of the regime’s support.
The national messenger bill passed in summer 2025 lays out requirements that go far beyond those of a typical messaging app. For example, it mandates user identification, integration with Russia’s state services portal and age verification.
Max is ambitiously intended to become an integral part of Russia’s digital ecosystem –all communication functions should run through it, from personal messaging to interactions with state institutions.
This vision aligns Russia with the Chinese experience. There, WeChat is not just a means of communication but a high-level mobile operating system, with its own app marketplace and embedded financial functionality. Perhaps it is no coincidence that advertisements for Max have highlighted its money transfer function using the Russian Central Bank’s Faster Payments System (SBP).
Thus, Max is positioned as a tool for redrawing the boundaries of Russian users’ digital autonomy.
The app has become the default tool for communication among residents of small towns and apartment blocks, parent-teacher groups, ethnic communities and more. These groups can be quite large and, because they are not public, are largely unreachable for Russian authorities, who seek to exert maximum control over the information landscape. Ironically, it is this audience that forms the backbone of the regime’s support.
The national messenger bill passed in summer 2025 lays out requirements that go far beyond those of a typical messaging app. For example, it mandates user identification, integration with Russia’s state services portal and age verification.
Max is ambitiously intended to become an integral part of Russia’s digital ecosystem –all communication functions should run through it, from personal messaging to interactions with state institutions.
This vision aligns Russia with the Chinese experience. There, WeChat is not just a means of communication but a high-level mobile operating system, with its own app marketplace and embedded financial functionality. Perhaps it is no coincidence that advertisements for Max have highlighted its money transfer function using the Russian Central Bank’s Faster Payments System (SBP).
Thus, Max is positioned as a tool for redrawing the boundaries of Russian users’ digital autonomy.
“Regime-loyal infrastructure is not enough for the Kremlin – it wants all everyday communication to happen within a system under full regime control.”
Vladimir Kiriyenko, the CEO of VKontakte since December 2021, with Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin at the 2022 St. Petersburg International Economic Forum . Kiriyenko is the son of Sergey Kiriyenko, First Deputy Kremlin Chief of Staff. Source: Wiki Commons
In the authorities’ conception, the new messenger ought to be a pillar of digital sovereignty.
An inside job
The recently passed national messenger law was clearly written with an already-finished product in mind. Barely more than a month passed between the law’s adoption and the selection of VK Group as the operator.
The choice of VK was driven not only by technical and organizational factors, but also by lobbying. The holding’s CEO, Vladimir Kiriyenko – son of Sergei Kiriyenko, who is responsible for domestic political agenda-setting in the Presidential Administration – evidently had access to the decision-making process and managed to present a solution aligned with the state’s interests quickly, before other major IT players, such as Sber and Yandex (which had come under state control six months earlier), could throw their hat in the ring.
From the authorities’ perspective, VK looked to be a convenient partner: the infrastructure is already in place, its management is loyal and it has experience implementing state projects. The company’s ecosystem has long included video, education, payments and digital government, so building in a messenger seemed like a logical step.
Max is now listed in the national register of Russian software, which opens the door to its deployment in the public sector and makes it possible to mandate its preinstallation on all smartphones sold in Russia.
‘Millions of users’
The advertising campaign for Max began even before its official launch. But unlike traditional promotions of state projects, which often rely on billboards and formal statements, this one focused on guerrilla marketing.
A single theme dominated the campaign: Max works where nothing else does – in elevators, on the road, in underground parking garages. Connection quality was presented as the app’s key advantage, and this message was echoed by all the hired influencers, from provocative rapper Instasamka to stand-up comedian Denis Dorokhov.
Almost simultaneously, VK Group announced it had reached its first million users. Two weeks later, it reported two million. Since the app was still in beta testing, this rapid growth raised eyebrows, even among regime-loyal bloggers. Some attributed it to marketing, others to administrative pressure and still others to inflated numbers. Meanwhile, the first channels began to appear on Max – some the work of large media outlets and Z-activists, and others cloned from Telegram without the original authors’ consent.
An inside job
The recently passed national messenger law was clearly written with an already-finished product in mind. Barely more than a month passed between the law’s adoption and the selection of VK Group as the operator.
The choice of VK was driven not only by technical and organizational factors, but also by lobbying. The holding’s CEO, Vladimir Kiriyenko – son of Sergei Kiriyenko, who is responsible for domestic political agenda-setting in the Presidential Administration – evidently had access to the decision-making process and managed to present a solution aligned with the state’s interests quickly, before other major IT players, such as Sber and Yandex (which had come under state control six months earlier), could throw their hat in the ring.
From the authorities’ perspective, VK looked to be a convenient partner: the infrastructure is already in place, its management is loyal and it has experience implementing state projects. The company’s ecosystem has long included video, education, payments and digital government, so building in a messenger seemed like a logical step.
Max is now listed in the national register of Russian software, which opens the door to its deployment in the public sector and makes it possible to mandate its preinstallation on all smartphones sold in Russia.
‘Millions of users’
The advertising campaign for Max began even before its official launch. But unlike traditional promotions of state projects, which often rely on billboards and formal statements, this one focused on guerrilla marketing.
A single theme dominated the campaign: Max works where nothing else does – in elevators, on the road, in underground parking garages. Connection quality was presented as the app’s key advantage, and this message was echoed by all the hired influencers, from provocative rapper Instasamka to stand-up comedian Denis Dorokhov.
Almost simultaneously, VK Group announced it had reached its first million users. Two weeks later, it reported two million. Since the app was still in beta testing, this rapid growth raised eyebrows, even among regime-loyal bloggers. Some attributed it to marketing, others to administrative pressure and still others to inflated numbers. Meanwhile, the first channels began to appear on Max – some the work of large media outlets and Z-activists, and others cloned from Telegram without the original authors’ consent.
“Despite the large-scale promotional effort, Max was met with skepticism, even in loyalist circles.”
Among voenkory and Z-content creators, Telegram remains the main platform to engage with their audiences.
Security concerns added to the sense of apprehension. Users pointed out that Max requests an excessive number of permissions, like access to contacts, geolocation, the camera, microphone and other sensitive data, which alarmed many voenkory.
To be fair, major messengers like WhatsApp and Telegram request similar permissions, as they are necessary for core features such as voice calls and photo sharing. Nevertheless, amid broader distrust of state-backed digital projects, even technically justified actions in Max were viewed with suspicion.
Orders from the top
Despite the ambitious goals and extensive marketing, Max has yet to become a part of Russians’ everyday digital lives. Even in the face of WhatsApp’s impending ban and the institutional backing for Max, the messenger is seen more as an annoying necessity than a real alternative.
The core issue is that Telegram, WhatsApp or even VK Messenger users see no compelling reason to switch. The new platform does not offer anything fundamentally different. Despite its claims of super reliability, Max offers only a standard set of features, which come with a higher level of mistrust.
Even within government agencies and state-owned corporations, where Max is being installed on orders from the top, it often remains a secondary or tertiary tool. Experts note that corporate groups still use primarily Telegram and WhatsApp, while Max is for “checking boxes.” As part of a pilot program, authorities have moved school chats in six regions to Max. This despite the failure of a similar effort a few years ago to set up chats among residents of the same apartment building on the government services portal.
The real test will come only when WhatsApp is officially blocked (it is already regularly shut down in regions such as Dagestan) and Max competes directly with Telegram. Most likely, the Kremlin will settle for a scenario in which the two messengers split the market. This would preserve the current media ecosystem, where the Russian authorities feel quite comfortable, while simultaneously providing them with leverage over Durov – for instance, they could pressure him to restrict access to the biggest oppositional Telegram channels in Russia, as is already occurring in Europe.
For now, the only indicator of Max’s real popularity is indirect: scammers have already started to pop up there.
Security concerns added to the sense of apprehension. Users pointed out that Max requests an excessive number of permissions, like access to contacts, geolocation, the camera, microphone and other sensitive data, which alarmed many voenkory.
To be fair, major messengers like WhatsApp and Telegram request similar permissions, as they are necessary for core features such as voice calls and photo sharing. Nevertheless, amid broader distrust of state-backed digital projects, even technically justified actions in Max were viewed with suspicion.
Orders from the top
Despite the ambitious goals and extensive marketing, Max has yet to become a part of Russians’ everyday digital lives. Even in the face of WhatsApp’s impending ban and the institutional backing for Max, the messenger is seen more as an annoying necessity than a real alternative.
The core issue is that Telegram, WhatsApp or even VK Messenger users see no compelling reason to switch. The new platform does not offer anything fundamentally different. Despite its claims of super reliability, Max offers only a standard set of features, which come with a higher level of mistrust.
Even within government agencies and state-owned corporations, where Max is being installed on orders from the top, it often remains a secondary or tertiary tool. Experts note that corporate groups still use primarily Telegram and WhatsApp, while Max is for “checking boxes.” As part of a pilot program, authorities have moved school chats in six regions to Max. This despite the failure of a similar effort a few years ago to set up chats among residents of the same apartment building on the government services portal.
The real test will come only when WhatsApp is officially blocked (it is already regularly shut down in regions such as Dagestan) and Max competes directly with Telegram. Most likely, the Kremlin will settle for a scenario in which the two messengers split the market. This would preserve the current media ecosystem, where the Russian authorities feel quite comfortable, while simultaneously providing them with leverage over Durov – for instance, they could pressure him to restrict access to the biggest oppositional Telegram channels in Russia, as is already occurring in Europe.
For now, the only indicator of Max’s real popularity is indirect: scammers have already started to pop up there.
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