Society
Russians Are Tired of the War, But Do Not Want to Make Concessions to End It
July 29, 2025
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Sergei Shelin
Journalist, independent analyst and author of Russia After Putin and Trump
(Freedom Letters, 2025)
Journalist Sergei Shelin points out a shift in public sentiment in Russia: whereas most Russians until recently expected the war to end soon, they are now losing faith that peace is near. At the same time, growing war fatigue is not translating into support for a settlement with concessions by both sides.
The original text in Russian was published in the Moscow Times and is being republished here with the author’s permission.
In early February, 49% of Russians surveyed by Russian Field believed the war with Ukraine would end in 2025. Only 39% were more pessimistic. But five months later, by late June, the share of those expecting the war to end this year had halved to just 25%. Meanwhile, 67% of the country now believes that 2025 will not mark the final year of the war.
In early February, 49% of Russians surveyed by Russian Field believed the war with Ukraine would end in 2025. Only 39% were more pessimistic. But five months later, by late June, the share of those expecting the war to end this year had halved to just 25%. Meanwhile, 67% of the country now believes that 2025 will not mark the final year of the war.
On July 28, 2025 Trump shortened deadline for Russia to talk peace. Source: Wiki Commons
Hopes fade for Trump and negotiations with Ukraine
The fact that half of 2025 has already passed is not enough to explain such a sharp reversal in expectations. Especially considering that perceptions of the success of the “special military operation” have not meaningfully changed, drifting, so to speak, toward optimism. Five months ago, 61% of Russians said the operation was going well, versus 23% who disagreed. Today, the figures are 67% and the same 23%, respectively.
Even so, the public no longer expects the campaign to wrap up anytime soon.
This shift in sentiment can be explained, first, by the rise and fall of hopes tied to mediation by Trump and, second, by the atmosphere surrounding the Russia-Ukraine negotiations that have been ongoing since May.
Back in March, presenting the results of a poll conducted at the peak of Trump’s diplomatic blitz by ExtremeScan, another pollster, I argued that the new US president had made ordinary Russians, until recently uncertain about the future, optimistic again. He gave them hope for a swift and favorable – for the empire – end to the war.
At the time, ExtremeScan recorded hopes both for peace and for expansion among ordinary Russians: “Trump’s emergence on the scene as Russia’s supporter has allowed Russians to dig in their heels on concessions that they had previously thought inevitable” (see Russia.Post here).
Russian Field observed much the same at the beginning of the year and is now capturing the entirely predictable collapse of these hopes. But this collapse cannot be attributed to Trump’s perceived failure alone.
Since May, Russians have been following the peace talks in Istanbul. Seventy-three percent believe that the Russian side “seeks to conclude a peace agreement” at the talks (only 22% think otherwise).
The fact that half of 2025 has already passed is not enough to explain such a sharp reversal in expectations. Especially considering that perceptions of the success of the “special military operation” have not meaningfully changed, drifting, so to speak, toward optimism. Five months ago, 61% of Russians said the operation was going well, versus 23% who disagreed. Today, the figures are 67% and the same 23%, respectively.
Even so, the public no longer expects the campaign to wrap up anytime soon.
This shift in sentiment can be explained, first, by the rise and fall of hopes tied to mediation by Trump and, second, by the atmosphere surrounding the Russia-Ukraine negotiations that have been ongoing since May.
Back in March, presenting the results of a poll conducted at the peak of Trump’s diplomatic blitz by ExtremeScan, another pollster, I argued that the new US president had made ordinary Russians, until recently uncertain about the future, optimistic again. He gave them hope for a swift and favorable – for the empire – end to the war.
At the time, ExtremeScan recorded hopes both for peace and for expansion among ordinary Russians: “Trump’s emergence on the scene as Russia’s supporter has allowed Russians to dig in their heels on concessions that they had previously thought inevitable” (see Russia.Post here).
Russian Field observed much the same at the beginning of the year and is now capturing the entirely predictable collapse of these hopes. But this collapse cannot be attributed to Trump’s perceived failure alone.
Since May, Russians have been following the peace talks in Istanbul. Seventy-three percent believe that the Russian side “seeks to conclude a peace agreement” at the talks (only 22% think otherwise).
“Meanwhile, 81% of Russians say the Ukrainian side has had no intention of reaching an agreement in Istanbul (15% disagree). Thus, the war must go on.”
Russian ‘magnanimity’ toward Ukraine
The fact that Russians view their great-power state as peace-loving and constructive is reflected in responses to a rather ambiguously phrased question: “who is now more interested in peace talks, Russia or Ukraine?” A clear majority – 60% versus 24% – say Russia. In February, Russians were less sure: 36% versus 32%.
Judging by the consistently high assessments of the Russian army’s performance, respondents do not see this “interest in negotiations” as a sign of military problems; rather, they see it as a reflection of Russia’s traditional magnanimity.
In any case, despite all the hostility toward Ukraine, public support for peace talks with the Ukrainians has again risen. In June, 50% of respondents favored negotiations, while 39% supported continuing the “special military operation” without seeking a ceasefire.
The fact that Russians view their great-power state as peace-loving and constructive is reflected in responses to a rather ambiguously phrased question: “who is now more interested in peace talks, Russia or Ukraine?” A clear majority – 60% versus 24% – say Russia. In February, Russians were less sure: 36% versus 32%.
Judging by the consistently high assessments of the Russian army’s performance, respondents do not see this “interest in negotiations” as a sign of military problems; rather, they see it as a reflection of Russia’s traditional magnanimity.
In any case, despite all the hostility toward Ukraine, public support for peace talks with the Ukrainians has again risen. In June, 50% of respondents favored negotiations, while 39% supported continuing the “special military operation” without seeking a ceasefire.
Map of Ukraine as of 9 July 2025 : Yellow: Continuously controlled by Ukraine Pink: Currently occupied or controlled by Russia Blue: Formerly occupied by Russia or Ukrainian-occupied Russian territory. Source: Wiki Commons
At the beginning of the war, those percentages were reversed: 35% supported negotiations, 54% wanted to press on. Over the months and years, sentiment gradually shifted in favor of diplomacy, reaching 53% to 36% by November 2024. But in February 2025, a hiccup: the split narrowed to 45% versus 43%, a reflection of that moment’s hope that everything could be settled directly with Trump, bypassing Ukraine. Now, the mood of cautious openness to compromise seen last year is beginning to come back.
The question remains: what kind of compromise do Russians envision? This may seem like a superficial matter, but only at first glance.
Of course, Putin appreciates Russians precisely because he does not need to ask them for their advice or consent. Still, the atmosphere in which his decisions are implemented matters. His orders may be carried out quietly and dutifully – or they may cause a stir, as happened during the autumn 2022 mobilization.
‘Life has become worse, life has become sadder’
The general sense of optimism among Russians has been steadily eroding. In a recent Levada Center survey, respondents reported observing the following feelings more frequently among those around them: pride in the nation (33%), hope (26%), fatigue and indifference (20%), fear (14%), and anger and aggression (12%).
Given the patriotic framing of some of these responses, clearly the upbeat mood of previous months has faded. “The last six months,” the Levada Center notes, “has seen a certain decline in the share of Russians reporting a sense of pride in their country (down 5 percentage points versus January 2025) or hope (down 8 percentage points).”
Meanwhile, more respondents said they noticed rising levels of fatigue (up 5 points versus July 2024), fear (up 5 points), anger (up 4 points since January 2025), envy (up 4 points) and resentment (up 3 points).
The question remains: what kind of compromise do Russians envision? This may seem like a superficial matter, but only at first glance.
Of course, Putin appreciates Russians precisely because he does not need to ask them for their advice or consent. Still, the atmosphere in which his decisions are implemented matters. His orders may be carried out quietly and dutifully – or they may cause a stir, as happened during the autumn 2022 mobilization.
‘Life has become worse, life has become sadder’
The general sense of optimism among Russians has been steadily eroding. In a recent Levada Center survey, respondents reported observing the following feelings more frequently among those around them: pride in the nation (33%), hope (26%), fatigue and indifference (20%), fear (14%), and anger and aggression (12%).
Given the patriotic framing of some of these responses, clearly the upbeat mood of previous months has faded. “The last six months,” the Levada Center notes, “has seen a certain decline in the share of Russians reporting a sense of pride in their country (down 5 percentage points versus January 2025) or hope (down 8 percentage points).”
Meanwhile, more respondents said they noticed rising levels of fatigue (up 5 points versus July 2024), fear (up 5 points), anger (up 4 points since January 2025), envy (up 4 points) and resentment (up 3 points).
“The daily reality facing Russians appears to be wearing them down, even if it has yet to lead to a fundamental shift in their worldview.”
The average resident of a large or mid-sized city is not worried about unemployment, which has largely vanished since the war began. Incomes are growing: in the spring (the most recent available data), nominal wages were up 15.3% year over year and real wages were up 4.6%. Yet increasingly, people seem unsure what to do with that money.
Enthusiasm for handing this extra income back to the state, by way of deposits at state-owned banks, is waning. In May and June, household deposits grew just RUB 0.9 trillion, and mostly due to interest accrual. In the same period a year before, deposits had grown a massive RUB 2.1 trillion.
Inflation, slowing economy taking its toll
Consumer spending is stagnating. According to Rosstat, retail sales grew just 1.8% year over year in May, and the services sector only 1.0%. Even these modest figures are a result of government fudging.
At this point, only those directly tied to the war, or those belonging to specially protected groups under Putin’s personal patronage, can afford to make long-term purchases. In June, for example, RUB 309 billion in mortgage loans were issued, reflecting the overall slowdown in housing construction and sales. Note that only 14% of these mortgages, just RUB 44 billion, were issued at market rates, without state subsidies.
The authorities claim that inflation has been tamed. But the average Russia feels its effects as strongly as ever. Whether they like it or not, even government-affiliated think tanks are forced to acknowledge this. According to the Center for Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-Term Forecasting, “subjective estimates of inflation have stabilized at 15-16%; expectations (for the coming year – SS) have slightly decreased, to 13%. But here, if we look at several months, [we see] this is rather a stabilization. The gap between perceived and actual inflation (i.e., between subjective estimates by the public and Rosstat prints – SS) is so wide that we are essentially dealing with two different ‘pictures of the world.’”
The social strata supplying mercenaries to the army and dealing with their deaths are not that large.
Enthusiasm for handing this extra income back to the state, by way of deposits at state-owned banks, is waning. In May and June, household deposits grew just RUB 0.9 trillion, and mostly due to interest accrual. In the same period a year before, deposits had grown a massive RUB 2.1 trillion.
Inflation, slowing economy taking its toll
Consumer spending is stagnating. According to Rosstat, retail sales grew just 1.8% year over year in May, and the services sector only 1.0%. Even these modest figures are a result of government fudging.
At this point, only those directly tied to the war, or those belonging to specially protected groups under Putin’s personal patronage, can afford to make long-term purchases. In June, for example, RUB 309 billion in mortgage loans were issued, reflecting the overall slowdown in housing construction and sales. Note that only 14% of these mortgages, just RUB 44 billion, were issued at market rates, without state subsidies.
The authorities claim that inflation has been tamed. But the average Russia feels its effects as strongly as ever. Whether they like it or not, even government-affiliated think tanks are forced to acknowledge this. According to the Center for Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-Term Forecasting, “subjective estimates of inflation have stabilized at 15-16%; expectations (for the coming year – SS) have slightly decreased, to 13%. But here, if we look at several months, [we see] this is rather a stabilization. The gap between perceived and actual inflation (i.e., between subjective estimates by the public and Rosstat prints – SS) is so wide that we are essentially dealing with two different ‘pictures of the world.’”
The social strata supplying mercenaries to the army and dealing with their deaths are not that large.
“Most Russians continue to focus on everyday matters and try to maintain their previous lifestyle. But the war is beginning to hit home for this majority too.”
President Putin meeting with US President’s Special Envoy Steve Witkoff. St Petersburg, April 11, 2025. Source: Kremlin.ru
The more drones, the more we eat
In its weekly surveys, FOM (Public Opinion Foundation) asks respondents to name, without prompting, the events of the past week that stood out to them. Recently, a new trend has emerged.
In the latest survey, most respondents (57%) either could not or would not name any memorable events. But among the 43% who could or would, the top responses, mentioned by 20%, were effective propaganda tropes about Russian victories: “we are following the special military operation,” “our soldiers are liberating our lands – it’s a shame they are dying,” “the situation on the special military operation and our boys on the front line – they are doing a great job,” “our boys are advancing and liberating territory.”
But in second place, cited by 9% of respondents (or nearly one in four of those who recalled something), were mentions of the war encroaching deeper into Russian territory: “drones flying in Tatarstan,” “bombings on our territory,” “UAVs in the Leningrad Region,” “explosions in Kazan and Kursk,” “drones in Udmurtia,” “drones flew to Engels and Voronezh,” “the number of drones penetrating our territory.”
Other responses included frustration with Trump (4%) – “he changed his attitude toward Russia,” “he is supplying Ukraine with weapons” – and disruptions in communications infrastructure (1%) – “the internet was shut off because of drones.”
Though most Russians remain personally untouched by the war, they are clearly experiencing psychological strain. One of the ways they are coping is by eating more. In May, food service sector sales were 11.4% higher in real terms than a year earlier.
Ordinary Russians’ superpower-sized appetites
After all these observations, let’s return to the Russian Field survey that we began with and ask: what sort of end to the war do these not so unperturbed people imagine? Are they, perhaps, becoming more open to compromise?
Russia Field has posed this question in various ways over time, changing the wording and sometimes even asking respondents to come up the terms of a peace settlement themselves. The results have been consistent.
For example, respondents were asked to select the terms they deemed necessary for a peace agreement with Ukraine. Recognition of the Donetsk and Luhansk people’s republics as Russian territory was selected by 78% (versus 16%). The transfer by Kyiv of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions, even the parts that Russia does not control today, was deemed necessary by 67% (versus 24%). Meanwhile, 73% demanded that Ukraine abandon its NATO aspirations (versus 19%), while 50% wanted to annex even more territory beyond what has already been seized (versus 40%).
And these are not the only demands made by Russia’s peace-loving citizens. The rest, like reductions in Ukraine’s military and new elections, carry the same imperial tone.
Support for the idea of coexistence with a sovereign Ukraine as it was before the war remains as marginal as ever: just 11% support a return to the 1991 borders (78% opposed) and only 18% favor giving back any Ukrainian territory (72% opposed).
The public’s growing weariness with the war is not translating into greater willingness to compromise. The only thing rising is the desire to stop the bloodshed.
According to ExtremeScan polling, a sizable share of Russians last autumn were willing to accept “mutual concessions” as a way to end the war. But Trump’s election, coinciding with the start of Russia’s latest offensive, made them think that perhaps no concessions would be necessary.
At the start of 2025, Russian Field found that the public expected the war to end not only victoriously but also in the near term. That hope for a swift, victorious conclusion, against the backdrop of Trump’s election, has fizzled. But the pre-Trump soberness has not fully returned either.
The peace-loving average Russian sees how Putin’s army is pushing deeper into Ukraine and is ready to wait. Especially since he does not have to go fight.
In its weekly surveys, FOM (Public Opinion Foundation) asks respondents to name, without prompting, the events of the past week that stood out to them. Recently, a new trend has emerged.
In the latest survey, most respondents (57%) either could not or would not name any memorable events. But among the 43% who could or would, the top responses, mentioned by 20%, were effective propaganda tropes about Russian victories: “we are following the special military operation,” “our soldiers are liberating our lands – it’s a shame they are dying,” “the situation on the special military operation and our boys on the front line – they are doing a great job,” “our boys are advancing and liberating territory.”
But in second place, cited by 9% of respondents (or nearly one in four of those who recalled something), were mentions of the war encroaching deeper into Russian territory: “drones flying in Tatarstan,” “bombings on our territory,” “UAVs in the Leningrad Region,” “explosions in Kazan and Kursk,” “drones in Udmurtia,” “drones flew to Engels and Voronezh,” “the number of drones penetrating our territory.”
Other responses included frustration with Trump (4%) – “he changed his attitude toward Russia,” “he is supplying Ukraine with weapons” – and disruptions in communications infrastructure (1%) – “the internet was shut off because of drones.”
Though most Russians remain personally untouched by the war, they are clearly experiencing psychological strain. One of the ways they are coping is by eating more. In May, food service sector sales were 11.4% higher in real terms than a year earlier.
Ordinary Russians’ superpower-sized appetites
After all these observations, let’s return to the Russian Field survey that we began with and ask: what sort of end to the war do these not so unperturbed people imagine? Are they, perhaps, becoming more open to compromise?
Russia Field has posed this question in various ways over time, changing the wording and sometimes even asking respondents to come up the terms of a peace settlement themselves. The results have been consistent.
For example, respondents were asked to select the terms they deemed necessary for a peace agreement with Ukraine. Recognition of the Donetsk and Luhansk people’s republics as Russian territory was selected by 78% (versus 16%). The transfer by Kyiv of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions, even the parts that Russia does not control today, was deemed necessary by 67% (versus 24%). Meanwhile, 73% demanded that Ukraine abandon its NATO aspirations (versus 19%), while 50% wanted to annex even more territory beyond what has already been seized (versus 40%).
And these are not the only demands made by Russia’s peace-loving citizens. The rest, like reductions in Ukraine’s military and new elections, carry the same imperial tone.
Support for the idea of coexistence with a sovereign Ukraine as it was before the war remains as marginal as ever: just 11% support a return to the 1991 borders (78% opposed) and only 18% favor giving back any Ukrainian territory (72% opposed).
The public’s growing weariness with the war is not translating into greater willingness to compromise. The only thing rising is the desire to stop the bloodshed.
According to ExtremeScan polling, a sizable share of Russians last autumn were willing to accept “mutual concessions” as a way to end the war. But Trump’s election, coinciding with the start of Russia’s latest offensive, made them think that perhaps no concessions would be necessary.
At the start of 2025, Russian Field found that the public expected the war to end not only victoriously but also in the near term. That hope for a swift, victorious conclusion, against the backdrop of Trump’s election, has fizzled. But the pre-Trump soberness has not fully returned either.
The peace-loving average Russian sees how Putin’s army is pushing deeper into Ukraine and is ready to wait. Especially since he does not have to go fight.
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