At the same time, Russia has fallen in love with the US again. How is that possible? After all, not long ago the US was the main enemy.

Most Russians have nothing against the US and the West in general. On the contrary, many miss, for example, Western brands and products.

The anti-Western rhetoric that is voiced in our interviews and can be seen in our ethnography is not, strictly speaking, ideological. People have this idea that the big powers are fighting each other – hence the war [in Ukraine]. Money is being divided up; land is being divided up. The West is regarded as the most important, the most powerful player and is seen as currently fighting Putin for resources.

If a person says, “the US is always starting wars,” it does not mean that he/she is against the US, against American culture or even against the US leadership. It means that he/she perceives the war as a backroom game between big players, with the US being the biggest.

Now, the most powerful player is in talks for a long-awaited peace with Russia – great, people say. In this regard, most Russians believe that what is happening in the negotiations is good for Russia, even if they do not understand the complicated negotiating process.

What do Russians want the most: for people to stop dying, for brands to return...?

They want all the anxiety around the special military operation to end. The special military operation constantly produces nerve-racking events: mobilization, then the threat of new mobilization, then Prigozhin’s rebellion, then the incursion into Kursk Region. Drones constantly fly across the border. All this is very nerve-racking.
There are also big concerns about inflation – everyone complains about rising prices.

What are “favorable terms” for a peace in the eyes of Russians? Territorial acquisitions?

What is of primary importance then?

Fear. People are afraid of the war with the West escalating. They believe if Russia concludes a peace that is somehow unfavorable [for itself], it might be attacked – such fears are out there. There are fears of new sanctions, of reparations after the end of the war, of an economic collapse if Russia loses.

Based on our interviews and focus groups, we can say that for many Russians, it is important to be confident that a peace is concluded on “favorable terms for Russia,” even if there is no understanding of what exactly those are.

What about Russia’s war aims? Do people understand them three years later?

No, not at all. The main goal of the special military operation is seen as the end of the special military operation. That’s how most people understand it.

Even supporters of the special military operation live in anxiety. No one has any positive feelings about the war. Few understand why we needed to attack Ukraine.

Still, we are seeing the emergence of a new, interesting group of people who do not understand why the war was started but believe that in three years the war has revealed a lot about Russia, about the international situation, about politics and about the economy. These people think a lot became clear thanks to the war.

It became clear that Russia has enemies – this is an important discovery. It became clear who our friends are. It became clear that we need to develop our economy – and we can do it; the economy is growing.

As a rule, people who think like this are now seeing their own financial situation improving. They reason like this: sure, the situation with the war is quite alarming, but it has been a kind of test for the Russian state, economy and society.

These people donate heavily to all sorts of volunteer things in support of the special military operation and to help refugees and soldiers (see Russia.Post here about how charity in Russia is changing). Many do not perceive the current situation as a crisis. For many, the “crisis” was the 1990s and Covid; now, these people, of course, are not delighted with the situation, but they say everything is generally OK!

In the activist/antiwar community, there is a clear link between the war and Putin. That is why they are skeptical of peace while Putin is in power. Do Russians you talk to have this association?

Among antiwar Russians, broadly there is an idea that the war is a man-made event that was started as a crime committed by a specific person. But most people do not think like this. They associate the war with Putin to the extent that he needs to deal with its consequences, like sanctions. And also end the war.

Of course, Kursk has led to a surge in anxiety. But the “skill” of not noticing the war applies to events there, as well. This is especially true for regions of the country where people have been less affected by the war. The less it affects them, the less they understand its meaning and the more they prefer not to notice it. They have learned not to notice it; they have mastered this “skill.”

Still, the most interesting changes, for me, have to do with the group of people who benefit from the war. As I said, they retroactively find meaning both in the war itself and in the reality that it produces.

Some of these people live in regions that have been hit harder by the war. But there's also evidence that military spending has fueled a consumer boom , and it is also true that in regions where the most people are taken for the army, people are most actively taking out mortgages and making large purchases. They have joined the “race for prosperity.” This means they feel confident.

But there's also evidence that military spending has fueled a consumer boom.

Levada Center surveys show that optimism about the economy is currently at its highest levels since 1991. The percentage of Russians who are confident in the future economically – not politically, not existentially, but economically – has never been higher in the entire history of post-Soviet Russia.

Thanks to this economic confidence, some people have decided to participate in civil society. They join volunteer organizations, including prowar ones. (Volunteer organizations are now organized to help both civilians and soldiers.)

They send stuff to the so-called “new territories” in Ukraine – some goes to refugees and some to the army. Volunteering is mixed in this way, and if you want to do something useful for the country, it is assumed you will do something good for the war effort too. Even people who previously identified themselves as antiwar have begun to participate in these projects.

We are seeing a rise in patriotism in these circles. And the more of these people there are, the more they feel solidarity with each other and the more they are ready to take part in active forms of aid.

Tell us more about Kursk. How have Russians reacted to what is de facto the occupation of part of their country? How do they interpret it?

Many refugees perceive the occupation of Kursk Region in very local terms: we have been deprived of housing, deprived of our lives, deprived of our local homeland – and the authorities have done a lousy job of helping. Refugees rarely think about what is happening in terms of politics, the war or incursions.

With time, however, even on social media, many refugees have begun to criticize the war, meaning their grievances and discontent are gradually becoming politicized. Yet the misfortune that has befallen them is not only a reason to criticize the authorities and the war; it is also a reason for solidarity with soldiers, who are in the same, unfortunate situation.

Is there a conflict between Russians who left the country and Russians who stayed?

A lot of people, both still in Russia and in emigration, feel a distance between “us” and “them.” Not necessarily aggression, but there is a clear perception that there is one life in Russia and another abroad. “They” do not know “us.”

I think the feeling of distance will intensify as more people decide that “we are definitely staying” or “we are definitely not going back.”

Russians who left are not considered traitors?

No. Supporters of the war believe that Russians who left are traitors [only] if they do something bad in relation to Russia: work with Western intelligence services, donate to the Ukrainian army. But if someone has not done anything like that, there should be no problem.

As I said before, for many people in Russia the war is not Putin’s crime; rather, it is a difficult situation, a maelstrom that has caused many problems. And everyone solves these problems as best they can – some leave the country; some pay bribes to get out of serving.

Those who remain in Russia treat those who left as people who solved their everyday problems by leaving. There is this understanding. At the same time, even antiwar “remainers” do not like it when someone starts saying only loyalists and cowardly conformists are left in Russia.

What has happened to Russians’ readiness to protest?

Nothing changed fundamentally in the third year of the war. People are not ready to go and try to overthrow Putin when there are no opportunities to do that; when there is no political organization that could lead any movement; when there is no political crisis in the country that might give hope for change.

Here, we come back to peace negotiations. People feel that negotiations are something real, close, tangible, and they immediately become emotionally involved in them and support them… The news flow around negotiations creates a sense of reality: talks will take place, the war may end. Nothing of the sort, however, is happening in terms of political change in Russia.

As I said, most people do not like how the government is tightening the screws, and there are many other things they do not like.