Politics
How the Russian Orthodox Church Conceptualizes the Ukraine War
November 13, 2024
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Mikhail Suslov
Associate professor, University of Copenhagen
Historian Mikhail Suslov look at the variations in how Church leaders, intellectuals and activists talk about the war in Ukraine and explains why they do not speak in one voice.
On March 27, 2024, the World Russian People’s Council (WRPC) issued its most contentious document in 30 years: the Order (Nakaz) on the Present and Future of the Russian World. The document’s first article frames Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine as a “holy war,” presenting it as part of the historical “national liberation” struggle of the Russian World against the “collective West”.
The WRPC, established as a platform to unite hierarchs from the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), religious intellectuals and senior state officials, is chaired by Patriarch Kirill. Given the high profile of the WRPC, the order was widely interpreted as reflecting the shifting official line toward endorsement of the “holy war” narrative. This essay delves into the complexities of Orthodox theology on war, highlighting the nuanced, often conflicting perspectives that militate against the view of a consolidating “Orthodox Taliban,” as it is sometimes referred to.
The WRPC, established as a platform to unite hierarchs from the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), religious intellectuals and senior state officials, is chaired by Patriarch Kirill. Given the high profile of the WRPC, the order was widely interpreted as reflecting the shifting official line toward endorsement of the “holy war” narrative. This essay delves into the complexities of Orthodox theology on war, highlighting the nuanced, often conflicting perspectives that militate against the view of a consolidating “Orthodox Taliban,” as it is sometimes referred to.
Saint Augustine was the first clear advocate of just-war theory. Source: Wiki Commons
The dilemma of killing in war as a challenge for Christianity
Early Christianity was characterized by pacifism and nonresistance, even in self-defense, modeled after Christ’s surrender to the soldiers who came to arrest him. However, as Christianity became the state religion of the Byzantine Empire, a dilemma arose over whether a Christian soldier could kill in battle despite Jesus’s clear prohibition against killing.
St Basil of Caesarea, one of the most venerated Church fathers, offered a mixed view: he argued that soldiers must defend their Christian homeland, even if this means killing, but prescribed a three-year ban on communion due to the “impurity of hands.”
This approach embedded a lasting moral tension within Eastern Christian thought on war: while killing may be necessary in war, it remains sinful. In contrast, St Augustine’s views in the Western tradition laid the foundation for just war theory (JWT), which absolves the sin of killing in war under specific conditions. JWT focuses on criteria that make a war just: it must be defensive, aim to restore peace, use proportionate force and be waged by legitimate authority, among other stipulations.
The Basis of the Social Concept, the main official document of the ROC, adopted in 2000, aligns with JWT in Chapter VIII. The Church states it does not forbid its members from participating in military action, viewing it as an “undesirable but necessary means” if it serves to “protect neighbors and restore trampled justice.” This rendition of JWT is consequentialist, meaning the moral assessment of participation in war depends on its anticipated outcomes (e.g., “restoration of trampled justice”).
Early Christianity was characterized by pacifism and nonresistance, even in self-defense, modeled after Christ’s surrender to the soldiers who came to arrest him. However, as Christianity became the state religion of the Byzantine Empire, a dilemma arose over whether a Christian soldier could kill in battle despite Jesus’s clear prohibition against killing.
St Basil of Caesarea, one of the most venerated Church fathers, offered a mixed view: he argued that soldiers must defend their Christian homeland, even if this means killing, but prescribed a three-year ban on communion due to the “impurity of hands.”
This approach embedded a lasting moral tension within Eastern Christian thought on war: while killing may be necessary in war, it remains sinful. In contrast, St Augustine’s views in the Western tradition laid the foundation for just war theory (JWT), which absolves the sin of killing in war under specific conditions. JWT focuses on criteria that make a war just: it must be defensive, aim to restore peace, use proportionate force and be waged by legitimate authority, among other stipulations.
The Basis of the Social Concept, the main official document of the ROC, adopted in 2000, aligns with JWT in Chapter VIII. The Church states it does not forbid its members from participating in military action, viewing it as an “undesirable but necessary means” if it serves to “protect neighbors and restore trampled justice.” This rendition of JWT is consequentialist, meaning the moral assessment of participation in war depends on its anticipated outcomes (e.g., “restoration of trampled justice”).
“The weakness of this ROC approach is that while outcomes remain hypothetical, the act of going to war is a concrete reality.”
This tension is less problematic in clear-cut defensive wars – fighting the invading forces, for example. However, in the case of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, this logic falters. On March 6, 2022, Patriarch Kirill justified the war against Ukraine as a “metaphysical battle” rather than a physical one, claiming it was necessary to prevent gay pride parades in Donetsk. Though metaphorical, this rationale, that tens of thousands should die to prevent pride parades, shocked many and undercut the explanatory power of JWT in this particular case.
JWT, while prominent, is not dominant in secular or religious discussions on war. Its most gory form is the concept of “holy war,” which retains the consequentialist basis of JWT but justifies violence by invoking transcendental outcomes: liberating sacred sites or spreading the faith, for example. The recent WRPC order references “holy war” in the same breath with the idea that Russia acts as the “Katechon,” a force holding back satanic forces associated with the West.
This strain of Russian messianism has gained traction, moving from the political fringes to mainstream platforms during the 2010s. The late Father Vsevolod Chaplin, for example, described Russia’s role in the Syrian conflict as that of a “Katechon” fighting a “holy war.” Similar rhetoric now comes from figures like Father Andrei Tkachev and Orthodox oligarch Konstantin Malofeev, the latter being the likely contributor to the WRPC order’s concept of “holy war.”
Alternatives to ‘holy war’
What I find most intriguing is not that the “holy war” concept is used, but that it appears so infrequently. A search of seven religious publishing outlets registered with Integrum.Profi reveals that “holy war” appeared only twice in 2023 and twice in 2024 (as of November 9). In fact, it practically vanished from the religious discourse after its “benefit performance” in the controversial WRPC order.
To compare, “special military operation” appeared 479 times in this sample over the same period. One reason for the rarity of the “holy war” concept is that it is deeply tied to the memory of the Great Patriotic War (1941-45), which makes its use in other contexts feel almost sacrilegious. Another reason is the term’s “Duginesque” (after Alexander Dugin, a guru of modern Eurasianism with a tinge of mysticism) vagueness, which fails to resonate with everyday clergy and laypeople, who are unconvinced that fighting “satanic tendencies” is sufficient justification for violence. Additionally, JWT and its “holy war” version face competition from other interpretations of war.
An alternative interpretation of war in the religious framework is “depoliticization of war.” This perspective minimizes the political dimension of war, recasting it as a personal ordeal faced in extreme circumstances, akin to enduring a natural disaster.
JWT, while prominent, is not dominant in secular or religious discussions on war. Its most gory form is the concept of “holy war,” which retains the consequentialist basis of JWT but justifies violence by invoking transcendental outcomes: liberating sacred sites or spreading the faith, for example. The recent WRPC order references “holy war” in the same breath with the idea that Russia acts as the “Katechon,” a force holding back satanic forces associated with the West.
This strain of Russian messianism has gained traction, moving from the political fringes to mainstream platforms during the 2010s. The late Father Vsevolod Chaplin, for example, described Russia’s role in the Syrian conflict as that of a “Katechon” fighting a “holy war.” Similar rhetoric now comes from figures like Father Andrei Tkachev and Orthodox oligarch Konstantin Malofeev, the latter being the likely contributor to the WRPC order’s concept of “holy war.”
Alternatives to ‘holy war’
What I find most intriguing is not that the “holy war” concept is used, but that it appears so infrequently. A search of seven religious publishing outlets registered with Integrum.Profi reveals that “holy war” appeared only twice in 2023 and twice in 2024 (as of November 9). In fact, it practically vanished from the religious discourse after its “benefit performance” in the controversial WRPC order.
To compare, “special military operation” appeared 479 times in this sample over the same period. One reason for the rarity of the “holy war” concept is that it is deeply tied to the memory of the Great Patriotic War (1941-45), which makes its use in other contexts feel almost sacrilegious. Another reason is the term’s “Duginesque” (after Alexander Dugin, a guru of modern Eurasianism with a tinge of mysticism) vagueness, which fails to resonate with everyday clergy and laypeople, who are unconvinced that fighting “satanic tendencies” is sufficient justification for violence. Additionally, JWT and its “holy war” version face competition from other interpretations of war.
An alternative interpretation of war in the religious framework is “depoliticization of war.” This perspective minimizes the political dimension of war, recasting it as a personal ordeal faced in extreme circumstances, akin to enduring a natural disaster.
“War, in this view, is simply another consequence of the original sin, which also effectively eliminates the question of responsibility for unleashing war.”
Life itself is seen as a series of trials meant to purify the soul, with war as a particularly intense one, a path to either salvation or perdition.
Seen through this lens, war becomes “concentrated life,” where its hardships provide fertile ground for sainthood, as seen in the many sainted princes and warriors in Russian, Serbian, Byzantine and other Orthodox traditions. For example, the book on Orthodox perspectives on war, written by fathers Dmitri Vasilenkov and Vladimir Vasilik in 2020 and approved for publication by the Moscow Patriarchate, largely ignores the political aspects of war, focusing instead on the “moral hygiene” of soldiers. They advise soldiers to avoid cursing, treat their enemies with respect and suppress destructive impulses such as anger and vengeance. By doing so, soldiers can transcend the brutality of war and come closer to their heavenly prototype, Archangel Michael.
The third streak of Orthodox thought on war is perhaps the most innovative and hard to untangle. It originates in the philosophy of Ivan Ilyin, a prominent interwar émigré thinker sometimes referred to as a favorite philosopher of Putin’s regime. Ilyin takes as his starting point St Basil’s moral dilemma: killing is sinful – period – yet it becomes a necessity in war. To reconcile this, Ilyin draws on Christ’s teaching in John 15:13: “greater love has no one than this: to lay down one’s life for one’s friends.”
Ilyin interprets this to mean that a soldier fulfills Christ’s commandment in two senses. First, he risks his life; second, given the synonymous use of “life” and “soul” in the Bible, he sacrifices his soul, which he has compromised by killing. Ilyin’s logic is: if a soldier consciously sacrifices his most valuable possession, his soul, this act will be recognized and forgiven by God, who will absolve the sin.
This idea, stripped of Ilyin’s philosophical refinement but delivered with the emotional conviction of a military priest, has been adopted by figures like Father Andrei Shelomentsev, who explains it as follows: when a soldier dies and stands before God, he might say, “Lord, here is my soul. I have tormented and wounded it with rage… and killing. But I had no choice in this war. I hand my soul over to You.”
Seen through this lens, war becomes “concentrated life,” where its hardships provide fertile ground for sainthood, as seen in the many sainted princes and warriors in Russian, Serbian, Byzantine and other Orthodox traditions. For example, the book on Orthodox perspectives on war, written by fathers Dmitri Vasilenkov and Vladimir Vasilik in 2020 and approved for publication by the Moscow Patriarchate, largely ignores the political aspects of war, focusing instead on the “moral hygiene” of soldiers. They advise soldiers to avoid cursing, treat their enemies with respect and suppress destructive impulses such as anger and vengeance. By doing so, soldiers can transcend the brutality of war and come closer to their heavenly prototype, Archangel Michael.
The third streak of Orthodox thought on war is perhaps the most innovative and hard to untangle. It originates in the philosophy of Ivan Ilyin, a prominent interwar émigré thinker sometimes referred to as a favorite philosopher of Putin’s regime. Ilyin takes as his starting point St Basil’s moral dilemma: killing is sinful – period – yet it becomes a necessity in war. To reconcile this, Ilyin draws on Christ’s teaching in John 15:13: “greater love has no one than this: to lay down one’s life for one’s friends.”
Ilyin interprets this to mean that a soldier fulfills Christ’s commandment in two senses. First, he risks his life; second, given the synonymous use of “life” and “soul” in the Bible, he sacrifices his soul, which he has compromised by killing. Ilyin’s logic is: if a soldier consciously sacrifices his most valuable possession, his soul, this act will be recognized and forgiven by God, who will absolve the sin.
This idea, stripped of Ilyin’s philosophical refinement but delivered with the emotional conviction of a military priest, has been adopted by figures like Father Andrei Shelomentsev, who explains it as follows: when a soldier dies and stands before God, he might say, “Lord, here is my soul. I have tormented and wounded it with rage… and killing. But I had no choice in this war. I hand my soul over to You.”
Archbishop Savva Tutunov. Source: Wiki Commons
In this interpretation, God, understanding the soldier’s motives, would “cleanse his soul with His love.” This position was echoed in 2023 by Archbishop Savva (Tutunov), who has rapidly risen through the ranks of the church hierarchy, at a conference on Orthodox theology of war. The distinctiveness of this view lies in its non-consequentialist reasoning: killing in war is justified not by its outcomes but by the soldier’s intention to fulfil the imperative to “lay down one’s life” for others. This logic, however, implies a troubling conclusion: nearly any soldier who kills and subsequently dies in battle could be seen as righteous and even worthy of canonization. As one religious journal has noted, as many as 47 saints of the ROC were warriors. With discussions about canonizing Alexander Suvorov now resurfacing, another warrior saint could soon be added.
Thus, despite the incorporation of JWT in the ROC’s Basis of the Social Concept, there exists an array of interpretations of war among Church leaders, intellectuals and activists. This plurality of perspectives is even more apparent at the grassroots level.
In 2011, the project Priests Online (Batiushka Online) launched, creating a social media space where believers could ask ROC priests questions directly. It spans multiple platforms, with VK being the most popular, hosting around 170 priests and a subscriber base of over 120,000 Orthodox believers. Though war is not a primary concern for the average believer, a keyword search covering January 2016 to September 2024 yielded 60 substantial responses by priests addressing the question of war and killing in war. These responses fall into four categories, with some overlap as priests often draw on multiple interpretations to make their points.
Thus, despite the incorporation of JWT in the ROC’s Basis of the Social Concept, there exists an array of interpretations of war among Church leaders, intellectuals and activists. This plurality of perspectives is even more apparent at the grassroots level.
In 2011, the project Priests Online (Batiushka Online) launched, creating a social media space where believers could ask ROC priests questions directly. It spans multiple platforms, with VK being the most popular, hosting around 170 priests and a subscriber base of over 120,000 Orthodox believers. Though war is not a primary concern for the average believer, a keyword search covering January 2016 to September 2024 yielded 60 substantial responses by priests addressing the question of war and killing in war. These responses fall into four categories, with some overlap as priests often draw on multiple interpretations to make their points.
As shown in the above table, there has been a notable shift in Orthodox interpretations of war in recent years. Previously, the dominant explanation (15 responses) was Christian pacifism, emphasizing that killing in war is always sinful. However, this view almost vanished in 2022-24, appearing only once in this period. The second major shift has entailed growing acceptance of the view that war is akin to a natural disaster (a “depoliticized” view). This perspective saw a significant increase in responses, rising from one to nine in the two periods considered. A third interpretation, grounded in JWT, views killing in war as a “necessary evil,” justified for the defense of one’s homeland and the restoration of peace. The proportion of these responses remained roughly the same (one third). Lastly, the idea of killing as an act of personal sacrifice, in the spirit of “laying down one’s life for one’s friends,” has gained traction.
The Orthodox stance on war remains complex among both ideological leaders and laypeople, encompassing views ranging from pacifism and JWT to the depoliticization and sacralization of war. The incorporation of the “holy war” concept into a significant Church document – the WRPC order – does not necessarily signify a definitive shift in Orthodox theology toward this interpretation. Instead, it may reflect its strategic adaptation by the ROC, which, in a bid to stay relevant during wartime, is aligning with ideological currents foreign to traditional Orthodox views on war, potentially indicating a weakening of its political role.
The Orthodox stance on war remains complex among both ideological leaders and laypeople, encompassing views ranging from pacifism and JWT to the depoliticization and sacralization of war. The incorporation of the “holy war” concept into a significant Church document – the WRPC order – does not necessarily signify a definitive shift in Orthodox theology toward this interpretation. Instead, it may reflect its strategic adaptation by the ROC, which, in a bid to stay relevant during wartime, is aligning with ideological currents foreign to traditional Orthodox views on war, potentially indicating a weakening of its political role.
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