Politics
‘The Church Cannot Be Reduced to an Institution or Its Corporate Leadership’
August 21, 2025
- Xenia LoutchenkoReligion researcher, author of the @orthozombies Telegram channel
- Konstantin ShavlovskyJournalist
Journalist Konstantin Shavlovsky speaks with Xenia Loutchenko, a researcher of the ROC, about her book Paved With Good Intentions. The Russian Orthodox Church from Gorbachev to Putin, relations between the ROC and the state since the end of the USSR and the Church’s stance on the war in Ukraine.
The original interview in Russia was published in Republic. We are republishing fragments here with their permission.
I read your book as a history of the fusion of church and state. Looking back, was another path possible?
In fact, this fusion with the state is not happening for the first time, and it is not something unexpected. But during perestroika a window of opportunity did open, and the Church had a chance to take a different path. That chance was lost.
Reading your book, I noted the coincidence of turning points in the history of the Church and the history of the country. Two key dates are 1993, when the patriarch participated in negotiations between the White House and the president, and 2012 [with] Bolotnaya and Pussy Riot. At the same time, the year 2000 does not seem to be a milestone in the church calendar.
The Cathedral of Christ the Savior was completed and consecrated in 2000. But Putin’s rise to power was not an important event for the Church.
In fact, this fusion with the state is not happening for the first time, and it is not something unexpected. But during perestroika a window of opportunity did open, and the Church had a chance to take a different path. That chance was lost.
Reading your book, I noted the coincidence of turning points in the history of the Church and the history of the country. Two key dates are 1993, when the patriarch participated in negotiations between the White House and the president, and 2012 [with] Bolotnaya and Pussy Riot. At the same time, the year 2000 does not seem to be a milestone in the church calendar.
The Cathedral of Christ the Savior was completed and consecrated in 2000. But Putin’s rise to power was not an important event for the Church.
“Much of what determined the further development of the Russian Orthodox Church happened before Putin.”
Christ the Savior Сathedral. Moscow. Source: Wiki Commons
The 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations had already been adopted in the version lobbied for by the ROC, where the preamble enshrined the “special role of Orthodoxy” in Russian history. It also established that Russia has traditional religions: Christianity, Islam, Judaism and Buddhism, meaning all others are automatically second class.
The Interfaith Council of Russia had already been created. It was intended to ensure that a consolidated position of the traditional religions could be worked out under the control of the ROC. The Church, of course, feared the previous democratic government.
In addition, Yeltsin had been offended by the ROC over the reburial of the remains of the royal family in 1998. For him, this was a very personal issue, as while serving as chair of the Sverdlovsk Regional Committee, he had signed off on the demolition of the Ipatiev House, where the Romanovs were shot. It was important for him to restore justice symbolically. But then these church people come and take a defiant stance, for absolutely no reason (the ROC did not recognize the conclusions of numerous examinations conducted on the remains of the royal family that confirmed their authenticity, and Patriarch Alexei II did not attend the reburial ceremony – Republic).
It remains a mystery to everyone what actually happened there. Perhaps the Church simply did not like the democrats and did not want [Boris] Nemtsov, who headed the commission for the reburial of the Tsar’s remains as a deputy prime minister, to bury the Tsar?
But in the end, it came across like this: we are real conservatives and we will not bury our tsar with this democratic government; let them bury their fakes, their false relics.
Is the modern ROC a reconstruction?
To a large extent. But there are different layers. [Tikhon] Shevkunov is one thing, people who revived parish culture are another. And then there are the “monastics,” among whom anti-Semitism, tsar-worship (the veneration of Nicholas II as the redeemer of the Russian people – Republic) and some strict ascetic practices, such as fasting almost to death, are most widespread. This is actually closer to certain Manichaean sects than to normative Orthodoxy. Overall, different groups reconstructed something of their own.
You tell the history of Russia through the history of the Church, and there is a dark spot in this history: all Soviet priests collaborated with the KGB. In Russia, there were no lustrations or repentance for the repressions, but should the Church not have repented for betraying its parishioners?
Not everyone collaborated. Sure, the entire episcopate was ordained with the sanction of the KGB, and entrance to seminaries was also filtered. But this does not mean that every priest was a KGB officer or did not actually believe in anything. A church career was not so prestigious that an unbeliever would enter the Church for that purpose.
But they informed on the laity?
Yes, they denounced and informed [on people]. They did pass on some information that was required of them, especially when it came to foreign policy.
The Interfaith Council of Russia had already been created. It was intended to ensure that a consolidated position of the traditional religions could be worked out under the control of the ROC. The Church, of course, feared the previous democratic government.
In addition, Yeltsin had been offended by the ROC over the reburial of the remains of the royal family in 1998. For him, this was a very personal issue, as while serving as chair of the Sverdlovsk Regional Committee, he had signed off on the demolition of the Ipatiev House, where the Romanovs were shot. It was important for him to restore justice symbolically. But then these church people come and take a defiant stance, for absolutely no reason (the ROC did not recognize the conclusions of numerous examinations conducted on the remains of the royal family that confirmed their authenticity, and Patriarch Alexei II did not attend the reburial ceremony – Republic).
It remains a mystery to everyone what actually happened there. Perhaps the Church simply did not like the democrats and did not want [Boris] Nemtsov, who headed the commission for the reburial of the Tsar’s remains as a deputy prime minister, to bury the Tsar?
But in the end, it came across like this: we are real conservatives and we will not bury our tsar with this democratic government; let them bury their fakes, their false relics.
Is the modern ROC a reconstruction?
To a large extent. But there are different layers. [Tikhon] Shevkunov is one thing, people who revived parish culture are another. And then there are the “monastics,” among whom anti-Semitism, tsar-worship (the veneration of Nicholas II as the redeemer of the Russian people – Republic) and some strict ascetic practices, such as fasting almost to death, are most widespread. This is actually closer to certain Manichaean sects than to normative Orthodoxy. Overall, different groups reconstructed something of their own.
You tell the history of Russia through the history of the Church, and there is a dark spot in this history: all Soviet priests collaborated with the KGB. In Russia, there were no lustrations or repentance for the repressions, but should the Church not have repented for betraying its parishioners?
Not everyone collaborated. Sure, the entire episcopate was ordained with the sanction of the KGB, and entrance to seminaries was also filtered. But this does not mean that every priest was a KGB officer or did not actually believe in anything. A church career was not so prestigious that an unbeliever would enter the Church for that purpose.
But they informed on the laity?
Yes, they denounced and informed [on people]. They did pass on some information that was required of them, especially when it came to foreign policy.
“But the Church could not repent for this, because it had taken another, much more advantageous position and right away declared itself a victim.”
So what apologies? What lustrations? There is no restitution in Russia – but for the Church there is. Only the Church has managed to lobby for laws under which prerevolutionary property is returned to it. And the process continues – alongside the terrorizing of business, the destruction of cultural monuments and everything else.
I noticed an interesting reversal: in Soviet times, lay people were afraid of priests because priests might “record” you, that is, inform on parishioners. Now, priests are afraid of lay people because they inform on the priests. To what extent has the war dealt a blow to Orthodoxy in this sense?
In Soviet times, people were not really afraid of priests. Everyone just knew that if you went to church, the priest was obliged to put you in the registry, and this information was sent upward. There were indeed cases when a grandmother baptized a baby and the father was then expelled from the party. But they were afraid not of priests, but of the Soviet government: the priest was simply doing his job.
Nowadays, parishioners may actually report on priests.
I noticed an interesting reversal: in Soviet times, lay people were afraid of priests because priests might “record” you, that is, inform on parishioners. Now, priests are afraid of lay people because they inform on the priests. To what extent has the war dealt a blow to Orthodoxy in this sense?
In Soviet times, people were not really afraid of priests. Everyone just knew that if you went to church, the priest was obliged to put you in the registry, and this information was sent upward. There were indeed cases when a grandmother baptized a baby and the father was then expelled from the party. But they were afraid not of priests, but of the Soviet government: the priest was simply doing his job.
Nowadays, parishioners may actually report on priests.
“Almost all cases of suspension from service or defrocking are the result of denunciations.”
Antiwar priests are held hostage by their parishioners. It takes just one parishioner to note whether a priest recites the Patriarch’s “prayer for the victory of Holy Rus’” or not. If he does not, the person writes a denunciation.
You write that Patriarch Kirill became the driver of support for repression and the war inside the Church. But is he the only reason? From the outside, it seems that among churchgoers, support for the war is generally higher than among other Russians.
This is a distorted perception, since we are judging by the media space. Yes, there are priests who, just like voenkory, run prowar Telegram channels and appear on the Spas TV channel. There are parishioners who weave camouflage nets, make trench candles, write letters to “our boys,” chip in for equipment and so on. But this is not much different from what is happening, for example, in Russian schools.
When an order was recently sent out to the dioceses that priest volunteers were needed to be sent to the front, no one wanted to go. Everyone who was ideologically patriotic and wanted to go to war has long since gone, and some have even died. Why should the rest of us priests have to go? We hold a prayer service to check the box, deliver humanitarian aid and call it a day!
I believe that the support for the war inside the Church is on average the same as across the rest of Russia. There is nothing particularly bellicose there. But this support could be much less among those who take their cues from their superiors and do not follow their personal convictions. They are the majority in the Church, as elsewhere. If the higher-ups did not demand this so much, they would not care.
Here we return to Patriarch Kirill. After all, the Church is a very vertical structure. Ordinary priests are not protected in any legal sense: the Labor Code does not structure your relations with the Church higher-ups.
You write that Patriarch Kirill became the driver of support for repression and the war inside the Church. But is he the only reason? From the outside, it seems that among churchgoers, support for the war is generally higher than among other Russians.
This is a distorted perception, since we are judging by the media space. Yes, there are priests who, just like voenkory, run prowar Telegram channels and appear on the Spas TV channel. There are parishioners who weave camouflage nets, make trench candles, write letters to “our boys,” chip in for equipment and so on. But this is not much different from what is happening, for example, in Russian schools.
When an order was recently sent out to the dioceses that priest volunteers were needed to be sent to the front, no one wanted to go. Everyone who was ideologically patriotic and wanted to go to war has long since gone, and some have even died. Why should the rest of us priests have to go? We hold a prayer service to check the box, deliver humanitarian aid and call it a day!
I believe that the support for the war inside the Church is on average the same as across the rest of Russia. There is nothing particularly bellicose there. But this support could be much less among those who take their cues from their superiors and do not follow their personal convictions. They are the majority in the Church, as elsewhere. If the higher-ups did not demand this so much, they would not care.
Here we return to Patriarch Kirill. After all, the Church is a very vertical structure. Ordinary priests are not protected in any legal sense: the Labor Code does not structure your relations with the Church higher-ups.
“Overall, everyone looks to the higher-ups, and responsibility for the current support of the war lies with the patriarch and the bishops.”
If the patriarch were against him, would the Church be against Putin?
No, it would not be against Putin, but there might be less enthusiasm. The current patriarch sincerely supports all of this, as his interests coincide with those of Putin, first of all with regard to Ukraine. Only Putin’s tanks can guarantee him that the Ukrainian church will remain part of the Russian one.
I cannot stand all the clichéd talk about an imperialist mindset (imperskost’), but here is a real imperialist mindset: the ROC is unwilling to let go of parts of the Church that were under its jurisdiction during the colonial periods of Russian history. This is a struggle to preserve the empire in the ecclesiastical sense, and the patriarch fully supports it.
But mirror things are happening now with the Orthodox Church of Ukraine: news from Ukraine about the ban on the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which is historically associated with the Moscow Patriarchate, persecution of allegedly pro-Russia priests and so on. What should be done about this?
No, it would not be against Putin, but there might be less enthusiasm. The current patriarch sincerely supports all of this, as his interests coincide with those of Putin, first of all with regard to Ukraine. Only Putin’s tanks can guarantee him that the Ukrainian church will remain part of the Russian one.
I cannot stand all the clichéd talk about an imperialist mindset (imperskost’), but here is a real imperialist mindset: the ROC is unwilling to let go of parts of the Church that were under its jurisdiction during the colonial periods of Russian history. This is a struggle to preserve the empire in the ecclesiastical sense, and the patriarch fully supports it.
But mirror things are happening now with the Orthodox Church of Ukraine: news from Ukraine about the ban on the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which is historically associated with the Moscow Patriarchate, persecution of allegedly pro-Russia priests and so on. What should be done about this?
“The ban of the UOC is a political decision that is absurd in a legal sense, and in a moral sense it is simply a very bad precedent.”
Clergy and laymen bar a Ministry of Culture commission from entering the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra. April 2023. Source: VK
But the saddest thing is that it has been justified by the media.
I sometimes speak with German politicians, officials and journalists, who say: “in Ukraine there is a Russian church and a Ukrainian church, so the Russian one needs to be removed...” I ask: “who told you this?” They are very surprised to learn that in fact everything is completely different, that these are not Russian and Ukrainian churches, that they are both Ukrainian.
But where are the Ukrainians themselves? Where are the people? The people need this church – the same millions of parishioners of whom there were more in the UOC than in the OCU, according to all prewar polling.
In this logic, one can ask: why do laypeople in Russia not defend antiwar priests? Laypeople in Russia fear persecution for “discrediting [the army],” and in Ukraine that the SBU will declare them “Russian spies.”
In my view, the situation in Russia and Ukraine differs at least in that there was no Maidan in Russia, but there was in Ukraine. And in Russia, Putin has been in power for the last 25 years, while in Ukraine, four presidents have changed. It seems there is a tradition there of successful collective protest against actions of the state.
Why do some people who call themselves Orthodox say they do not believe in God?
Yes, Lukashenko also said that he is an Orthodox atheist.
Sociologist Dmitri Furman wrote in 1999 that more than 80% of people in Russia call themselves Orthodox. I would stop there and not dig deeper. Either we believe people or we do not. If a person says that he is Orthodox, then he is Orthodox.
Furman and his coauthor Kimmo Kaariainen introduced the term “pro-Orthodox consensus” in their 2000 work New Churches, Old Believers. They defined it as a consensus positive view of the national past, traditions, identity and stability, one might even say torpor in the religious sphere.
I really like this term, “pro-Orthodox consensus.”
I sometimes speak with German politicians, officials and journalists, who say: “in Ukraine there is a Russian church and a Ukrainian church, so the Russian one needs to be removed...” I ask: “who told you this?” They are very surprised to learn that in fact everything is completely different, that these are not Russian and Ukrainian churches, that they are both Ukrainian.
But where are the Ukrainians themselves? Where are the people? The people need this church – the same millions of parishioners of whom there were more in the UOC than in the OCU, according to all prewar polling.
In this logic, one can ask: why do laypeople in Russia not defend antiwar priests? Laypeople in Russia fear persecution for “discrediting [the army],” and in Ukraine that the SBU will declare them “Russian spies.”
In my view, the situation in Russia and Ukraine differs at least in that there was no Maidan in Russia, but there was in Ukraine. And in Russia, Putin has been in power for the last 25 years, while in Ukraine, four presidents have changed. It seems there is a tradition there of successful collective protest against actions of the state.
Why do some people who call themselves Orthodox say they do not believe in God?
Yes, Lukashenko also said that he is an Orthodox atheist.
Sociologist Dmitri Furman wrote in 1999 that more than 80% of people in Russia call themselves Orthodox. I would stop there and not dig deeper. Either we believe people or we do not. If a person says that he is Orthodox, then he is Orthodox.
Furman and his coauthor Kimmo Kaariainen introduced the term “pro-Orthodox consensus” in their 2000 work New Churches, Old Believers. They defined it as a consensus positive view of the national past, traditions, identity and stability, one might even say torpor in the religious sphere.
I really like this term, “pro-Orthodox consensus.”
“People call themselves Orthodox because they agree with belonging to this sociocultural tradition.”
Putin attends Orthodox Christmas service in Moscow. 2025. Source: YouTube
They believe that in our city there should be a church, a priest who baptizes us, marries us, blesses cars and apartments. And if something happens, you can go to him and ask. This is the role that society has assigned to the Church.
It is clear why the Church needs the state. But why does the state need the Church?
Let’s start with the fact that they are at least superstitious. When I hear people say that Putin is a pragmatist, I think everything that has happened in the last three years tells us the opposite.
Can we really say that Putin is a believer?
This is a question like “who should we consider Orthodox.” He himself says he believes in God. Why should we doubt it? But how and in what god is another matter. Putin lives in a mythologized version of Russian history and believes in his historical mission. He, course, needs immortality. Preferably physical, and he tries for that, but just in case, he is looking at other options.
The prologue of your book is dedicated to Navalny’s funeral and the fact that his Orthodox identity played an important role in his biography. Is this really true?
He says this explicitly. But he is one of those people for whom faith is important, not the Orthodox way of life. I was struck by his completely sincere faith. In my book, I quote his last words from Patriot about how if you believe, then somehow Christ will stand up for you – so why get nervous? This is an extraordinary level of true Christian humility.
I never thought about Navalny’s church affiliation, but the story of his funeral was mystical for me. What does it tell us about the Russian government’s relationship with the sacred?
This is a very interesting question. It was obvious that the authorities really wanted to bury him like a dog. So that no one would know where he was buried. Just throw him in the ground and move on.
Maybe it is because Putin is superstitious that he did not want to take such a sin on his soul. Of course, that is astonishing – killing is OK, but...
Yes, killing is OK. But not burying someone is really not Christian.
Obviously, his mother’s firmness played a role, as she insisted that her son’s body be handed over to her. But if we were to write “The Life of Navalny” now, it would probably include “the miracle of the funeral.” Because this funeral was a miracle, both that it took place at all and the way people kept coming, coming, coming, and nothing happened. And that there were so many people.
When something like this funeral happens, it immediately becomes clear why all of this is really necessary.
Because the Church cannot be reduced to an institution. It can be described in sociological terms, but in its essence it is not an institution. The Church cannot be reduced to its corporate leadership. And it never has been about its leadership. But it just so happens that one does not exist without the other, for some mysterious reason.
It is clear why the Church needs the state. But why does the state need the Church?
Let’s start with the fact that they are at least superstitious. When I hear people say that Putin is a pragmatist, I think everything that has happened in the last three years tells us the opposite.
Can we really say that Putin is a believer?
This is a question like “who should we consider Orthodox.” He himself says he believes in God. Why should we doubt it? But how and in what god is another matter. Putin lives in a mythologized version of Russian history and believes in his historical mission. He, course, needs immortality. Preferably physical, and he tries for that, but just in case, he is looking at other options.
The prologue of your book is dedicated to Navalny’s funeral and the fact that his Orthodox identity played an important role in his biography. Is this really true?
He says this explicitly. But he is one of those people for whom faith is important, not the Orthodox way of life. I was struck by his completely sincere faith. In my book, I quote his last words from Patriot about how if you believe, then somehow Christ will stand up for you – so why get nervous? This is an extraordinary level of true Christian humility.
I never thought about Navalny’s church affiliation, but the story of his funeral was mystical for me. What does it tell us about the Russian government’s relationship with the sacred?
This is a very interesting question. It was obvious that the authorities really wanted to bury him like a dog. So that no one would know where he was buried. Just throw him in the ground and move on.
Maybe it is because Putin is superstitious that he did not want to take such a sin on his soul. Of course, that is astonishing – killing is OK, but...
Yes, killing is OK. But not burying someone is really not Christian.
Obviously, his mother’s firmness played a role, as she insisted that her son’s body be handed over to her. But if we were to write “The Life of Navalny” now, it would probably include “the miracle of the funeral.” Because this funeral was a miracle, both that it took place at all and the way people kept coming, coming, coming, and nothing happened. And that there were so many people.
When something like this funeral happens, it immediately becomes clear why all of this is really necessary.
Because the Church cannot be reduced to an institution. It can be described in sociological terms, but in its essence it is not an institution. The Church cannot be reduced to its corporate leadership. And it never has been about its leadership. But it just so happens that one does not exist without the other, for some mysterious reason.
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