Politics
Patriarch Kirill Comes Out in Favor of ‘Orthodox Utilitarianism’ Again
July 24, 2025
- Xenia LoutchenkoReligion researcher, author of the @orthozombies Telegram channel
Religion researcher Xenia Loutchenko shows how the debates over bills and amendments to Russian laws concerning social norms reveal disagreement about what does or does not align with traditional values, especially among those speaking in the name of Russian Orthodoxy.
The original text in Russian was published in the Moscow Times and is being republished here with the author’s permission. It is part of the Country and World – Sakharov Review project (see its Telegram here)
During a discussion in the Duma, some lawmakers proposed equating informal marriages of those killed or wounded in the Ukraine war with formal marriages. Others insisted that the war is no justification for moral relativism. Some were prepared to interpret traditional values flexibly, justifying even killing when it is deemed necessary by the state. For others, traditional values are absolute and immutable.
During a discussion in the Duma, some lawmakers proposed equating informal marriages of those killed or wounded in the Ukraine war with formal marriages. Others insisted that the war is no justification for moral relativism. Some were prepared to interpret traditional values flexibly, justifying even killing when it is deemed necessary by the state. For others, traditional values are absolute and immutable.
Anna Kuznetsova with Vladimir Putin after she was appointed children's ombudsman in September 2016. Since October 2021, Kuznetsova has been deputy speaker of the Duma. Source: Wiki Commons
Citizen patriarch
Andrei Klishas, chair of the Federation Council’s Committee on Constitutional Legislation and State Building, published on his Telegram channel Patriarch Kirill’s response to the bill on “de facto marriage.” The bill proposes equating women who were in civil partnerships with fallen or wounded soldiers to official wives, granting them the same social guarantees. In his letter to Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin, the patriarch wrote that the bill “deserves support.”
Shortly before this, Vedomosti reported that two deputy speakers – Anna Kuznetsova, a priest’s wife and mother of seven children, and Irina Yarovaya – opposed the bill. According to the newspaper’s sources, the reason was that it violated traditional values.
Andrei Klishas, chair of the Federation Council’s Committee on Constitutional Legislation and State Building, published on his Telegram channel Patriarch Kirill’s response to the bill on “de facto marriage.” The bill proposes equating women who were in civil partnerships with fallen or wounded soldiers to official wives, granting them the same social guarantees. In his letter to Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin, the patriarch wrote that the bill “deserves support.”
Shortly before this, Vedomosti reported that two deputy speakers – Anna Kuznetsova, a priest’s wife and mother of seven children, and Irina Yarovaya – opposed the bill. According to the newspaper’s sources, the reason was that it violated traditional values.
“Thus, the Patriarch appears to support extramarital cohabitation, while the Orthodox Kuznetsova maintains that even the special military operation is no excuse for moral compromises.”
Volodin himself seems to have sided with Kuznetsova and Yarovaya. In any case, the bill has been shelved indefinitely.
Years ago, the late Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin, who once wielded considerable influence, was friendly with Klishas and publicly clashed with Volodin. Perhaps it is mere coincidence, but it appears the patriarch is continuing the friendships and enmities of his alter ego. At one point, Kirill removed Chaplin from his inner circle, stripping him of all his positions. Yet he seems to keep taking the same Chaplin-trodden paths.
Recall Chaplin’s remark that Patriarch Kirill is a “collective project.” But what we know for certain is only that Klishas is the author of the bill and that he responded to the criticism around traditional values with the letter from the patriarch, who, for some reason, did not refuse to support him – though the Moscow Patriarchate hardly needs to weigh in on every piece of legislation up for debate.
Pragmatist of all Rus’
What is notable in this story is not the fate of the bill, but the fact that it has exposed a conflict between two approaches to traditional values. Let’s call them “fundamentalist” and “lenient.”
The first is the somewhat naïve position of Orthodox conservatives, mostly laypeople. In this case, they are represented by Kuznetsova, but the group includes, for example, the “Orthodox oligarch” Konstantin Malofeev. They were taught that Orthodoxy has clear rules and prohibitions that must be obeyed rather than interpreted. You break them, you have sinned; you do not repent, you go to hell.
Fundamentalist Christians want to extend these rules to society as a whole, to save humanity. Their work includes lobbying for legislation.
This dynamic is familiar from the US and right-wing American protestants. Hence abortion restrictions, obstacles to getting a divorce and so forth. It was from these circles that Russian conservatives took their inspiration. Even before 2014, Malofeev and Yelena Mizulina cooperated (here and here) with the far-right US-based World Congress of Families (also see Russia.Post here). At the time, researchers described it as the Kremlin’s “moralistic pivot.”
But Patriarch Kirill and the Church apparatus have proven to be only situational fellow travelers of the Orthodox moralists, guided by a far more flexible interpretation of traditional values. They treat the rules and prohibitions through the theological principle of oikonomia – leniency toward transgressions when justified by practical considerations. In the case of the Church, it is by the interests of the state.
It is a question of priorities: is the state “good” because it defends traditional values (as moral fundamentalists argue), or are these values themselves relative and used to uphold the higher good, i.e., the state?
Years ago, the late Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin, who once wielded considerable influence, was friendly with Klishas and publicly clashed with Volodin. Perhaps it is mere coincidence, but it appears the patriarch is continuing the friendships and enmities of his alter ego. At one point, Kirill removed Chaplin from his inner circle, stripping him of all his positions. Yet he seems to keep taking the same Chaplin-trodden paths.
Recall Chaplin’s remark that Patriarch Kirill is a “collective project.” But what we know for certain is only that Klishas is the author of the bill and that he responded to the criticism around traditional values with the letter from the patriarch, who, for some reason, did not refuse to support him – though the Moscow Patriarchate hardly needs to weigh in on every piece of legislation up for debate.
Pragmatist of all Rus’
What is notable in this story is not the fate of the bill, but the fact that it has exposed a conflict between two approaches to traditional values. Let’s call them “fundamentalist” and “lenient.”
The first is the somewhat naïve position of Orthodox conservatives, mostly laypeople. In this case, they are represented by Kuznetsova, but the group includes, for example, the “Orthodox oligarch” Konstantin Malofeev. They were taught that Orthodoxy has clear rules and prohibitions that must be obeyed rather than interpreted. You break them, you have sinned; you do not repent, you go to hell.
Fundamentalist Christians want to extend these rules to society as a whole, to save humanity. Their work includes lobbying for legislation.
This dynamic is familiar from the US and right-wing American protestants. Hence abortion restrictions, obstacles to getting a divorce and so forth. It was from these circles that Russian conservatives took their inspiration. Even before 2014, Malofeev and Yelena Mizulina cooperated (here and here) with the far-right US-based World Congress of Families (also see Russia.Post here). At the time, researchers described it as the Kremlin’s “moralistic pivot.”
But Patriarch Kirill and the Church apparatus have proven to be only situational fellow travelers of the Orthodox moralists, guided by a far more flexible interpretation of traditional values. They treat the rules and prohibitions through the theological principle of oikonomia – leniency toward transgressions when justified by practical considerations. In the case of the Church, it is by the interests of the state.
It is a question of priorities: is the state “good” because it defends traditional values (as moral fundamentalists argue), or are these values themselves relative and used to uphold the higher good, i.e., the state?
“According to the latter logic, the needs of the state redeem all sins, give them meaning and even sanctify them.”
Civil marriage ceases to be seen as sinful cohabitation: when it concerns special military operation soldiers, it is transformed into a real, sinless marriage. Widows can hold their heads high and receive material recognition of their honorable status, likely supporting the war and expressing gratitude to the caring state.
The head of the Patriarchate’s legal department, Abbess Ksenia Chernega, has already explained that the Church, through the Patriarch, supported the bill because the president instructed the government to enact such amendments.
The head of the Patriarchate’s legal department, Abbess Ksenia Chernega, has already explained that the Church, through the Patriarch, supported the bill because the president instructed the government to enact such amendments.
Noize MC at a solo concert in Helsinki in 2024. Source: Wiki Commons
Someone else’s covenant
Sexual ethics broadly have really evolved. When the state began prioritizing demographic growth, the Church unexpectedly endorsed premarital sex, on one condition – the birth of a child.
This new morality is clearly illustrated by Mama’s Letter, a fictional film with documentary elements produced by the Spas TV channel. This propaganda piece against abortion was released in cinemas, shown in Orthodox seminaries and screened in the occupied territories of Ukraine.
The film’s protagonist, having become pregnant by a classmate, is constantly pressured – by her Orthodox friend, doctors and psychologists – not to have an abortion. Her choice in favor of motherhood leads to her transformation into a happy churchgoer.
Men in the film are portrayed exclusively as sperm donors: they bear no responsibility, no guilt, no agency. One cannot help but recall Noize MC’s song “Female Praying Mantis” (Samka bogomola) about how women sell men off to war.This does not resemble traditional values. Neither contraception nor chastity is mentioned in Mama’s Letter. Childbirth, it turns out, redeems the sin of premarital sex.
Sexual ethics broadly have really evolved. When the state began prioritizing demographic growth, the Church unexpectedly endorsed premarital sex, on one condition – the birth of a child.
This new morality is clearly illustrated by Mama’s Letter, a fictional film with documentary elements produced by the Spas TV channel. This propaganda piece against abortion was released in cinemas, shown in Orthodox seminaries and screened in the occupied territories of Ukraine.
The film’s protagonist, having become pregnant by a classmate, is constantly pressured – by her Orthodox friend, doctors and psychologists – not to have an abortion. Her choice in favor of motherhood leads to her transformation into a happy churchgoer.
Men in the film are portrayed exclusively as sperm donors: they bear no responsibility, no guilt, no agency. One cannot help but recall Noize MC’s song “Female Praying Mantis” (Samka bogomola) about how women sell men off to war.This does not resemble traditional values. Neither contraception nor chastity is mentioned in Mama’s Letter. Childbirth, it turns out, redeems the sin of premarital sex.
“The Church has also supported an initiative to provide financial assistance to pregnant schoolgirls.”
One might assume that such shifts in public morality help soften moral strictures, albeit awkwardly: at least the notion of “illegitimate children” appears to have receded into oblivion. If only a similar metamorphosis had not taken place on murder. When the patriarch declared that death during “civil strife” is a sacrificial act that washes away all sins, it seemed a clumsy turn of phrase – an overreach, surely not to be taken literally.
But since then, this idea has become common currency in the Church. “Of course, murder is a sin, but killing in war is not counted as a sin for a soldier or warrior, because in war he defends his homeland,” said Dmitri Vasilenkov, an official in the Patriarchate and the chief military priest in Ukraine, in a recent interview with RTVI.
Killing in the interests of the state is not a sin. That is how oikonomia works.
It remains unclear whether the bill on “de facto marriage” will ultimately be passed. But it has already sparked a debate about traditional values in the corridors of the Duma. Kuznetsova and Yarovaya may well be surprised by the Patriarch’s position: he has long sought to appeal to fundamentalists, yet every new generation of conservatives since the 1990s has seen him as an outsider.
But since then, this idea has become common currency in the Church. “Of course, murder is a sin, but killing in war is not counted as a sin for a soldier or warrior, because in war he defends his homeland,” said Dmitri Vasilenkov, an official in the Patriarchate and the chief military priest in Ukraine, in a recent interview with RTVI.
Killing in the interests of the state is not a sin. That is how oikonomia works.
It remains unclear whether the bill on “de facto marriage” will ultimately be passed. But it has already sparked a debate about traditional values in the corridors of the Duma. Kuznetsova and Yarovaya may well be surprised by the Patriarch’s position: he has long sought to appeal to fundamentalists, yet every new generation of conservatives since the 1990s has seen him as an outsider.
Share this article
Read More
