Politics

The Dangers of Istanbul for Ukraine

May 15, 2025
  • Kirill Rogov

    Director of the expert and discussion platform Re:Russia

Political analyst Kirill Rogov previews a potential meeting of Zelensky, Putin and Trump in Istanbul, following Putin’s proposal of direct Russia-Ukraine talks, and argues that the Russian leader may try to exploit his American counterpart’s dream of achieving a breakthrough in peace negotiations during his first trip abroad.
The original text in Russian was published on Re:Russia and is being republished here with their permission.

A watershed meeting of Donald Trump with Vladimir Putin during the former’s first trip abroad – with a breakthrough in the Russia-Ukraine war being achieved to cap off the US president’s peacemaking efforts – has been the main and most desirable scenario for Washington since at least February. Initially, a Trump-Putin meeting was planned to take place in Riyadh.

This scenario is likely to have largely determined the all-carrot-no-stick strategy that Trump pursued during the three months of negotiations. These efforts ran into Kremlin intransigence, however, and did not lead to results.

Putin’s recent proposal to restart direct talks with Kyiv in Istanbul, in response to a ceasefire ultimatum presented to him, has been widely interpreted as an attempt to demonstrate his readiness to negotiate while rejecting a ceasefire. However, this interpretation is most likely incorrect. It was Putin who named the exact date of the talks – Thursday, May 15, which is the day Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia wraps up and he is to fly back to the US. Essentially, Putin has given Trump another chance to realize his dream of achieving a breakthrough in peace negotiations with Moscow.

This scenario looks quite dangerous for Ukraine and Europe. It is Putin who now decides whether the three presidents will meet or not in Istanbul, meaning he has the leverage to force the Trump administration to make concessions. Volodymyr Zelensky could be forced to sign an agreement prepared by Putin and Trump.
“During the April talks between Washington and Moscow, the stumbling block to a deal became clear: the Kremlin wants limits on Ukraine’s military and is against any European deterrent force on Ukrainian territory.”
Ukraine and Europe, for their part, likely find such terms unacceptable, as they not only make Ukraine vulnerable to another Russian attack but also jeopardize the country’s postwar economic recovery.

Trump’s “big, beautiful” plan

Trump’s comment that he might come to Istanbul on May 15, where Zelensky has already promised to be waiting for Vladimir Putin, has built up the diplomatic intrigue in recent days, but it should not have been unexpected.

In fact, Trump’s plan to meet Putin on his first trip abroad and perform a diplomatic miracle by cutting the Gordian knot of the Russia-Ukraine war has been in the works since at least early February. Trump himself, immediately after his first phone call with Putin, mentioned the possibility of a meeting as part of his visit to Saudi Arabia. Later, in late March, Axios reported that its sources on the upcoming visit to Saudi Arabia said that a meeting with Putin had been discussed on the sidelines of talks between the Russians and Americans on February 18 in Riyadh and that it was expected to take place after a ceasefire agreement in Ukraine.
President Putin meeting with Trump's special envoy Steve Witkoff. St Petersburg, April 11, 2025. Source: Kremlin.ru
One can imagine how exciting this scenario was for Trump. Possibly, it was exactly this excitement that motivated the strategy of making concessions to Moscow and refusing to pressure the Kremlin, the latter having been proposed by Keith Kellogg (see Re:Russia about it here), the special presidential envoy for Ukraine. At the turn of March/April, after negotiations between the Russians and Americans in Riyadh stalled and Russia intensified its attacks on Ukrainian cities, Trump threatened the Kremlin with sanctions and tariffs, but a few days later he dispatched to Moscow Steve Witkoff, who seems to be the main dove on Russia in the administration.

On April 17, Putin's foreign policy advisor Yuri Ushakov briefly mentioned a possible meeting in Riyadh (noting that it was a US proposal). But Washington’s reaction to a return visit by Witkoff disappointed the Kremlin, and further contacts were seemingly put on hold. On April 24, in response to a question about whether he might meet with Putin during his May trip to the Middle East, Trump was ambiguous: “it’s possible, but most likely not. I think we’ll meet with him shortly thereafter.” On May 5, Putin’s press secretary said his boss was not planning any visit to Saudi Arabia. Later, on May 10, NBC sources in the Trump administration were quoted as saying that a Trump-Putin meeting was possible only after a ceasefire regime was put in place but that there was little hope for that.
“Thus, a possible meeting of the three presidents in Istanbul is not so much a new twist as a modification of the long-awaited, showstopping conclusion of the negotiating marathon that started in Riyadh.”
Three-way ping pong

Interestingly, on the same day that the NBC sources cast doubt on the possibility of a ceasefire agreement and a meeting between Trump and Putin, four European leaders – Macron, Starmer, Merz and Tusk – unexpectedly went to Kyiv and issued an ultimatum to Moscow demanding an immediate 30-day ceasefire. Two days before, Trump had posted: “the U.S. calls for, ideally, a 30-day unconditional ceasefire… If the ceasefire is not respected, the U.S. and its partners will impose further sanctions.”

There are two fundamentally possible tracks for any peace negotiations. The first is that the warring sides, through the mediation of a third party, agree on the terms of an end to hostilities and, having come to an understanding on the basic terms of peace, sign a ceasefire agreement. The second track entails the opposite order: a ceasefire without preliminary conditions is the first step and then, when the guns have fallen silent, the sides negotiate and gradually bring their positions into alignment. Thus, the two tracks define differently what is the “cart” in the negotiating process and what is the “horse” pulling it forward.

Since February, Trump has insisted on the second track. Moscow has not explicitly rejected this idea, which was formulated back during the first Russia-US meetings in Riyadh, but has insisted on “nuances” that must be agreed on before. It has thus managed to draw the Trump administration into negotiations on the terms of peace, that is, to swap the cart and the horse. These negotiations dead-ended by end-April, however. Basically, Moscow’s position is that the condition for a ceasefire is its maximalist demands on Ukraine as laid out at the beginning of the war. Against this backdrop, the Kyiv ultimatum of Zelensky and the four European leaders looked like another attempt to force the Kremlin to return to the second track.

President Putin made a counterproposal within just a few hours, on the night of May 11. This was quite an extraordinary event, as Putin is not one for nighttime press conferences. Having made the assembled correspondents wait an hour and a half to create maximum excitement around his speech, he essentially rejected the coalition’s demand for a ceasefire and proposed direct Russia-Ukraine negotiations in Istanbul as a continuation of those that were cut off three years ago.

European leaders continue to insist that negotiations only make sense if a ceasefire is put in place first. Indeed, if the Kremlin intends to repeat the maximalist conditions that it put forward three years ago and insisted on during talks with Trump’s representatives in April and that Kyiv equates with capitulation, then what is the point of a new round of negotiations? Ushakov has already confirmed that Moscow will stick to its original position from 2022.
“Zelensky’s initial reaction to Putin’s proposal was in line with the idea that a ceasefire should precede negotiations.”
“We expect Russia to confirm a ceasefire – full, lasting, and reliable – starting tomorrow, May 12, and Ukraine is ready to meet”, he wrote. But Trump unexpectedly picked up Putin’s proposal and ran with it in a rather ambiguous post:

President Putin of Russia doesn’t want to have a Cease Fire Agreement with Ukraine, but rather wants to meet on Thursday, in Turkey, to negotiate a possible end to the BLOODBATH. Ukraine should agree to this, IMMEDIATELY. At least they will be able to determine whether or not a deal is possible, and if it is not, European leaders, and the U.S., will know where everything stands, and can proceed accordingly! I’m starting to doubt that Ukraine will make a deal with Putin, who’s too busy celebrating the Victory of World War II, which could not have been won (not even close!) without the United States of America. HAVE THE MEETING, NOW!!!

Trump simultaneously undermined the ultimatum put to Putin by demanding that Zelensky engage in direct, unconditional talks and expressed skepticism about the ability of Russia and Ukraine to make progress in these talks. Shortly after, Zelensky posted that he would be waiting for Putin in Istanbul on May 15. Hours later, Trump said he too might come to Istanbul.
Putin's late-night press conference on May 11. Source: Kremlin.ru
At first glance, Putin’s proposal looked like an attempt at an asymmetrical move – a rejection of the ceasefire ultimatum and an offer to continue peace efforts, but on Russia’s terms. Many observers saw it as an attempt to drag things out further. Conversely, Zelensky’s response that he would personally go to Istanbul looked, from this perspective, like a deliberate escalation. Meanwhile, Trump’s comment that he might also come to Istanbul seemed to put Putin in an almost hopeless position.

Yet this interpretation of events is almost certainly wrong.
“It was Putin who, in his nighttime speech, first proposed a specific date for resuming negotiations: Thursday, May 15.”
If the proposal was meant to buy time, a specific date would not have been named. Especially not the same day when Trump will be wrapping up his visit to Saudi Arabia.
In other words, it was Putin, well aware of Trump’s dream, who hinted at the possibility of a meeting in Istanbul where Trump could realize his ambitious plan to settle the Russia-Ukraine war during his first trip abroad. And Trump has run with it.

Who will lose and what is at stake?

A Trump stop in Istanbul to meet Putin and Zelensky only makes sense if some agreement is to be signed there under his patronage, at least to ratchet down the war temporarily, that can be held up as a diplomatic victory for the US president. But what will be in this agreement? We do not know. It is not known whether Zelensky and Ukraine’s European partners know. It is entirely possible that a final text has yet to be agreed on and the horse-trading continues as we speak. (This is also indicated by public comments made by Witkoff days ago.)

That said, we know who has already agreed to come to Istanbul and who will almost certainly not be there. Zelensky, blackmailed by Washington with threats to cut off military aid, was forced to follow Trump’s lead. Meanwhile, there will almost certainly be no European leaders in Istanbul – the leaders of the UK, France and Germany, who have backed Zelensky all the previous times when the Trump administration has put the screws to him.

Putin has responded neither to Zelensky’s call to come to Istanbul nor to Trump’s hints that he might be there.
“Putin’s silence best demonstrates who has the strongest position: it is he who decides whether the meeting will take place.”
European leaders lobbied Zelensky to meet with the Russian delegation in Istanbul, even though Vladimir Putin will not be there. Source: Youtube
This means he still has the chance to take advantage of the US president’s dream of inking a peace deal during his first trip abroad.

In fact, after months of negotiations between the Trump team and the Kremlin, there is basically one stumbling block left. To achieve quick success, the Trump administration was ready throughout April to make significant concessions to Moscow, such as recognizing Crimea as Russian. But Kyiv and the European coalition have refused to budge on two Kremlin demands: that Ukraine surrender the regions that Russia claims but has not fully conquered; and that the European coalition neither assist Ukraine in building up its defense capabilities nor send a peacekeeping force after the end of hostilities.

Moscow was apparently ready to back down from the first demand, but the second, which would leave Ukraine defenseless against another Russian attack, had become an insurmountable obstacle for Moscow and Washington by end-April. For Ukraine and Europe, this is not only a question of security – it is also a question of whether private business can be brought in to help rebuild the Ukrainian economy. There is a risk that an agreement foisted on Ukraine, having been prepared without the participation of Zelensky and Europe, will contain concessions on this very issue.

If Putin does not come to Istanbul, ministerial-level talks between Moscow and Kyiv will likely prove fruitless. If it emerges that Putin is going to Istanbul, this should put the Ukrainians and Europeans on high alert. Zelensky will have little room for maneuver if Putin and Trump show up in Istanbul with an agreement that Trump demands that Zelensky sign. That said, perhaps Zelensky can again summon up the strength and resourcefulness, driven by desperation, that he has repeatedly demonstrated over the past three years.
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