Politics
Is Putin’s Ideological Push at Russian Universities Sustainable?
February 13, 2025
- Ivan Fomin
- Sofia Chernysheva
- Egor KozhevnikovCharles University
- Daniel NedolyanYerevan State University
The authors look at Telegram chats of college professors who teach the recently mandated propagandistic course “Foundations of Russian Statehood,” as well as scholarly articles, where they find criticism of the course for being conceptually confusing, vague in purpose and difficult or even dangerous to teach.
The Putin regime’s continuous attempts to formulate, codify and promote an official state ideology do not guarantee success. After all, there is a difference between assembling a state ideology and turning it into an effective tool for indoctrination and mobilization.
One of the domains in which the Kremlin seeks to inculcate the “right” ideological values is education. Putin and his policies, including the aggression against Ukraine, generally tend to be significantly less popular among younger Russians. Thus, the regime’s future depends, among other things, on whether the Kremlin manages to indoctrinate the younger generation.
One of the domains in which the Kremlin seeks to inculcate the “right” ideological values is education. Putin and his policies, including the aggression against Ukraine, generally tend to be significantly less popular among younger Russians. Thus, the regime’s future depends, among other things, on whether the Kremlin manages to indoctrinate the younger generation.
The "Foundations of Russian Statehood" textbook for students with natural sciences and engineering/technical majors. Source: VK
In pursuit of this goal, in 2022 the Kremlin established a new state-organized movement for schoolchildren resembling the Soviet Pioneers. In addition, every school in Russia is now mandated to employ a counselor tasked with promoting “patriotic education.” Furthermore, starting in September 2022 all schools have had to hold a weekly flag-raising ceremony, followed by ideological lessons called “Conversations about Important Things.”
Similar policies have been implemented in Russian higher education. In 2023, Russian universities were required to introduce a new course titled “Foundations of Russian Statehood” (FoRS), which is designed to promote the key concepts of the Kremlin’s ideology.
While these measures might give the impression that the Putin regime’s ideology is becoming more powerful and sustainable, that remains uncertain. In fact, the government’s efforts to establish a comprehensive system of ideological indoctrination have revealed significant challenges and limitations.
Similar policies have been implemented in Russian higher education. In 2023, Russian universities were required to introduce a new course titled “Foundations of Russian Statehood” (FoRS), which is designed to promote the key concepts of the Kremlin’s ideology.
While these measures might give the impression that the Putin regime’s ideology is becoming more powerful and sustainable, that remains uncertain. In fact, the government’s efforts to establish a comprehensive system of ideological indoctrination have revealed significant challenges and limitations.
“In particular, the conversations of Russian university professors teaching ‘Foundations of Russian Statehood’ underscore the headwinds faced by Putin’s downstream ideologues.”
Some of these conversations are publicly available in Telegram groups created to coordinate training courses for future FoRS professors. Other points of friction emerge from articles in Russian academic journals, where teachers share their experiences and criticisms related to FoRS. How should the FoRS course be taught? Who should teach it and to whom? And, finally, what exactly is supposed to be taught? All these questions turn out to be problematic for at least some of those who have been entrusted to indoctrinate Russia’s youth. Analysis of these issues provides insights into what the regime is up against as it tries to instrumentalize higher education.
What is statehood anyway?
The curriculum for FoRS is outlined in guidelines provided by the Ministry of Education and Science. In addition, professors of FoRS can use one of three textbooks depending on their students’ academic track – social sciences, natural sciences or general.
Yet neither the ministry’s guidelines nor the textbooks give clear instructions on what exactly the professors are supposed to teach. As a result, many conversations taking place in professors’ Telegram groups revolve around the often-confusing content of FoRS. University instructors criticize the creators of the course for insufficient clarity with regard to interpretations of important historical events, definitions of key concepts and, most importantly, the overall purpose of the course.
When it comes to historical narratives, teachers feel uncertain about whether they should maintain neutrality or express their own opinions to students. Fervent discussions take place in the group chats about the government’s official stance on communism and the Soviet period and the lack of definitive conclusions that the teachers should rely on. Similar discussions are had about historical figures such as Lavrenty Beria or Boris Yeltsin.
In addition, there is much criticism about the lack of clear definitions for major concepts essential for understanding the course. Even the term “statehood,” which features in the name of the course and recurs throughout the textbooks, has no single definition – each textbook gives a different definition. Without a unified conceptual framework, many teachers struggle to effectively convey the course content to their students.
Similarly, though two of the five chapters in the FoRS textbooks are devoted to the study of the “Russian state-civilization,” no clear definition of what constitutes a “civilization” is provided. One teacher found a definition in a dictionary but was left unsatisfied by the large number of conceptualizations from a range of philosophical standpoints.
The notions of the “Russian world” and “Russian territory” also turn out to be challenging for the FoRS instructors.
What is statehood anyway?
The curriculum for FoRS is outlined in guidelines provided by the Ministry of Education and Science. In addition, professors of FoRS can use one of three textbooks depending on their students’ academic track – social sciences, natural sciences or general.
Yet neither the ministry’s guidelines nor the textbooks give clear instructions on what exactly the professors are supposed to teach. As a result, many conversations taking place in professors’ Telegram groups revolve around the often-confusing content of FoRS. University instructors criticize the creators of the course for insufficient clarity with regard to interpretations of important historical events, definitions of key concepts and, most importantly, the overall purpose of the course.
When it comes to historical narratives, teachers feel uncertain about whether they should maintain neutrality or express their own opinions to students. Fervent discussions take place in the group chats about the government’s official stance on communism and the Soviet period and the lack of definitive conclusions that the teachers should rely on. Similar discussions are had about historical figures such as Lavrenty Beria or Boris Yeltsin.
In addition, there is much criticism about the lack of clear definitions for major concepts essential for understanding the course. Even the term “statehood,” which features in the name of the course and recurs throughout the textbooks, has no single definition – each textbook gives a different definition. Without a unified conceptual framework, many teachers struggle to effectively convey the course content to their students.
Similarly, though two of the five chapters in the FoRS textbooks are devoted to the study of the “Russian state-civilization,” no clear definition of what constitutes a “civilization” is provided. One teacher found a definition in a dictionary but was left unsatisfied by the large number of conceptualizations from a range of philosophical standpoints.
The notions of the “Russian world” and “Russian territory” also turn out to be challenging for the FoRS instructors.
“On several occasions in the Telegram chats, they debate whether the occupied regions in Ukraine and areas like Transnistria should be considered part of the ‘Russian world’.”
A discussion on Komsomolskaya Pravda radio: "'Fundamentals of Russian Statehood.' How is the new subject being implemented in Russian universities? What is it for? And how effectively does it meet the needs of society and students themselves?" October 2024. Source: VK
Statism? Conservatism? Civilizationism?
The official FoRS guidelines are criticized not only in teachers’ group chats but also in Russian academic journals. Elaborated criticisms of the ideological content of the course are in only about 8% of all articles about FoRS that we were able to find. This number may not seem high, but in a high-pressure political and academic environment like Russia’s, the mere fact that these opinions are expressed in public for debate is significant. Moreover, as it turns out, even Russian scholars generally loyal to the regime are not always satisfied with the ideology presented in FoRS.
Most articles identify the “theory of civilizations” (primarily tracing it to Russian thinkers like Nikolai Danilevsky rather than Samuel Huntington or Arnold Toynbee) as the main ideological concept put forward in the FoRS textbooks. Several articles focus on the poorly defined concept of “civilization,” which is said to cause difficulties for students frequently. The articles, some more critical of the course than others, refer to a variety of philosophical theories to support their arguments.
An especially critical article takes a Marxist approach. Writing from the Marxist perspective, its author condemns the textbooks as disseminating an historically idealistic, conservative, religious and biased interpretation of history. After explicitly saying the textbooks contain fascist ideas, the author concludes that the course should be made optional for students.
Ironically, some of the course’s harshest critics come from the far right. One such article author argues that the textbooks are too liberal, with too many references to “Russophobes,” and overly ambiguous in their use of ideological concepts. According to the author, “tradition” and “civilization,” for instance, should be treated as objective truths rather than phenomena yet to be fully developed, as stated in the textbooks.
Other articles are less critical and offer more constructive feedback, suggesting that the civilizational theory used in the textbooks be replaced with alternative concepts, such as world-systems theory or communitarianism. Still others strongly criticize parts of the course while striking an overall moderate tone and staying within what is ideologically acceptable in Russia.
One of these articles suggests that the concept of “tradition” in the textbooks is not clearly defined and argues that humanism should be recognized as the Russian traditional value. Furthermore, it states that since the Russian constitution defines Russia as a democratic country, the textbooks’ attacks on democracy are inappropriate. The author’s strategy, in this case, seems to be exploiting and highlighting the inconsistencies in the Kremlin’s ideology at different levels.
Patriotism versus politicization
Since the FoRS guidelines are vague, teachers have differing ideas about the course’s overall purpose. In their Telegram groups, two camps have formed.
The first advocates “patriotic education,” believing that FoRS should nurture patriotic values and foster “love for the motherland” among students. In contrast, the second camp is critical of politicization, arguing that FoRS should adopt a more “scientific” perspective and offer students a menu of ideologies to help them to become informed citizens. Some instructors try to find a middle ground, suggesting that more ideological diversity could be beneficial as long as the presented ideologies are not “anti-Russian.”
The official FoRS guidelines are criticized not only in teachers’ group chats but also in Russian academic journals. Elaborated criticisms of the ideological content of the course are in only about 8% of all articles about FoRS that we were able to find. This number may not seem high, but in a high-pressure political and academic environment like Russia’s, the mere fact that these opinions are expressed in public for debate is significant. Moreover, as it turns out, even Russian scholars generally loyal to the regime are not always satisfied with the ideology presented in FoRS.
Most articles identify the “theory of civilizations” (primarily tracing it to Russian thinkers like Nikolai Danilevsky rather than Samuel Huntington or Arnold Toynbee) as the main ideological concept put forward in the FoRS textbooks. Several articles focus on the poorly defined concept of “civilization,” which is said to cause difficulties for students frequently. The articles, some more critical of the course than others, refer to a variety of philosophical theories to support their arguments.
An especially critical article takes a Marxist approach. Writing from the Marxist perspective, its author condemns the textbooks as disseminating an historically idealistic, conservative, religious and biased interpretation of history. After explicitly saying the textbooks contain fascist ideas, the author concludes that the course should be made optional for students.
Ironically, some of the course’s harshest critics come from the far right. One such article author argues that the textbooks are too liberal, with too many references to “Russophobes,” and overly ambiguous in their use of ideological concepts. According to the author, “tradition” and “civilization,” for instance, should be treated as objective truths rather than phenomena yet to be fully developed, as stated in the textbooks.
Other articles are less critical and offer more constructive feedback, suggesting that the civilizational theory used in the textbooks be replaced with alternative concepts, such as world-systems theory or communitarianism. Still others strongly criticize parts of the course while striking an overall moderate tone and staying within what is ideologically acceptable in Russia.
One of these articles suggests that the concept of “tradition” in the textbooks is not clearly defined and argues that humanism should be recognized as the Russian traditional value. Furthermore, it states that since the Russian constitution defines Russia as a democratic country, the textbooks’ attacks on democracy are inappropriate. The author’s strategy, in this case, seems to be exploiting and highlighting the inconsistencies in the Kremlin’s ideology at different levels.
Patriotism versus politicization
Since the FoRS guidelines are vague, teachers have differing ideas about the course’s overall purpose. In their Telegram groups, two camps have formed.
The first advocates “patriotic education,” believing that FoRS should nurture patriotic values and foster “love for the motherland” among students. In contrast, the second camp is critical of politicization, arguing that FoRS should adopt a more “scientific” perspective and offer students a menu of ideologies to help them to become informed citizens. Some instructors try to find a middle ground, suggesting that more ideological diversity could be beneficial as long as the presented ideologies are not “anti-Russian.”
“The only problem is there are no guidelines on what constitutes ‘pro-Russian’ versus ‘anti-Russian’ ideologies.”
Andrei Polosin, deputy rector of RANEPA and academic director of the DNA of Russia project. Source: VK
In the Telegram chats, there are also proponents of particularly radical ideas, which, in some cases, go too far even for their fellow FoRS instructors. For example, in a discussion on how to explain the “dangers of liberalism” to students, some claimed that a multiparty system is an “anti-Russian idea,” though this view failed to find support.
For now, all these camps continue to work within the system. Yet one is left to wonder how much diversity is hidden behind the seemingly uniform ideological facade.
How to teach FoRS without getting in trouble?
When discussing the importance of shielding students from the “wrong” information, some teachers in the Telegram chats argue that those capable of thinking independently and analyzing information critically may eventually ask questions for which official propaganda lacks clear answers. They may also note inconsistencies – why a liberal cannot be a patriot, for example.
Teachers also express concern about the lack of clarity regarding which topics can be covered freely and which, if misinterpreted or simply mentioned, could entail repercussions for “discrediting” the authorities or worse. This problem is particularly acute given the conceptual gaps in the course, which teachers, amid the threat of “denunciations” from students, are left to fill in.
In teachers’ Telegram chats, there are also active discussions about so-called “provocateurs.” This label is usually refers to students who ask questions challenging the ideas taught, regardless of their own political views. Teachers finger foreign students, students sympathizing with the “liberal opposition” and those who use Western social media as the hardest to teach, as they are often opinionated and tend to question course material.
Another aspect of the debate concerning the FoRS is teachers’ qualifications. On Telegram, many instructors voice their disagreement on who should be deemed qualified to teach the course. Given its multidisciplinary nature – encompassing history, political science, law and philosophy – teachers struggle to reach a consensus on the ideal qualifications for an instructor.
Moreover, there are visible disagreements over the appropriate level of education for FoRS instructors. On the one hand, established professors with doctoral degrees dislike the idea of working in the same position as teachers with master’s degrees. (Assumptions about insufficient experience among holders of master’s degrees coincide with disapproval of the Russian education system as a whole.) Some of their younger peers, on the other hand, insist that their MA-level qualifications are sufficient, and they even call for the mandatory retirement of professors at age 50.
Finally, teachers tend to disagree with the creators of the course on who should take it. Many argue that the course is too complicated for first-year students, who, besides, are overloaded as it is with compulsory humanities courses, even if they are majoring in STEM subjects.
Is ideologization sustainable under Putinism?
Despite the Russian government’s attempts to ideologically permeate nearly all spheres of public life, their chances of success are far from certain. At the very least, their effectiveness is undermined by various challenges at the lower levels of the indoctrination system. In particular, the numerous grievances and criticisms expressed by the teachers of “patriotic upbringing” highlight the difficulties Putin’s regime faces in further expanding that system in Russian higher education. As the teachers’ discussions show, FoRS in its current form is problematic, both in content and in pedagogical design. Many teachers find the course conceptually inconsistent, vague in its purpose and difficult or even dangerous to teach.
More broadly, this suggests that the ideological transformation of the Russian political regime related to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine remains incomplete and uncertain. In any case, the Kremlin has struggled to find the ideological resources needed to adapt the political system to wartime.
Some observers have rushed to describe the Kremlin’s ongoing ideological endeavors as marking the transition from an authoritarian to a totalitarian regime. It remains to be seen, however, whether those in power in Russia have the means or even desire to implement such a radical transition.
Putin obviously seeks broader support among the younger generation and hopes to cultivate a pool of cheaper, more ideologically motivated cadres and soldiers. At the same time, he does not seem committed to or capable of building a regime based on mass political mobilization and a rigid and comprehensive ideology. His ideological aides are hardly unaware of this, and the lower-level ideologues in classrooms sense this too.
For now, all these camps continue to work within the system. Yet one is left to wonder how much diversity is hidden behind the seemingly uniform ideological facade.
How to teach FoRS without getting in trouble?
When discussing the importance of shielding students from the “wrong” information, some teachers in the Telegram chats argue that those capable of thinking independently and analyzing information critically may eventually ask questions for which official propaganda lacks clear answers. They may also note inconsistencies – why a liberal cannot be a patriot, for example.
Teachers also express concern about the lack of clarity regarding which topics can be covered freely and which, if misinterpreted or simply mentioned, could entail repercussions for “discrediting” the authorities or worse. This problem is particularly acute given the conceptual gaps in the course, which teachers, amid the threat of “denunciations” from students, are left to fill in.
In teachers’ Telegram chats, there are also active discussions about so-called “provocateurs.” This label is usually refers to students who ask questions challenging the ideas taught, regardless of their own political views. Teachers finger foreign students, students sympathizing with the “liberal opposition” and those who use Western social media as the hardest to teach, as they are often opinionated and tend to question course material.
Another aspect of the debate concerning the FoRS is teachers’ qualifications. On Telegram, many instructors voice their disagreement on who should be deemed qualified to teach the course. Given its multidisciplinary nature – encompassing history, political science, law and philosophy – teachers struggle to reach a consensus on the ideal qualifications for an instructor.
Moreover, there are visible disagreements over the appropriate level of education for FoRS instructors. On the one hand, established professors with doctoral degrees dislike the idea of working in the same position as teachers with master’s degrees. (Assumptions about insufficient experience among holders of master’s degrees coincide with disapproval of the Russian education system as a whole.) Some of their younger peers, on the other hand, insist that their MA-level qualifications are sufficient, and they even call for the mandatory retirement of professors at age 50.
Finally, teachers tend to disagree with the creators of the course on who should take it. Many argue that the course is too complicated for first-year students, who, besides, are overloaded as it is with compulsory humanities courses, even if they are majoring in STEM subjects.
Is ideologization sustainable under Putinism?
Despite the Russian government’s attempts to ideologically permeate nearly all spheres of public life, their chances of success are far from certain. At the very least, their effectiveness is undermined by various challenges at the lower levels of the indoctrination system. In particular, the numerous grievances and criticisms expressed by the teachers of “patriotic upbringing” highlight the difficulties Putin’s regime faces in further expanding that system in Russian higher education. As the teachers’ discussions show, FoRS in its current form is problematic, both in content and in pedagogical design. Many teachers find the course conceptually inconsistent, vague in its purpose and difficult or even dangerous to teach.
More broadly, this suggests that the ideological transformation of the Russian political regime related to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine remains incomplete and uncertain. In any case, the Kremlin has struggled to find the ideological resources needed to adapt the political system to wartime.
Some observers have rushed to describe the Kremlin’s ongoing ideological endeavors as marking the transition from an authoritarian to a totalitarian regime. It remains to be seen, however, whether those in power in Russia have the means or even desire to implement such a radical transition.
Putin obviously seeks broader support among the younger generation and hopes to cultivate a pool of cheaper, more ideologically motivated cadres and soldiers. At the same time, he does not seem committed to or capable of building a regime based on mass political mobilization and a rigid and comprehensive ideology. His ideological aides are hardly unaware of this, and the lower-level ideologues in classrooms sense this too.
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