Politics
A Dangerous Parody of the Cuban Missile Crisis
August 7, 2025
- Alexander GoltsJournalist
Journalist Alexander Golts warns that amid a fundamental breakdown in bilateral relations in the sphere of strategic stability, the rhetorical showdown between Medvedev and Trump risks a catastrophe.
Cuban Missile Crisis. United States Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson shows aerial photos of Russian missiles in Cuba to the United Nations Security Council in the presence of USSR ambassador Valerian Zorin. October 1962. Source: Wiki Commons
In previous articles in Russia.Post, I wrote that with the collapse of the system of nuclear arms control agreements between Moscow and Washington, which took more than half a century to construct, humanity is opening the door to an extremely dangerous world. A world in which nuclear escalation can occur suddenly and spiral rapidly.
In early August, events took place that suggest this dangerous world has already arrived. Before our eyes, a parody of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis unfolded.
Trump announced that he had “ordered two Nuclear Submarines to be positioned in the appropriate regions, just in case these foolish and inflammatory statements are more than just that.” Two days later, he clarified that he had ordered the submarines “closer to Russia.” How can one not recall President Kennedy’s famous ultimatum? The difference, of course, is that unlike the events of 60 years ago, the trigger was not the deployment of nuclear missiles by an adversary just a few dozen miles from US territory, but simply a Telegram post, written by a politician whom few would dare to call authoritative.
Social media showdown
Medvedev, the former president whom Putin did not allow to run for a second term, now occupies a peculiar position in Putin’s power hierarchy. The post of deputy chair of Russia’s Security Council was created specifically for him.
Formally, he chairs the Interdepartmental Commission on Staffing the Russian Armed Forces and serves as first deputy chair of the Military-Industrial Commission. At the same time, it is obvious that he has no actual authority. Matters related to the defense industry and military recruitment are handled by entirely different people: Defense Minister Andrei Belousov, Minister of Industry and Trade Denis Manturov and Viktor Chemezov, chief of Rostec, which produces more than 70% of Russia’s military output.
Since the beginning of the war against Ukraine, Medvedev has regularly drawn attention for his extremely aggressive posts in Telegram and social media. In an unhinged tone, he routinely threatens Western countries with nuclear war.
By all accounts, the goal of Medvedev’s escapades is to erase any memory of the liberal aspirations of his presidency and to demonstrate unwavering loyalty to Putin.
In early August, events took place that suggest this dangerous world has already arrived. Before our eyes, a parody of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis unfolded.
Trump announced that he had “ordered two Nuclear Submarines to be positioned in the appropriate regions, just in case these foolish and inflammatory statements are more than just that.” Two days later, he clarified that he had ordered the submarines “closer to Russia.” How can one not recall President Kennedy’s famous ultimatum? The difference, of course, is that unlike the events of 60 years ago, the trigger was not the deployment of nuclear missiles by an adversary just a few dozen miles from US territory, but simply a Telegram post, written by a politician whom few would dare to call authoritative.
Social media showdown
Medvedev, the former president whom Putin did not allow to run for a second term, now occupies a peculiar position in Putin’s power hierarchy. The post of deputy chair of Russia’s Security Council was created specifically for him.
Formally, he chairs the Interdepartmental Commission on Staffing the Russian Armed Forces and serves as first deputy chair of the Military-Industrial Commission. At the same time, it is obvious that he has no actual authority. Matters related to the defense industry and military recruitment are handled by entirely different people: Defense Minister Andrei Belousov, Minister of Industry and Trade Denis Manturov and Viktor Chemezov, chief of Rostec, which produces more than 70% of Russia’s military output.
Since the beginning of the war against Ukraine, Medvedev has regularly drawn attention for his extremely aggressive posts in Telegram and social media. In an unhinged tone, he routinely threatens Western countries with nuclear war.
By all accounts, the goal of Medvedev’s escapades is to erase any memory of the liberal aspirations of his presidency and to demonstrate unwavering loyalty to Putin.
“In the West, these posts had been largely ignored, the former president’s threats not taken seriously. That changed recently when Trump got into an online spat with Medvedev.”
Dmitri Medvedev at a meeting of Russia's Security Council's Interdepartmental Commission on Recruiting Contract Soldiers for the Russian Armed Forces. Source: Telegram
In June, after the US airstrike on Iran, Medvedev wrote on X that “a number of countries are ready to directly supply Iran with their own nuclear warheads.” Trump lashed out: “did I hear Former President Medvedev, from Russia, casually throwing around the ‘N word’ (Nuclear!), and saying that he and other Countries would supply Nuclear Warheads to Iran? Did he really say that or, is it just a figment of my imagination? If he did say that, and, if confirmed, please let me know, IMMEDIATELY. The ‘N word’ should not be treated so casually.”
The sharpness had an effect: Medvedev was forced to clarify that Russia does not intend to transfer nuclear weapons to Iran.
But a month later, Medvedev decided to get even. When Trump announced that he was shortening, from several weeks to just 10-12 days, the deadline he had given Putin to make peace in Ukraine or face tougher sanctions, Medvedev wrote: “each new ultimatum is a threat and a step towards war. Not between Russia and Ukraine, but with his own country. Don’t go down the Sleepy Joe road!”
Trump responded that Medvedev was “entering very dangerous territory.” He also called the Russian economy “dead” and warned Medvedev not to play with fire. That was when the former president of Russia, apparently with Putin’s sanction, began making serious threats.
Following his rather strange train of thought, Medvedev decided to remind Trump of the Perimeter nuclear weapons control system, developed back in Soviet times and known in the West as “Dead Hand.” Its purpose is to launch Russian nuclear missiles automatically. That was when Trump announced his order to deploy nuclear submarines “closer to Russia,” explaining that it was necessary “just in case these foolish and inflammatory statements are more than just that.” This entire episode may well go down in military history textbooks as the first international conflict to originate on social media.
Putin sets the tone
Let’s acknowledge that Russian leaders’ habit of threatening the use of nuclear threats, with and without good reason, did not begin with Medvedev. For the past 20 years, Putin has regularly reminded the world of the Kremlin’s ability to blow up the planet. He has spoken of magical glide warheads capable of penetrating US missile defenses. He has unveiled the development of a super-torpedo and a super-missile powered by nuclear engines.
Perhaps Putin was most explicit in 2018: “any aggressor should know that retaliation is inevitable, and they will be annihilated. And we as the victims of an aggression, we as martyrs would go to paradise while they will simply perish because they will not even have time to repent for their sins.”
The sharpness had an effect: Medvedev was forced to clarify that Russia does not intend to transfer nuclear weapons to Iran.
But a month later, Medvedev decided to get even. When Trump announced that he was shortening, from several weeks to just 10-12 days, the deadline he had given Putin to make peace in Ukraine or face tougher sanctions, Medvedev wrote: “each new ultimatum is a threat and a step towards war. Not between Russia and Ukraine, but with his own country. Don’t go down the Sleepy Joe road!”
Trump responded that Medvedev was “entering very dangerous territory.” He also called the Russian economy “dead” and warned Medvedev not to play with fire. That was when the former president of Russia, apparently with Putin’s sanction, began making serious threats.
Following his rather strange train of thought, Medvedev decided to remind Trump of the Perimeter nuclear weapons control system, developed back in Soviet times and known in the West as “Dead Hand.” Its purpose is to launch Russian nuclear missiles automatically. That was when Trump announced his order to deploy nuclear submarines “closer to Russia,” explaining that it was necessary “just in case these foolish and inflammatory statements are more than just that.” This entire episode may well go down in military history textbooks as the first international conflict to originate on social media.
Putin sets the tone
Let’s acknowledge that Russian leaders’ habit of threatening the use of nuclear threats, with and without good reason, did not begin with Medvedev. For the past 20 years, Putin has regularly reminded the world of the Kremlin’s ability to blow up the planet. He has spoken of magical glide warheads capable of penetrating US missile defenses. He has unveiled the development of a super-torpedo and a super-missile powered by nuclear engines.
Perhaps Putin was most explicit in 2018: “any aggressor should know that retaliation is inevitable, and they will be annihilated. And we as the victims of an aggression, we as martyrs would go to paradise while they will simply perish because they will not even have time to repent for their sins.”
“Since the start of the full-scale war against Ukraine, nuclear threats have become one of the Kremlin’s key tools for communicating with the West.”
Nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine USS OHIO (SSBN-726). Source: Wiki Commons
Just days before Russia formally annexed several regions of Ukraine, Putin announced a partial mobilization and warned that if Russia’s territorial integrity were threatened, it would use all means at its disposal, including nuclear weapons. On the day Trump made public his order to deploy nuclear submarines, Putin rejected Trump’s demand for a ceasefire. Of course, he backed this up with an announcement that serial production of his latest wonder weapon, the Oreshnik medium-range missile, had started and that the first system had already been delivered to the military.
The previous US administration preferred to ignore Russia’s nuclear threats in the public sphere. When they became especially unhinged, as during Russia’s demonstrative tactical nuclear exercises, a Pentagon spokesperson would respond coldly, stating that despite the rhetoric, no changes had been observed in the deployment of Russia’s nuclear forces. In other words, the US did not intend to take any action.
Only once did Washington respond with concrete steps. In autumn 2022, after a series of major setbacks, the Kremlin appeared to seriously contemplate the use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield. US President Joe Biden publicly acknowledged this: “for the first time since the Cuban Missile Crisis, we have a direct threat to the use of nuclear weapons, if in fact things continue down the path they have been going.”
Soon afterward, a White House spokesperson confirmed that CIA Director William Burns had personally warned Sergei Naryshkin, head of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service, about the consequences of using nuclear weapons, saying: “he is conveying a message on the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons by Russia, and the risks of escalation to strategic stability.”
After that, Russia’s threats subsided. As we can see, the Biden administration consistently distinguished between the Kremlin’s rhetoric and its actual behavior (or actual intentions to do something).
When words become actions
By ordering submarines to be deployed in response to rhetoric, Trump changed the game. He said: “words are very important, and can often lead to unintended consequences.”
Irresponsible talk about nuclear weapons and threats to use them vividly illustrates the degradation of Russian politics, as no arguments are left other than reducing Russia’s enemies to radioactive ash.
Yet the fact remains: Trump has moved the situation into a state of actual – not rhetorical – nuclear escalation.
The previous US administration preferred to ignore Russia’s nuclear threats in the public sphere. When they became especially unhinged, as during Russia’s demonstrative tactical nuclear exercises, a Pentagon spokesperson would respond coldly, stating that despite the rhetoric, no changes had been observed in the deployment of Russia’s nuclear forces. In other words, the US did not intend to take any action.
Only once did Washington respond with concrete steps. In autumn 2022, after a series of major setbacks, the Kremlin appeared to seriously contemplate the use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield. US President Joe Biden publicly acknowledged this: “for the first time since the Cuban Missile Crisis, we have a direct threat to the use of nuclear weapons, if in fact things continue down the path they have been going.”
Soon afterward, a White House spokesperson confirmed that CIA Director William Burns had personally warned Sergei Naryshkin, head of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service, about the consequences of using nuclear weapons, saying: “he is conveying a message on the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons by Russia, and the risks of escalation to strategic stability.”
After that, Russia’s threats subsided. As we can see, the Biden administration consistently distinguished between the Kremlin’s rhetoric and its actual behavior (or actual intentions to do something).
When words become actions
By ordering submarines to be deployed in response to rhetoric, Trump changed the game. He said: “words are very important, and can often lead to unintended consequences.”
Irresponsible talk about nuclear weapons and threats to use them vividly illustrates the degradation of Russian politics, as no arguments are left other than reducing Russia’s enemies to radioactive ash.
Yet the fact remains: Trump has moved the situation into a state of actual – not rhetorical – nuclear escalation.
“It is not reliably known what Trump had in mind. All information concerning the movement of US submarines is classified.”
What is known is that 8-10 of the US Navy’s 14 Ohio-class submarines carrying strategic missiles are constantly at sea, where they are extremely difficult to detect. That, in fact, is the essence of their mission. These submarines, always ready to launch, are guarantors of deterrence, i.e., a state in which no adversary would risk initiating a nuclear strike, fearing retaliation from the depths of the ocean.
Armed with missiles that have a range of 12,000 kilometers, they can hit nearly any target on Earth from almost any deployment area. They typically patrol well-defended areas – deploying them somewhere else does not make sense.
Deploying nuclear-powered attack submarines (of which the US has more than 50) to forward positions would make more tactical sense. Their primary task is to hunt for an adversary’s ballistic missile submarines, complicating their ability to launch. These vessels can also strike land targets, but their Tomahawk cruise missiles are conventionally armed. For deterrence, they must be deployed in significant numbers. Moving just two such submarines closer to Russia is unlikely to have a meaningful effect.
Of course, Trump could have sent two of the four converted Ohio-class submarines, each capable of carrying 150 Tomahawks. But deploying them without proper cover is risky. Thus, Trump’s move amounts to little more than a symbolic show of force.
Still, that does not make the situation any less dangerous. Trump’s order has made nuclear escalation a reality. Let’s imagine, to humanity’s misfortune, that at a time when US-Russia tensions have worsened to the point of a nuclear standoff, one side’s early-warning system suddenly fails.
There have been multiple instances of such failures. On November 9, 1979, for example, the NORAD command center received satellite data suggesting a massive Soviet missile launch against the US. The data corresponded closely to assumed Soviet launch scenarios. Roughly 1,000 Minuteman ICBM crews were ordered to put their missiles on standby as 10 interceptor jets were scrambled to confirm the Soviet strike. Six minutes later, the alarm was declared to have been false.
Perhaps the most well-known incident occurred on September 26, 1983. Sunlight reflecting off clouds had triggered sensors in the Soviet Oko early-warning satellite to report the launch of a US ICBM. Only the calm of a single officer, duty shift commander Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Petrov, prevented catastrophe.
In such a situation, the leaders of Russia and the US would have, at best, 20 minutes to assess the threat. A global catastrophe could take place because of words on social media.
Until quite recently, a system existed to prevent these situations. It included multiple hotlines to allow direct contact between military leaders during crises. START established a Bilateral Consultative Commission to resolve disputes. And in 2014, as a confidence-building measure, Russia finally fulfilled Yeltsin’s pledge not to preload flight coordinates into Russian missiles.
But in the current climate, with strategic stability fundamentally falling apart, it is no longer clear which agreements are still in force and which are not. And in the absence of reliable information about the other side’s intentions, the military will assume the worst scenario is the most likely.
With catastrophic consequences.
Armed with missiles that have a range of 12,000 kilometers, they can hit nearly any target on Earth from almost any deployment area. They typically patrol well-defended areas – deploying them somewhere else does not make sense.
Deploying nuclear-powered attack submarines (of which the US has more than 50) to forward positions would make more tactical sense. Their primary task is to hunt for an adversary’s ballistic missile submarines, complicating their ability to launch. These vessels can also strike land targets, but their Tomahawk cruise missiles are conventionally armed. For deterrence, they must be deployed in significant numbers. Moving just two such submarines closer to Russia is unlikely to have a meaningful effect.
Of course, Trump could have sent two of the four converted Ohio-class submarines, each capable of carrying 150 Tomahawks. But deploying them without proper cover is risky. Thus, Trump’s move amounts to little more than a symbolic show of force.
Still, that does not make the situation any less dangerous. Trump’s order has made nuclear escalation a reality. Let’s imagine, to humanity’s misfortune, that at a time when US-Russia tensions have worsened to the point of a nuclear standoff, one side’s early-warning system suddenly fails.
There have been multiple instances of such failures. On November 9, 1979, for example, the NORAD command center received satellite data suggesting a massive Soviet missile launch against the US. The data corresponded closely to assumed Soviet launch scenarios. Roughly 1,000 Minuteman ICBM crews were ordered to put their missiles on standby as 10 interceptor jets were scrambled to confirm the Soviet strike. Six minutes later, the alarm was declared to have been false.
Perhaps the most well-known incident occurred on September 26, 1983. Sunlight reflecting off clouds had triggered sensors in the Soviet Oko early-warning satellite to report the launch of a US ICBM. Only the calm of a single officer, duty shift commander Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Petrov, prevented catastrophe.
In such a situation, the leaders of Russia and the US would have, at best, 20 minutes to assess the threat. A global catastrophe could take place because of words on social media.
Until quite recently, a system existed to prevent these situations. It included multiple hotlines to allow direct contact between military leaders during crises. START established a Bilateral Consultative Commission to resolve disputes. And in 2014, as a confidence-building measure, Russia finally fulfilled Yeltsin’s pledge not to preload flight coordinates into Russian missiles.
But in the current climate, with strategic stability fundamentally falling apart, it is no longer clear which agreements are still in force and which are not. And in the absence of reliable information about the other side’s intentions, the military will assume the worst scenario is the most likely.
With catastrophic consequences.
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