ECONOMY
Alaska: Another False Start or a Breakthrough?
August 25, 2025
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Vladislav Inozemtsev
Cofounder and expert at the Center for Analysis and Strategies in Europe (CASE) in Nicosia, Cyprus
Economist Vladislav Inozemtsev makes the argument that Trump’s diplomacy has created unusually favorable conditions to achieve an end to the Russia-Ukraine war.
The original text in Russian was published in the Moscow Times and is being republished here with the author’s permission.
Over the last few weeks, developments have taken place that, if they have not radically changed existing political alignments, have at least opened up extensive opportunities for change. The driver of these developments is US President Trump, who now stands to reap either all the rewards or all the blame from the process he has set in motion.
It is still too early to predict the outcome, so for now I will focus only on what can already be analyzed.
Over the last few weeks, developments have taken place that, if they have not radically changed existing political alignments, have at least opened up extensive opportunities for change. The driver of these developments is US President Trump, who now stands to reap either all the rewards or all the blame from the process he has set in motion.
It is still too early to predict the outcome, so for now I will focus only on what can already be analyzed.
President Donald J. Trump welcomes Russian President Vladimir Putin to Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Anchorage, Alaska, August 15, 2025.
Source: Wiki Commons
Source: Wiki Commons
A ram for a peacekeeper
First of all, Trump has shown himself to be a politician who does not take public opinion into account when he is solving a problem, and in my view, this is more of an advantage than a disadvantage. He invited Putin to Alaska, ignoring all the outcry about rolling out the red carpet for a war criminal and aggressor.
At the same time, Trump appears not only to have gained an understanding of Putin’s demands but also to have persuaded him that neither the US nor the West as a whole is ready to grant all his wishes. He has agreed to nothing for Ukraine, behind its back; instead, he has made himself the central figure in a new form of “shuttle diplomacy,” aiming to narrow the gap between the sides and bring about peace. This deserves respect, since the US could just as well have ignored the issue, reaping maximum gains from the conflict by supplying weapons to Ukraine at Europe’s expense, as was recently agreed to.
Three days after the meeting with Putin in Alaska, Trump held very respectful talks with Zelensky. Even the White House welcoming ceremony singled him out among all the European leaders, and they, in turn, demonstrated perfectly the role and place of Ukraine’s allies in Europe. Without disparaging their support (their readiness to help Kyiv is confirmed by the preliminary agreement to provide nearly $100 billion in financing to buy US weapons), I would argue the “support group” that went to Washington did not do so to keep Trump from offending Zelensky, but to make sure Zelensky himself did not “go after” Trump and derail the peace process. Otherwise, the Europeans would have to find a way out of what seem to be emotional and rash promises to “stand with Ukraine” even if the US walked away – promises they had no intention of keeping.
Trump’s moves come at an exceptionally opportune moment: he needs to show progress on ending the Ukraine war before Congress comes back from recess in early September. Earlier, before the recess, Trump, promising to do everything himself, had effectively put the brakes on a bill imposing tariffs on buyers of Russian oil.
Will the war end soon?
Zelensky is ready to talk peace and adjust Ukraine’s position against the backdrop of Russian advances on the battlefield, intensifying raids on Ukrainian cities and less Western military support. I will leave aside the issue of mobilization.
First of all, Trump has shown himself to be a politician who does not take public opinion into account when he is solving a problem, and in my view, this is more of an advantage than a disadvantage. He invited Putin to Alaska, ignoring all the outcry about rolling out the red carpet for a war criminal and aggressor.
At the same time, Trump appears not only to have gained an understanding of Putin’s demands but also to have persuaded him that neither the US nor the West as a whole is ready to grant all his wishes. He has agreed to nothing for Ukraine, behind its back; instead, he has made himself the central figure in a new form of “shuttle diplomacy,” aiming to narrow the gap between the sides and bring about peace. This deserves respect, since the US could just as well have ignored the issue, reaping maximum gains from the conflict by supplying weapons to Ukraine at Europe’s expense, as was recently agreed to.
Three days after the meeting with Putin in Alaska, Trump held very respectful talks with Zelensky. Even the White House welcoming ceremony singled him out among all the European leaders, and they, in turn, demonstrated perfectly the role and place of Ukraine’s allies in Europe. Without disparaging their support (their readiness to help Kyiv is confirmed by the preliminary agreement to provide nearly $100 billion in financing to buy US weapons), I would argue the “support group” that went to Washington did not do so to keep Trump from offending Zelensky, but to make sure Zelensky himself did not “go after” Trump and derail the peace process. Otherwise, the Europeans would have to find a way out of what seem to be emotional and rash promises to “stand with Ukraine” even if the US walked away – promises they had no intention of keeping.
Trump’s moves come at an exceptionally opportune moment: he needs to show progress on ending the Ukraine war before Congress comes back from recess in early September. Earlier, before the recess, Trump, promising to do everything himself, had effectively put the brakes on a bill imposing tariffs on buyers of Russian oil.
Will the war end soon?
Zelensky is ready to talk peace and adjust Ukraine’s position against the backdrop of Russian advances on the battlefield, intensifying raids on Ukrainian cities and less Western military support. I will leave aside the issue of mobilization.
“The Europeans, for their part, have little appetite even to put their economies on a war footing, let alone reinstate conscription or send soldiers to fight Russian thugs in the Donbas.”
They are therefore inclined to back peace efforts as soon as they appear feasible. This was on display in Washington, where the closing remarks amounted to little more than admiration and gratitude toward the host.
Even Putin has good reason to consider ending the war – likely only for a time, as I doubt his obsessive idea of finding a “final solution to the Ukraine question” will go away. Economic headwinds are mounting, and Moscow must reckon with a likely tightening of sanctions should Trump’s efforts not be properly appreciated.
All of this has created favorable conditions for peace. I mean peace – not just a truce or ceasefire – as the entire logic of the current talks is to reach a long-term settlement. If one is reached, it will be presented as such, even if it is later violated. I thus expect a quick end to hostilities.
The course of recent negotiations gives grounds for my optimism, since each element has naturally led to the next. The meeting in Anchorage made communication with Zelensky inevitable. That, in turn, provoked the visit of an unprecedented European delegation to Washington. The visible softening of Kyiv’s stance, together with Trump’s own effort, now looks set to form the basis for Putin’s consent to meet Zelensky, something he has long resisted. A “tripartite summit,” which Trump has mentioned more than once, thus looks entirely possible. It could produce a preliminary peace deal from which the final document would follow.
Even Putin has good reason to consider ending the war – likely only for a time, as I doubt his obsessive idea of finding a “final solution to the Ukraine question” will go away. Economic headwinds are mounting, and Moscow must reckon with a likely tightening of sanctions should Trump’s efforts not be properly appreciated.
All of this has created favorable conditions for peace. I mean peace – not just a truce or ceasefire – as the entire logic of the current talks is to reach a long-term settlement. If one is reached, it will be presented as such, even if it is later violated. I thus expect a quick end to hostilities.
The course of recent negotiations gives grounds for my optimism, since each element has naturally led to the next. The meeting in Anchorage made communication with Zelensky inevitable. That, in turn, provoked the visit of an unprecedented European delegation to Washington. The visible softening of Kyiv’s stance, together with Trump’s own effort, now looks set to form the basis for Putin’s consent to meet Zelensky, something he has long resisted. A “tripartite summit,” which Trump has mentioned more than once, thus looks entirely possible. It could produce a preliminary peace deal from which the final document would follow.
“At each stage, a certain acceptance of the new reality takes place, and the sides slowly are reducing their opposition to proposals that only until recently seemed impossible or unlikely.”
Trump–Zelenskyy Oval Office meeting. August 2025. Source: YouTube
Every meeting produces promises that facilitate a new batch of them. Finally, that the White House so openly wields its financial and military leverage to pressure its partners is actually encouraging, as in this case the end justifies the means.
Big meeting brewing
How quickly could the next steps follow? It has already been said that a trilateral meeting of Trump, Zelensky and Putin should take place within two weeks. This seems likely to me – not least because it would suit both the Americans and the Europeans for Putin to arrive in Beijing to see his friend Xi after everything has already been decided, without the “invaluable” participation of China, which until recently was described as just about the only way out of the deadlock.
Trump’s general stance on both Putin and the war in Ukraine suggests that he views the conflict as internal to the Western world, with both sides belonging to a Eurocentric civilization. He is thus unlikely to bring in non-Western powers to settle it. One might recall Trump’s recent laments that his predecessors had “lost” Russia, carelessly allowing it to become a Chinese satellite.
What might be the contours (literally demarcation lines and borders) of a potential agreement? This remains the hardest question, since it has caused and will continue to cause the greatest disagreements.
The most difficult issue concerns those parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions not yet occupied by Russia. Most likely, Trump and Zelensky will push for Russian and Ukrainian zones of control to match the current front line; if any troop withdrawals are to take place, they would be offset by equal territorial concessions in other regions. This approach is viable, but the price will be concessions on other issues like officially recognizing new borders and rolling back sanctions.
On the first point, I believe Trump remains ready to recognize Crimea as part of Russia officially. (In a sense, this would be consistent with the norm that borders should not be changed by military force, as a “referendum” on becoming part of Russia was held and no war was fought for the peninsula.) If so, the difference in how Russia acquired other Ukrainian regions would take care of the question of their formal recognition as Russian territory.
Sanctions are another matter. They are a major asset for Ukraine and the West and easing or lifting them will likely be stretched out over many years, serving as leverage to ensure Russia complies with any commitments under an agreement. Moreover, it is hard to remove sanctions in general and given the Europeans’ reluctance to abandon them and enthusiasm to see them expanded in particular.
NATO, but not NATO
It is no surprise that particular attention at the Washington meeting was paid to formalizing security guarantees for Ukraine, especially since its accession to the alliance has been definitively taken off the agenda.
Big meeting brewing
How quickly could the next steps follow? It has already been said that a trilateral meeting of Trump, Zelensky and Putin should take place within two weeks. This seems likely to me – not least because it would suit both the Americans and the Europeans for Putin to arrive in Beijing to see his friend Xi after everything has already been decided, without the “invaluable” participation of China, which until recently was described as just about the only way out of the deadlock.
Trump’s general stance on both Putin and the war in Ukraine suggests that he views the conflict as internal to the Western world, with both sides belonging to a Eurocentric civilization. He is thus unlikely to bring in non-Western powers to settle it. One might recall Trump’s recent laments that his predecessors had “lost” Russia, carelessly allowing it to become a Chinese satellite.
What might be the contours (literally demarcation lines and borders) of a potential agreement? This remains the hardest question, since it has caused and will continue to cause the greatest disagreements.
The most difficult issue concerns those parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions not yet occupied by Russia. Most likely, Trump and Zelensky will push for Russian and Ukrainian zones of control to match the current front line; if any troop withdrawals are to take place, they would be offset by equal territorial concessions in other regions. This approach is viable, but the price will be concessions on other issues like officially recognizing new borders and rolling back sanctions.
On the first point, I believe Trump remains ready to recognize Crimea as part of Russia officially. (In a sense, this would be consistent with the norm that borders should not be changed by military force, as a “referendum” on becoming part of Russia was held and no war was fought for the peninsula.) If so, the difference in how Russia acquired other Ukrainian regions would take care of the question of their formal recognition as Russian territory.
Sanctions are another matter. They are a major asset for Ukraine and the West and easing or lifting them will likely be stretched out over many years, serving as leverage to ensure Russia complies with any commitments under an agreement. Moreover, it is hard to remove sanctions in general and given the Europeans’ reluctance to abandon them and enthusiasm to see them expanded in particular.
NATO, but not NATO
It is no surprise that particular attention at the Washington meeting was paid to formalizing security guarantees for Ukraine, especially since its accession to the alliance has been definitively taken off the agenda.
“In my view, the idea of guarantees like ‘Article 5 without NATO membership’ seems workable.”
Trump–Zelenskyy Oval Office meeting. February 2025. Source: Wiki Commons
Such a mechanism would create only unilateral obligations: certain states would be obliged to defend Ukraine if it were attacked, while Ukraine would not be obliged to defend them if they were attacked. It would not provide for any joint operations with guarantor states in peacetime, nor the deployment of their troops or bases in Ukraine, nor perhaps even joint military exercises – all this could be plainly laid out to meet Moscow’s demands.
What really makes me doubtful, however, is that I do not know of a single case in which any Western country or, for example, NATO as a bloc “automatically” came to the defense of a state with which they had agreements to provide military assistance. (US interventions have typically been preceded by complex maneuvers like the adoption of UN Security Council resolutions, as in the case of Iraq’s aggression against Kuwait and the formation of various coalition forces to carry out retaliatory operations.)
The question of whether such guarantees would prove effective therefore remains in doubt. Still, their very existence would lower the Kremlin’s appetite for new aggression. Russian interference in Ukraine is rooted in post-Soviet geopolitics: since the collapse of the USSR, Russia and Europe have seen Ukraine as “theirs,” but the country has never formally included into Russian or European integration projects.
Putin will never abandon the idea of a “final solution to the Ukraine question.” What matters now is the method he will employ in pursuing it.
What really makes me doubtful, however, is that I do not know of a single case in which any Western country or, for example, NATO as a bloc “automatically” came to the defense of a state with which they had agreements to provide military assistance. (US interventions have typically been preceded by complex maneuvers like the adoption of UN Security Council resolutions, as in the case of Iraq’s aggression against Kuwait and the formation of various coalition forces to carry out retaliatory operations.)
The question of whether such guarantees would prove effective therefore remains in doubt. Still, their very existence would lower the Kremlin’s appetite for new aggression. Russian interference in Ukraine is rooted in post-Soviet geopolitics: since the collapse of the USSR, Russia and Europe have seen Ukraine as “theirs,” but the country has never formally included into Russian or European integration projects.
Putin will never abandon the idea of a “final solution to the Ukraine question.” What matters now is the method he will employ in pursuing it.
“I would expect domestic destabilization inside Ukraine, together with the activation of pro-Russia forces there, to become the Kremlin’s preferred method for some time.”
The pro-Russia cause has taken a hit, but the Kremlin’s repertoire of subversive tactics and recruitment is extensive.
As for openly violating the peace agreement and starting a new war, I think that will come only after Trump leaves the White House. For now, the Kremlin is likely to treat any agreement as a personal matter and will therefore lean toward observing it. Moreover, I am far from convinced that Russia today has the strength or the resources for another prolonged war, which would hardly be any easier than the one that is now perhaps nearing an end.
From Ukraine’s standpoint
Another important question is how the Ukrainian government and Ukrainian society will react. All public opinion polls show that Ukrainians want the war to end – if not at any cost, then at least by making significant concessions. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian government remains visibly skeptical and is likely to agree to such terms only as a last resort. Much in its current behavior suggests it is fine with the status quo: the prevailing belief is that victory over Russia might still be won if the West provides enough support.
The prowar segment of Ukrainian society is quite large, influential and active. I would venture to say that if any peace deal is signed, Zelensky will have little hope of winning the next election. (Here one recalls the exchange in the Oval Office about holding elections during wartime.) The Ukrainian president is hardly enthusiastic about that. Thus, we see there are obstacles to implementing a peace plan outside of Moscow.
Naturally, the chances of a peaceful settlement remain highly uncertain. But recent developments nonetheless give grounds for tempered optimism. I hope it is not misplaced.
As for openly violating the peace agreement and starting a new war, I think that will come only after Trump leaves the White House. For now, the Kremlin is likely to treat any agreement as a personal matter and will therefore lean toward observing it. Moreover, I am far from convinced that Russia today has the strength or the resources for another prolonged war, which would hardly be any easier than the one that is now perhaps nearing an end.
From Ukraine’s standpoint
Another important question is how the Ukrainian government and Ukrainian society will react. All public opinion polls show that Ukrainians want the war to end – if not at any cost, then at least by making significant concessions. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian government remains visibly skeptical and is likely to agree to such terms only as a last resort. Much in its current behavior suggests it is fine with the status quo: the prevailing belief is that victory over Russia might still be won if the West provides enough support.
The prowar segment of Ukrainian society is quite large, influential and active. I would venture to say that if any peace deal is signed, Zelensky will have little hope of winning the next election. (Here one recalls the exchange in the Oval Office about holding elections during wartime.) The Ukrainian president is hardly enthusiastic about that. Thus, we see there are obstacles to implementing a peace plan outside of Moscow.
Naturally, the chances of a peaceful settlement remain highly uncertain. But recent developments nonetheless give grounds for tempered optimism. I hope it is not misplaced.
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