Russian analysts working for state institutions
point to Moscow’s long-standing demand to eliminate the “root causes” of the conflict, meaning that any deal in Ukraine is linked to a comprehensive reassessment of Russia-West relations.
“If Russia believes this plan will eliminate the root causes of the Ukraine conflict, then it will be [considered] acceptable. After that, it would be appropriate to move toward a regime of peaceful coexistence in Europe. We need to return to our foundations and build a European security system, and this is a major, separate issue that must be addressed,” said Sergei Oznobishchev, head of the military-political research and analysis at the Moscow-based Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO).
“I believe this plan still fails to resolve the fundamental contradictions within the European security architecture. Tensions will remain, in part because the infrastructure of NATO and the EU is oriented toward deterring Russia, a course that is extremely difficult to reverse,” argues Igor Istomin, who chairs the department of applied international studies at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO).
At the same time, Russian pro-Kremlin analysts acknowledge that the version of the plan published by Axios and Honcharenko may be unacceptable for Kyiv.
“All the components of the agreement appear quite logical, but will Zelensky accept these terms? I believe such concessions would be suicidal for him politically,” said Oznobishchev of IMEMO.
Vadim Kozyulin, head researcher at the Russian Diplomatic Academy’s Center for Global Studies and International Relations, says:
From Russia’s perspective, the plan looks realistic, whereas for the EU and Ukraine it is completely unacceptable. A strong position for Moscow, a weak one for Kyiv – this broadly corresponds to the current situation: Russia is advancing, Ukraine is losing territory and is shaken by internal corruption scandals. But it will probably take further fighting to make this plan acceptable to both sides.
As for the possibility of compromise, I do not see it. All the key points – including Russia’s basic demands such as the status of the Russian language and the Orthodox Church, a ban on NATO membership, limits on the size of the armed forces and a prohibition on the placement of foreign troops in Ukraine – are unacceptable for Kyiv, to say nothing of territorial concessions that Ukraine, under its Constitution, cannot make. A breakthrough is unlikely in the near future.
Another theme that appears in several comments by Russian pro-government analysts is the potential unsustainability of the arrangement called for in the 28-point plan – due to the risk of revanchist sentiment in Ukraine.
Political scientist Valery Garbuzov, a so-called corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, cautions: “if Ukraine signs something under pressure, it will do so through gritted teeth. When states act in this manner, they suppress grievances; revanchist forces emerge seeking to reclaim what has been lost. So-called ‘Versailles syndrome’ develops, like in the Weimar Republic after World War I. And this is even worse, as such an atmosphere creates highly favorable conditions for revanchism. A solution of this kind creates new problems.”
“Overall, for Ukraine and for the West, this would be a temporary arrangement,” Oznobishchev concludes. “In 1918, there was the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, from which Russia sought by every means to free itself. Similar sentiments will take hold in Ukraine, and the next president, I am certain, will have the ‘return of ancestral Ukrainian territories’ in his campaign. Thus, the situation may stabilize, but only briefly (historically speaking). In the future, this reconciliation (
zamireniye) will come under constant pressure.”