Society
Russia’s Recruitment of Men for the Ukraine War Is Increasingly More Stick, Less Carrot
May 13, 2026
Following the politically unsuccessful mobilization in autumn 2022, the Kremlin has built a multichannel system for maintaining its manpower in Ukraine, mostly promising recruits and their families big sums of money, help resolving bureaucratic or legal issues, and educational opportunities. However, this system is now struggling to produce the same numbers as before.
The mobilization in September 2022 allowed the Russian army to replenish its ranks with hundreds of thousands of soldiers, but that came at a political price: a drop in approval ratings, rising social tensions and a spike in the outflow of skilled workers. Since then, the Kremlin has seemed to take this into account, having shifted from the “stick” to the “carrot” to address the problem of replenishing the ranks of the Russian army. As early as 2022, it launched a large-scale campaign to attract volunteers, promising generous benefits and pay by Russian standards. So far, this approach appears to have allowed the military not only to offset battlefield losses but even to slightly increase its manpower – at least until recently.
The exact number of troops fighting in Ukraine is unknown. As of the end-December, Putin said there were more than 700,000 personnel involved in the war, while Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence estimated the figure at around 620,000 a year earlier. The number of fatalities is even less clear. Russian independent media outlets maintain their own estimates based on open-source data. The best-substantiated estimate has been produced by Meduza, whose analysis found that around 350,000 Russian soldiers had been killed in the war as of end-2025.
An average of 1,000 volunteers join the Russian army every day. By analyzing proxy indicators such as regional budget expenditures, independent media outlets have recorded roughly a 25% decline in recruitment of kontraktniki, or contract soldiers, in recent months. “All the active, healthy people with some sort of political or life position are long gone,” a source in the Moscow mayor’s office told the independent outlet Verstka. To maintain the flow of soldiers to the front lines, the authorities are trying a range of tactics.
The official mobilization campaign has now effectively ended, though media outlets and human rights groups continue to document cases in which people are pressured into signing supposedly voluntary contracts to serve. Legally, the mobilization is still in force. One of the most significant consequences is that signed contracts cannot be terminated except in a limited number of cases. Most Russian soldiers who voluntarily went to fight in Ukraine may not return home until a decree formally ending the mobilization is signed.
Millionaires on the front lines
In 2022, Putin introduced one-time bonuses for men signing contracts with the Defense Ministry. At the start of the war, they amounted to RUB195,000, but in 2024 they were increased to RUB400,000. In addition to these federal payments, servicemen receive bonuses from the region of their residence that are also indexed annually. Currently, St Petersburg offers the largest bonus at RUB4.1 million, followed by Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Region at RUB3.7 million and Magadan Region at RUB3.6 million. The money is deposited into the recruit’s account within a month.
The minimum monthly salary for men fighting in Ukraine is RUB210,000. Additional payments are made to those involved in active combat operations, and for advancing and for destroying enemy equipment. The state also compensates for injuries. Soldiers who suffer severe wounds in combat receive RUB3 million, while severe injuries resulting in disability entail compensation in the amount of RUB4 million. Families of soldiers killed in action receive RUB5.5 million.
These multimillion-ruble payments are among the strongest incentives driving Russians to sign up to fight in Ukraine. The fact is: despite heavy casualties and broad war fatigue, there are still many willing recruits. For people from poorer areas of the country, the military represents a chance to escape poverty, pay off debts, secure subsidized mortgages and provide for their families.
In practice, however, servicemen often never receive the promised money. As early as 2023, Verstka identified 52 Russian regions whose residents complained about substantial delays. Valentina Melnikova, head of the Union of Committees of Soldiers’ Mothers, attributed this to “the collapse faced by the military bureaucracy.”
At end-2025, soldiers complained to Putin during his annual call-in show about delayed payments. “I cannot even believe it,” he responded. In early January, Anna Tsivileva, Putin’s cousin’s daughter and currently a deputy defense minister, blamed the problem on outdated systems still largely doing things in paper form.
The other big issue is bribery. Commanders frequently extort money from their subordinates through threats and intimidation. Even though uniforms, transportation, accommodation and food are officially covered by the state, in reality kontraktniki and their families often pay for these expenses themselves. They are also forced to donate money for drones, Starlink terminals and equipment repairs.
At the front, almost anything can be bought. Kontraktniki reportedly pay anywhere from RUB50,000 to RUB1 million, depending on the greed of their commanders, to remain in the rear and avoid combat missions. Getting leave can cost between RUB50,000 and RUB500,000. Obtaining a document certifying injury – potentially a ticket back to civilian life – costs anywhere from RUB50,000 to RUB6 million. These “services” can also be purchased through gifts, such as buying a commander a quad bike.
The exact number of troops fighting in Ukraine is unknown. As of the end-December, Putin said there were more than 700,000 personnel involved in the war, while Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence estimated the figure at around 620,000 a year earlier. The number of fatalities is even less clear. Russian independent media outlets maintain their own estimates based on open-source data. The best-substantiated estimate has been produced by Meduza, whose analysis found that around 350,000 Russian soldiers had been killed in the war as of end-2025.
An average of 1,000 volunteers join the Russian army every day. By analyzing proxy indicators such as regional budget expenditures, independent media outlets have recorded roughly a 25% decline in recruitment of kontraktniki, or contract soldiers, in recent months. “All the active, healthy people with some sort of political or life position are long gone,” a source in the Moscow mayor’s office told the independent outlet Verstka. To maintain the flow of soldiers to the front lines, the authorities are trying a range of tactics.
The official mobilization campaign has now effectively ended, though media outlets and human rights groups continue to document cases in which people are pressured into signing supposedly voluntary contracts to serve. Legally, the mobilization is still in force. One of the most significant consequences is that signed contracts cannot be terminated except in a limited number of cases. Most Russian soldiers who voluntarily went to fight in Ukraine may not return home until a decree formally ending the mobilization is signed.
Millionaires on the front lines
In 2022, Putin introduced one-time bonuses for men signing contracts with the Defense Ministry. At the start of the war, they amounted to RUB195,000, but in 2024 they were increased to RUB400,000. In addition to these federal payments, servicemen receive bonuses from the region of their residence that are also indexed annually. Currently, St Petersburg offers the largest bonus at RUB4.1 million, followed by Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Region at RUB3.7 million and Magadan Region at RUB3.6 million. The money is deposited into the recruit’s account within a month.
The minimum monthly salary for men fighting in Ukraine is RUB210,000. Additional payments are made to those involved in active combat operations, and for advancing and for destroying enemy equipment. The state also compensates for injuries. Soldiers who suffer severe wounds in combat receive RUB3 million, while severe injuries resulting in disability entail compensation in the amount of RUB4 million. Families of soldiers killed in action receive RUB5.5 million.
These multimillion-ruble payments are among the strongest incentives driving Russians to sign up to fight in Ukraine. The fact is: despite heavy casualties and broad war fatigue, there are still many willing recruits. For people from poorer areas of the country, the military represents a chance to escape poverty, pay off debts, secure subsidized mortgages and provide for their families.
In practice, however, servicemen often never receive the promised money. As early as 2023, Verstka identified 52 Russian regions whose residents complained about substantial delays. Valentina Melnikova, head of the Union of Committees of Soldiers’ Mothers, attributed this to “the collapse faced by the military bureaucracy.”
At end-2025, soldiers complained to Putin during his annual call-in show about delayed payments. “I cannot even believe it,” he responded. In early January, Anna Tsivileva, Putin’s cousin’s daughter and currently a deputy defense minister, blamed the problem on outdated systems still largely doing things in paper form.
The other big issue is bribery. Commanders frequently extort money from their subordinates through threats and intimidation. Even though uniforms, transportation, accommodation and food are officially covered by the state, in reality kontraktniki and their families often pay for these expenses themselves. They are also forced to donate money for drones, Starlink terminals and equipment repairs.
At the front, almost anything can be bought. Kontraktniki reportedly pay anywhere from RUB50,000 to RUB1 million, depending on the greed of their commanders, to remain in the rear and avoid combat missions. Getting leave can cost between RUB50,000 and RUB500,000. Obtaining a document certifying injury – potentially a ticket back to civilian life – costs anywhere from RUB50,000 to RUB6 million. These “services” can also be purchased through gifts, such as buying a commander a quad bike.
Pavel Egorov / Unsplash
‘Welfare queens’ back home
In addition to direct cash payments, the authorities provide soldiers with numerous benefits, meant to compensate for the risks of military service and support servicemen’s families. Most are tied to the status of “combat veteran” (veteran boyevykh deystviy). It entitles recipients to pension benefits, 50% compensation for housing rental costs, prosthetics and much more.
The state generously subsidizes housing purchases for military personnel. The most popular housing program used by kontraktniki is the Military Mortgage program, which has existed since 2005. Under the program, servicemen purchase an apartment or house while the state repays the mortgage loan. Previously, soldiers became eligible only after three years of service, but an exception was made for those fighting in Ukraine – they become eligible for the benefit immediately after signing a contract.
A separate package of benefits is envisaged for servicemen’s families. Their children are admitted to kindergartens, schools and summer camps without waiting lists, receive free hot meals and are exempt from extracurricular activity fees. They may also enroll in specialized colleges and technical schools without entrance examinations, on a separate admissions track, and receive priority access to dormitory spots. However, only veterans themselves are exempt from accommodation fees, not their children.
In May 2022, Putin introduced a quota reserving 10% of all state-funded university places (full scholarships) for the children of men fighting in Ukraine.
If a contract soldier’s child is already studying on a tuition-paying basis, they have the right to transfer to a state-funded place, provided they have no missed/failed academic assignments, disciplinary sanctions or outstanding tuition debts. At the end of last year, Putin also allowed widows of soldiers to enroll in universities and specialized colleges free of charge through a separate quota and without entrance examinations.
If questions arise regarding benefits paperwork, inheritance matters or any other legal issues, families may seek help from state lawyers free of charge. The state will even subsidize the purchase of a car.
In practice, however, realizing these benefits is often hard – a fact acknowledged even by the authorities themselves – owing to excessive bureaucracy, overcrowded hospitals and difficulties in obtaining the “combat veteran” status that unlocks benefits.
In addition to direct cash payments, the authorities provide soldiers with numerous benefits, meant to compensate for the risks of military service and support servicemen’s families. Most are tied to the status of “combat veteran” (veteran boyevykh deystviy). It entitles recipients to pension benefits, 50% compensation for housing rental costs, prosthetics and much more.
The state generously subsidizes housing purchases for military personnel. The most popular housing program used by kontraktniki is the Military Mortgage program, which has existed since 2005. Under the program, servicemen purchase an apartment or house while the state repays the mortgage loan. Previously, soldiers became eligible only after three years of service, but an exception was made for those fighting in Ukraine – they become eligible for the benefit immediately after signing a contract.
A separate package of benefits is envisaged for servicemen’s families. Their children are admitted to kindergartens, schools and summer camps without waiting lists, receive free hot meals and are exempt from extracurricular activity fees. They may also enroll in specialized colleges and technical schools without entrance examinations, on a separate admissions track, and receive priority access to dormitory spots. However, only veterans themselves are exempt from accommodation fees, not their children.
In May 2022, Putin introduced a quota reserving 10% of all state-funded university places (full scholarships) for the children of men fighting in Ukraine.
If a contract soldier’s child is already studying on a tuition-paying basis, they have the right to transfer to a state-funded place, provided they have no missed/failed academic assignments, disciplinary sanctions or outstanding tuition debts. At the end of last year, Putin also allowed widows of soldiers to enroll in universities and specialized colleges free of charge through a separate quota and without entrance examinations.
If questions arise regarding benefits paperwork, inheritance matters or any other legal issues, families may seek help from state lawyers free of charge. The state will even subsidize the purchase of a car.
In practice, however, realizing these benefits is often hard – a fact acknowledged even by the authorities themselves – owing to excessive bureaucracy, overcrowded hospitals and difficulties in obtaining the “combat veteran” status that unlocks benefits.
Mikhail Tyrsyna / Unsplash
Everyone, everywhere, all at once
On top of the main recruitment method – encouraging Russians to sign contracts through generous financial incentives – the state is also resorting to several other tactics to replenish the army’s ranks.
One of the first large recruitment pools tapped was that of convicts. In summer 2022, Wagner head Yevgeny Prigozhin traveled to penal colonies offering inmates pardons in exchange for going to fight in Ukraine. “After six months you go home with a pardon. Whoever wants to stay with us, they stay with us. So there is no chance of going back to prison,” he said. In total, around 48,000 men were recruited into Wagner.
From spring 2023, the Defense Ministry effectively institutionalized the practice by recruiting convicts into a special unit called Storm Z. According to estimates by the independent outlet Important Stories, around 30,000 inmates may have been recruited into Storm Z. After six months of service, they received presidential pardons and the opportunity to return home. Later that summer, Putin signed a law allowing prisoners to escape criminal liability by signing a contract with the Defense Ministry. Even people whose cases had not yet gone to trial were thus deemed eligible to fight in Ukraine.
Independent media outlets have documented numerous cases in which inmates were threatened if they refused to sign contracts. Foreign nationals serving sentences in Russian prisons and penal colonies have complained of being humiliated, beaten and placed in solitary confinement for refusing to enlist.
“People do not know what to do. They say they would rather kill themselves than renounce their citizenship and go to war. They think it is better to commit suicide than turn their backs on their homeland and go fight,” one foreign inmate told the RFE/RL and VOA offshoot Current Time.
Recruitment in penal colonies was greased by promises of high salaries, expunged criminal records and social security. In practice, however, former convicts have often found themselves in legal ambiguity. The Russian service of the BBC has reported widespread cases in which recruits were sent to the front without having signed proper contracts or without official volunteer status, creating problems with insurance payouts and compensation for the families of those killed.
At the same time, the authorities intensified recruitment efforts among migrants and foreign nationals. In major Russian cities, siloviki raided dormitories, markets and migration centers, with foreign nationals offered contracts in exchange for fast-tracked Russian citizenship, the resolution of migration issues or financial compensation. According to independent media reports, things only got worse in this respect in 2025 – siloviki allegedly began beating migrant workers in police stations and migration centers for refusing to fight in Ukraine.
The recruitment of foreign nationals extends beyond Russia’s borders, as well. Last year, journalist Ayan Sharipbayev of the Kazakhstani outlet Elmedia described a well-organized scheme for recruiting Kazakhstani citizens to fight in Ukraine through targeted online ads. Even though fighting as a mercenary is a criminal offense in Kazakhstan, many Kazakhstanis still choose to go fight for Russia. To avoid future complications, Putin signed a law this March that Russia would not extradite foreigners or stateless persons who fought in the Russian army if their extradition requests were linked to criminal prosecution for involvement in combat operations.
On top of the main recruitment method – encouraging Russians to sign contracts through generous financial incentives – the state is also resorting to several other tactics to replenish the army’s ranks.
One of the first large recruitment pools tapped was that of convicts. In summer 2022, Wagner head Yevgeny Prigozhin traveled to penal colonies offering inmates pardons in exchange for going to fight in Ukraine. “After six months you go home with a pardon. Whoever wants to stay with us, they stay with us. So there is no chance of going back to prison,” he said. In total, around 48,000 men were recruited into Wagner.
From spring 2023, the Defense Ministry effectively institutionalized the practice by recruiting convicts into a special unit called Storm Z. According to estimates by the independent outlet Important Stories, around 30,000 inmates may have been recruited into Storm Z. After six months of service, they received presidential pardons and the opportunity to return home. Later that summer, Putin signed a law allowing prisoners to escape criminal liability by signing a contract with the Defense Ministry. Even people whose cases had not yet gone to trial were thus deemed eligible to fight in Ukraine.
Independent media outlets have documented numerous cases in which inmates were threatened if they refused to sign contracts. Foreign nationals serving sentences in Russian prisons and penal colonies have complained of being humiliated, beaten and placed in solitary confinement for refusing to enlist.
“People do not know what to do. They say they would rather kill themselves than renounce their citizenship and go to war. They think it is better to commit suicide than turn their backs on their homeland and go fight,” one foreign inmate told the RFE/RL and VOA offshoot Current Time.
Recruitment in penal colonies was greased by promises of high salaries, expunged criminal records and social security. In practice, however, former convicts have often found themselves in legal ambiguity. The Russian service of the BBC has reported widespread cases in which recruits were sent to the front without having signed proper contracts or without official volunteer status, creating problems with insurance payouts and compensation for the families of those killed.
At the same time, the authorities intensified recruitment efforts among migrants and foreign nationals. In major Russian cities, siloviki raided dormitories, markets and migration centers, with foreign nationals offered contracts in exchange for fast-tracked Russian citizenship, the resolution of migration issues or financial compensation. According to independent media reports, things only got worse in this respect in 2025 – siloviki allegedly began beating migrant workers in police stations and migration centers for refusing to fight in Ukraine.
The recruitment of foreign nationals extends beyond Russia’s borders, as well. Last year, journalist Ayan Sharipbayev of the Kazakhstani outlet Elmedia described a well-organized scheme for recruiting Kazakhstani citizens to fight in Ukraine through targeted online ads. Even though fighting as a mercenary is a criminal offense in Kazakhstan, many Kazakhstanis still choose to go fight for Russia. To avoid future complications, Putin signed a law this March that Russia would not extradite foreigners or stateless persons who fought in the Russian army if their extradition requests were linked to criminal prosecution for involvement in combat operations.
Wietse Jongsma / Unsplash
Nor does foreign recruitment end at the edges of the former Soviet space, with vulnerable people from countries in Africa, Central and South Asia, and Latin America increasingly drawn into the conflict. In spring 2026, the International Federation for Human Rights, Truth Hounds and the Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and the Rule of Law published a report titled “Combatants, mercenaries or victims of human trafficking? Russia’s exploitation of foreign fighters in its war against Ukraine.” The report argues that Russia’s recruitment of foreign fighters violates the Palermo Protocol to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, ratified by Russia in 2000. Kyiv estimates that since February 2022 Russia has recruited at least 27,000 foreign nationals from more than 130 countries.
Students are another at-risk group. Since end-2025, universities have increasingly pressured students to sign contracts with the Defense Ministry. The independent Telegram channel Faridaily (@faridaily24), citing sources, reported that Science and Higher Education Minister Valery Falkov informed the rectors of Russia’s largest universities that at least 2% of students are expected to sign military contracts. Later, a leaked Defense Ministry document revealed plans to recruit 80,000 Russians into “drone forces” in a year, including 58,000 students, graduates of UAV training courses, former Air Force personnel and “citizens of the female sex” with relevant skills. The independent student-focused outlet Groza has identified 182 universities and 64 colleges in Russia advertising serving in UAV units under contracts to students. Some university administrations have put in place quotas for students to be sent to war. Independent media outlets have documented cases in which students were threatened with expulsion and told that signing a contract was their only way to remain enrolled. Students are often misled with promises of special, one-year contracts in “drone forces,” only to discover that no such special contracts exist and that signing could leave them trapped at the front indefinitely.
Gradually, the recruitment drive has penetrated almost every sphere of life. Contracts are offered to the unemployed at job centers, to debtors by bailiffs and to criminal suspects and defendants by investigators and courts. In exchange for fighting in Ukraine, the authorities are willing to offer money, freedom, citizenship or a chance to escape poverty. Still, increasingly recruitment is less voluntary.
Students are another at-risk group. Since end-2025, universities have increasingly pressured students to sign contracts with the Defense Ministry. The independent Telegram channel Faridaily (@faridaily24), citing sources, reported that Science and Higher Education Minister Valery Falkov informed the rectors of Russia’s largest universities that at least 2% of students are expected to sign military contracts. Later, a leaked Defense Ministry document revealed plans to recruit 80,000 Russians into “drone forces” in a year, including 58,000 students, graduates of UAV training courses, former Air Force personnel and “citizens of the female sex” with relevant skills. The independent student-focused outlet Groza has identified 182 universities and 64 colleges in Russia advertising serving in UAV units under contracts to students. Some university administrations have put in place quotas for students to be sent to war. Independent media outlets have documented cases in which students were threatened with expulsion and told that signing a contract was their only way to remain enrolled. Students are often misled with promises of special, one-year contracts in “drone forces,” only to discover that no such special contracts exist and that signing could leave them trapped at the front indefinitely.
Gradually, the recruitment drive has penetrated almost every sphere of life. Contracts are offered to the unemployed at job centers, to debtors by bailiffs and to criminal suspects and defendants by investigators and courts. In exchange for fighting in Ukraine, the authorities are willing to offer money, freedom, citizenship or a chance to escape poverty. Still, increasingly recruitment is less voluntary.
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