A strong civil society is considered essential to modern democracies. In Russia, despite low levels of politicization and constant pressure from the state, many civil society institutions have for decades operated, supporting grassroots democratic practices that resisted that pressure. The full-scale invasion of Ukraine, along with the subsequent intensification of repression, has made the work of grassroots projects far more difficult. Researchers from the Hannah Arendt Research Center set out to analyze how Russian civil society has adapted to these changes and to assess whether it is still capable of achieving social change and what it has learned over the past three decades.

The researchers used a mixed methodology: 116 in-depth interviews, digital ethnography of 12 online communities and conference observations, automated analysis of more than 6,500 communities on Telegram and VK, and “foresight sessions” with Russian and foreign experts. This made it possible both to capture the broad contours of developments and to analyze specific cases, practices and strategies in detail.

The study proceeds from the view that the usual normative definition of civil society as a set of democratization institutions – e.g., parties, trade unions, elections – fits poorly with the reality in Russia. Instead, the authors suggest approaching civil society through the prism of solidarity practices. The central metaphor is the “rhizome,” popularized by Gilles Deleuze: a horizontal network without a single center in which individual elements may appear and disappear yet, thanks to multiple connections, remain stable. Institutional strength matters less than the ability to offer mutual assistance, stay flexible and create new forms of agency in the face of pressure from the state.

The report pays special attention to the concept of “reflexive solidarity.” Unlike family or affective support, reflexive solidarity is based on helping “outsiders,” on consciously overcoming differences and disagreements. It is this form of solidarity, the interviews show, that has become the key resource helping projects to survive and grow amid the war and increasing repression. For many activists, civil society is not an abstract value but the practice of working together, where mutual support matters more than declarations. Reflexive solidarity, the researchers say, is most clearly manifested in human rights work. Those who practice reflexive solidarity, meanwhile, are more likely to share democratic forms of interaction and values.

Based on the data collected, the study maps Russian civil society in 2024 and identifies six main clusters. The first is antiwar and pro-democracy activism, human rights initiatives and independent media, which typically have relocated or now operate underground. They usually have better access to resources but lack contact with regional and local communities.

The second cluster comprises environmental movements, cultural heritage preservation initiatives, leftist groups and trade unions. These are usually seen in regions outside of Moscow and St Petersburg. They are chronically under-resourced and live under constant threat of repression. 

The third cluster consists of projects helping vulnerable groups like migrants, the homeless, the disabled and troubled families. Here, the state tries to seize the social support agenda through its own programs. Here, the state tries to seize the social support agenda through its own programs. Classic charity, in particular, is the domain the state prefers to sponsor with its “own” socially oriented associations, since this is where the money is.

The fourth cluster is animal protection, which has become the most widespread and fastest-growing area of independent, “horizontal” activity. Animal welfare has emerged as a relatively safe way to practice solidarity, empathy and justice. For many Russians, it represents an entry point into civic engagement and a first experience of political agency.

The fifth cluster is the so-called “third places,” such as independent bookstores, cultural centers, evenings devoted to writing letters to political prisoners. These function as semipublic spaces for communication, reminiscent of what the kitchen was for late Soviet dissidents, but in a more open format.

Finally, the sixth cluster is “uncivil society”: wives of mobilized soldiers, prowar volunteer groups and pro-government projects. Structurally different from independent movements, these are the actors the state seeks to use to legitimize its war and control grassroots activism. At the same time, participants in prowar initiatives also fear repression, especially when they try to tackle problems the authorities are failing to solve.

The report highlights three main challenges for civil society. The first is political pressure. Since 2022, dozens of repressive laws have been passed. Independent organizations are targeted as “foreign agents” and “undesirable” or “extremist.” Protests have been effectively criminalized, public dissent is blocked, and repression is directed both against individual activists and against entire organizations.

The second challenge is a dearth of resources. International funding has become inaccessible or too risky, and independent projects in Russia are off limits for grants and subsidies. Many groups operate on a volunteer basis, adopt horizontal structures and network models, and combine professional activity with activism.

The third challenge is a breakdown in communication. The mass emigration of activists, combined with censorship barriers, has translated into fragmentation. Mistrust is growing between “internal” and “external” projects; dialogue is hard. Even prowar groups hesitate to speak openly for fear of persecution. Meanwhile, the potential criminalization of VPNs raises the threat of Russia’s complete isolation.

The report also documents survival strategies. These include localizing activity and focusing on work “on the ground” instead of open political actions; creating “third places” as spaces of trust and recruitment; developing horizontal structures that enable rapid adaptation; and seeking allies abroad. “Safe” spheres such as animal welfare and ecology have a specific role: they provide entry points into activism for people far removed from politics and help develop skills needed for collective action.

New initiatives are emerging outside of animal welfare and ecology too. After the invasion of Ukraine, many well-known projects emigrated or closed, eventually replaced by new ones created by people without prior activist experience. These new projects avoid drawing the authorities’ attention: they do not register as legal entities, use informal financial schemes and use horizontal structures instead of a centralized leadership. Collective decision-making, where everyone has a veto, reduces the risk of organizational paralysis when individual participants are persecuted.

An analysis of digital footprints shows shifting dynamics. Protest and politically charged discussions are more common on Telegram, while VK, far more obedient to the authorities, remains a platform for “safer” and prowar initiatives. Animal rights communities attract and bring people together better than others. Environmental projects, by contrast, are almost invisible in public social networks due to strict digital security measures. Regional differences are also apparent: in Moscow and St Petersburg, the level of human rights discourse and reflexive solidarity is higher, while in regions outside of the “two capitals” many initiatives are dependent on state resources.

Foresight sessions with experts confirmed the main findings of the study and helped improve forecasts for the near future. These discussions considered scenarios of a further tightening of the screws, restricted access to the internet and changes in donor support. Suggested survival strategies include building resource centers for NGOs, providing psychological support for activists, adopting hybrid work formats and expanding cooperation with more protected structures, including religious communities. Such partnerships, the researchers note, are complicated and far from black and white. Activists cannot be neatly divided into pro-government or opposition, the report’s authors told Meduza – rather, they are trying to survive and work under extremely difficult conditions, which often forces compromise.

The report concludes that participation in independent initiatives in Russia remains extremely risky, yet this does not mean civil society has disappeared. Instead, it changes form, reassembles, adapts and finds new ways to grow. The boundaries between “civic” and “political” activism are eroding: local initiatives are both a way of pursuing individuals’ civic interests and a form of political resistance. Even in the face of repression, practices like helping war victims, supporting political prisoners and working with vulnerable groups persist.

The future of Russian civil society depends largely on the sustainability of reflexive solidarity practices. These enable people to overcome divisions, build connections across differences and preserve the moral dimension of collective action. The report’s authors conclude that civil society in Russia has not vanished. It continues to exist as a rhizome – a flexible and fluctuating network that, despite immense pressure, retains the capacity to endure.