Society
Russians’ Preferred Future is a Return to the Prewar Past
July 12, 2024
Elena Koneva
Sociologist, ExtremeScan founder and researcher, Chronicles project partner, WAPOR national representative in Russia
Based on several series of surveys between February 2022 and April 2024 and focus groups in four Russian cities, sociologist Elena Koneva writes about how Russians imagine the future of their country amid the ongoing war.
Men anxious to avoid mobilization waiting in line to cross the border from Russia to Georgia. Autumn 2022. Source: X
Shock and panic predominated in the first one and a half to two months after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, giving way to polarization by mid-April 2022, with some feeling excitement and others anger. Around the end of June 2022, withdrawal began: the realization came that this was not a small victorious “special operation,” but a long war.
The fourth phase began at the end of September 2022 with the shocking announcement of mobilization and worries around it.
The fifth phase – sinking into the war – started in the spring of 2023. War had become the main context of life. This lasted until the summer and early autumn of 2023, when it smoothly gave way to the sixth phase – suppression. That has been ongoing for almost a year, interrupted for three months by the Russian presidential campaign, when the war became actualized and attitudes toward it were influenced by external factors like Boris Nadezhdin’s antiwar rhetoric, the murder of Navalny and plain (for some people) election falsification.
Today, the war is seen against a backdrop of stabilizing economic perceptions and definitive adaptation to the situation.
A distant war
The war has turned into a protracted force of nature, almost impossible to escape and impossible to influence. Withdrawal takes place for two reasons: first, people feel fear and helplessness, and second, the war for most Russians is a distant affair, while life in Russia has stabilized, meaning you do not have to think about the war, or at least not talk about it. As a focus group participant said: “As long as Rostov-on-Don is not bombed, I consider the situation stabilized.”
The war has been pushed to the periphery of consciousness to such an extent that sometimes it seems that it does not exist. Whereas starting in the summer of 2022, in various social groups – in the family, at work, among neighbors – it became customary to keep quiet about the war so as not to reveal differences in views, a year and a half later people are silent naturally, as such conversations are not necessary – the war does not affect the daily life of most people.
The hanging threat of mobilization is frustrating, but people have learned to perceive it as inevitable, since for the majority it remains somewhere on the periphery and is not clear and present.
The fourth phase began at the end of September 2022 with the shocking announcement of mobilization and worries around it.
The fifth phase – sinking into the war – started in the spring of 2023. War had become the main context of life. This lasted until the summer and early autumn of 2023, when it smoothly gave way to the sixth phase – suppression. That has been ongoing for almost a year, interrupted for three months by the Russian presidential campaign, when the war became actualized and attitudes toward it were influenced by external factors like Boris Nadezhdin’s antiwar rhetoric, the murder of Navalny and plain (for some people) election falsification.
Today, the war is seen against a backdrop of stabilizing economic perceptions and definitive adaptation to the situation.
A distant war
The war has turned into a protracted force of nature, almost impossible to escape and impossible to influence. Withdrawal takes place for two reasons: first, people feel fear and helplessness, and second, the war for most Russians is a distant affair, while life in Russia has stabilized, meaning you do not have to think about the war, or at least not talk about it. As a focus group participant said: “As long as Rostov-on-Don is not bombed, I consider the situation stabilized.”
The war has been pushed to the periphery of consciousness to such an extent that sometimes it seems that it does not exist. Whereas starting in the summer of 2022, in various social groups – in the family, at work, among neighbors – it became customary to keep quiet about the war so as not to reveal differences in views, a year and a half later people are silent naturally, as such conversations are not necessary – the war does not affect the daily life of most people.
The hanging threat of mobilization is frustrating, but people have learned to perceive it as inevitable, since for the majority it remains somewhere on the periphery and is not clear and present.
“Those who were directly affected by the war, lost loved ones or saw their health suffer remain in a silent minority and do not affect the general sentiment in society.”
According to ExtremeScan data from the autumn of 2023, the special military operation came in third place among significant factors affecting respondents' personal lives, after health (their own and that of loved ones) and family income.
Withdrawal, however, does not solve the problem. The war has not gone away; it hangs over everyone, without exception.
Available research in Russia shows a significant increase in anxiety and depressed moods.
In the first half of 2022, Russians bought 6 million boxes of antidepressants, a 50% increase from the previous year. Experts have attributed this surge in demand to the anxiety associated with the 'special military operation'. In the first 11 weeks of 2024, Russians purchased 40% more antidepressants compared to the same period in 2023. The pervasive uncertainty, as noted by psychologists, has made planning for the future a challenging task for many.
Anxiety can be suppressed and negative thoughts avoided, but it is impossible to completely ignore the war. War does not always affect everyday life, but it significantly affects reflection on one’s own life.
No future without an end to the war
The persistent negative outlook among the populace is most evident in their perception of the future. The ability to plan one's life is a significant indicator of one's overall psychological well-being. Even in the relatively prosperous year of 2019, 62% of Russians, according to the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM), felt that the country's situation was not conducive to life planning.
In the atmosphere of uncertainty and stress that has developed in Russia in the third year of the war, Russians avoid making plans for several years ahead or thinking about the future. This behaviour deepens the state of anxiety, especially if there are expectations of a negative outcome.
Focus group participants agree that the planning horizon, previously several years, has been reduced to a period of six months to several days. (At the beginning of the war, respondents assumed that the conflict would last six months.)
Withdrawal, however, does not solve the problem. The war has not gone away; it hangs over everyone, without exception.
Available research in Russia shows a significant increase in anxiety and depressed moods.
In the first half of 2022, Russians bought 6 million boxes of antidepressants, a 50% increase from the previous year. Experts have attributed this surge in demand to the anxiety associated with the 'special military operation'. In the first 11 weeks of 2024, Russians purchased 40% more antidepressants compared to the same period in 2023. The pervasive uncertainty, as noted by psychologists, has made planning for the future a challenging task for many.
Anxiety can be suppressed and negative thoughts avoided, but it is impossible to completely ignore the war. War does not always affect everyday life, but it significantly affects reflection on one’s own life.
No future without an end to the war
The persistent negative outlook among the populace is most evident in their perception of the future. The ability to plan one's life is a significant indicator of one's overall psychological well-being. Even in the relatively prosperous year of 2019, 62% of Russians, according to the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM), felt that the country's situation was not conducive to life planning.
In the atmosphere of uncertainty and stress that has developed in Russia in the third year of the war, Russians avoid making plans for several years ahead or thinking about the future. This behaviour deepens the state of anxiety, especially if there are expectations of a negative outcome.
Focus group participants agree that the planning horizon, previously several years, has been reduced to a period of six months to several days. (At the beginning of the war, respondents assumed that the conflict would last six months.)
“For over two years now, we have observed a pattern: the longer the war is expected to last, the more the planning horizon shrinks.”
Respondents complain that when life has turned into waiting for the war to end, planning one’s own life becomes a luxury that only optimists try to cling to.
... there is always the thought that, sure, everything could change, but I still plan, because when you lose all your supports, then life becomes a little meaningless, and the only way to cope with this stress and keep going is to continue to plan, and just keep in mind that I am an adult, I know how to make decisions, I know how to think, look at the situation, I can figure it out, I can change my plans...
Feelings of unpredictability affect the locus of control. Respondents to focus groups said that they had lost a sense of control over their lives. The future is [lost] in the fog of war; it depends entirely on it ending. No matter what they do, external events can ruin everything.
We sit and are afraid to buy real estate; we are afraid to invest money in anything, in cash, in non-cash, in deposits. At any moment we can be bombed or have our things taken away. All we can do is plan our evacuation, our escape, because nothing good will happen in the future.
Meanwhile, in a city on the border with Ukraine, participants calculate the planning horizon literally in hours.
The prevailing opinion is that all life plans have collapsed or were postponed indefinitely, which essentially is the same thing. Below are estimates of the horizon for specific respondents.
... there is always the thought that, sure, everything could change, but I still plan, because when you lose all your supports, then life becomes a little meaningless, and the only way to cope with this stress and keep going is to continue to plan, and just keep in mind that I am an adult, I know how to make decisions, I know how to think, look at the situation, I can figure it out, I can change my plans...
Feelings of unpredictability affect the locus of control. Respondents to focus groups said that they had lost a sense of control over their lives. The future is [lost] in the fog of war; it depends entirely on it ending. No matter what they do, external events can ruin everything.
We sit and are afraid to buy real estate; we are afraid to invest money in anything, in cash, in non-cash, in deposits. At any moment we can be bombed or have our things taken away. All we can do is plan our evacuation, our escape, because nothing good will happen in the future.
Meanwhile, in a city on the border with Ukraine, participants calculate the planning horizon literally in hours.
The prevailing opinion is that all life plans have collapsed or were postponed indefinitely, which essentially is the same thing. Below are estimates of the horizon for specific respondents.
New apartment buildings in Leninsky District, Samara. Source: Wiki Commons
“Tomorrow” (female, 35+, Samara ); “a month” (male, 35+, Samara); “I get up and go. Nowadays you do not know what will happen next” (male, 35 or younger, Izhevsk); “I do not plan far ahead” (female, 35+, Irkutsk); “[only] here and now” (female, 35+, Irkutsk); “from a planning horizon of five years to a planning horizon of a few days. Now, I do not know at all. Even five days is a lot. I know tomorrow” (male, 35+, Rostov-on-Don); “you do not know what will happen, what will happen to you, what will happen in general. It’s been like this for a year or two” (male, 35 or younger, Samara).
It is easier to plan if you are tied to some significant milestones—for example, kindergarten, school, and college for your children, or paying off a mortgage, etc. This helps you stay on track and distracts you from external events.
“I have a 10-year mortgage. It helps [me] to look ahead” (female, 35+, Rostov-on-Don); “I have a lot of illnesses, including serious ones, heart problems. But there is a child who needs to be raised. So, I hope that I will make it at least until he is 25-30 years old” (male, 35+, Rostov-on-Don).
There are too many uncertainties in life today, complicating making long-term plans. Respondents would rather talk about the need to develop the ability to quickly respond to a changing situation.
“Again, they will either lift sanctions or they will not. If they do, I will be able to ship and sell cars from the US…” (male, 35 or younger, Rostov-on-Don ); “previously, it was possible to plan even, maybe… for 3-5 years... maybe even longer if you took out loans or a mortgage. Now, it’s six months or even a year, you are afraid to plan seriously” (female, 35 or younger, Samara); “I do not plan far ahead. My plans for the future depend on the war” (male, 35+, Irkutsk).
People want to believe in the future but they cannot, with respondents 35 years old or younger the most pessimistic. Those in the older age group tend to demonstrate optimism, though they admit that it is not based on facts but an unfounded belief in Russia's strength and luck.
The experience of recent years shows that even if the bullet has been dodged for now, people should nonetheless prepare for a worsening of the situation in every sense. There are no factors militating for an improvement.
Regime keeping Russians in the dark about war goals and outlook
The Kremlin does not inform citizens about benchmarks, goals and tasks for the country’s development or its own actions. The topic of the future is missing from the public discourse. Respondents even cited Soviet five-year plans as an example of a government foundation for thinking about the future.
It is easier to plan if you are tied to some significant milestones—for example, kindergarten, school, and college for your children, or paying off a mortgage, etc. This helps you stay on track and distracts you from external events.
“I have a 10-year mortgage. It helps [me] to look ahead” (female, 35+, Rostov-on-Don); “I have a lot of illnesses, including serious ones, heart problems. But there is a child who needs to be raised. So, I hope that I will make it at least until he is 25-30 years old” (male, 35+, Rostov-on-Don).
There are too many uncertainties in life today, complicating making long-term plans. Respondents would rather talk about the need to develop the ability to quickly respond to a changing situation.
“Again, they will either lift sanctions or they will not. If they do, I will be able to ship and sell cars from the US…” (male, 35 or younger, Rostov-on-Don ); “previously, it was possible to plan even, maybe… for 3-5 years... maybe even longer if you took out loans or a mortgage. Now, it’s six months or even a year, you are afraid to plan seriously” (female, 35 or younger, Samara); “I do not plan far ahead. My plans for the future depend on the war” (male, 35+, Irkutsk).
People want to believe in the future but they cannot, with respondents 35 years old or younger the most pessimistic. Those in the older age group tend to demonstrate optimism, though they admit that it is not based on facts but an unfounded belief in Russia's strength and luck.
The experience of recent years shows that even if the bullet has been dodged for now, people should nonetheless prepare for a worsening of the situation in every sense. There are no factors militating for an improvement.
Regime keeping Russians in the dark about war goals and outlook
The Kremlin does not inform citizens about benchmarks, goals and tasks for the country’s development or its own actions. The topic of the future is missing from the public discourse. Respondents even cited Soviet five-year plans as an example of a government foundation for thinking about the future.
“Silence or inconsistency by the regime on the outlook for the country’s development also makes any attempts to predict the near future pointless.”
“We were told, the first words [of the authorities] were demilitarization, no territorial claims were made toward Ukraine. Then they said: four new regions. Fine. Now, there is some new objective to shift the borders... Who knows what the fourth objective will be. They do not tell [us] anything” (male, 35+, Izhevsk); “when there is some kind of stability, [even if] the war does not end, but when we already sense something and everything is going according to the authorities’ plan, [then] we will expect the end of the war” (female, 35+, Irkutsk).
The main refrain is: once the special operation ends, it will be possible to start making plans and forecasts. That cannot be done while the war is ongoing.
When we asked respondents about their plans for the next 2-3 years, the period turned out to be too short for them, as they do not expect the special operation to end in that time.
Thus, the future as such will come when the war ends. But a war has two possible outcomes: victory or defeat. How do people view them?
The main refrain is: once the special operation ends, it will be possible to start making plans and forecasts. That cannot be done while the war is ongoing.
When we asked respondents about their plans for the next 2-3 years, the period turned out to be too short for them, as they do not expect the special operation to end in that time.
Thus, the future as such will come when the war ends. But a war has two possible outcomes: victory or defeat. How do people view them?
Two Humvees that, according to the Russian Ministry of Defense, were abandoned during the retreat from Russia of the Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK). Source: Wiki Commons
‘Victory’ is for ‘them,’ the state – not the people
The vision of victory is being actively studied by all pro-Kremlin sociologists, apparently to come up with effective rhetoric the Kremlin might use for ending the war. Thus, the answers produced by such polling reflect the propaganda agenda.
At the end of last year, Russian Field asked respondents for their personal view on what outcome of the special operation could be considered a victory for Russia. The abovementioned lack of a single and clear goal of the war was reflected in a wide spectrum of responses.
Commenting on these results, the head of state pollster VTsIOM, Valery Fedorov, admitted that “there is no single formed vision of victory in Russian society.”
In the Russian Field survey, respondents parroted propaganda phrases: the annexation of part of Ukraine and the incorporation of new territories into the state; the complete capitulation of Ukraine; the end of Ukraine as a state; the demilitarization of Ukraine; and its denazification.
These and other phrases are a generalized set of spontaneous responses.
Since the question implies the “state” context, the responses received are not unexpected. However, the Russian Field’s results generally do not look credible. Amid the predominating propaganda narratives, only 9% of respondents spoke about “achieving peace so that everyone comes out alive.”
As data from ExtremeScan and the project Chronicles show, respondents do not closely link their fate with that of the state. In focus groups, they repeat popular propaganda clichés while emotionally and passionately discussing difficult personal experiences around the war and their desire for peace.
Yes, respondents associate victory in the “state sense” with the conquest of new territories. At the same time, imperial expansion is not seen as the motivation for that, but rather a desire to push back the front line and create a buffer zone to make it harder for the Ukrainians to shell Russian territory.
To take respondents’ minds off propaganda narratives, we conducted a quantitative survey asking what personal benefit victory would bring them.
The vision of victory is being actively studied by all pro-Kremlin sociologists, apparently to come up with effective rhetoric the Kremlin might use for ending the war. Thus, the answers produced by such polling reflect the propaganda agenda.
At the end of last year, Russian Field asked respondents for their personal view on what outcome of the special operation could be considered a victory for Russia. The abovementioned lack of a single and clear goal of the war was reflected in a wide spectrum of responses.
Commenting on these results, the head of state pollster VTsIOM, Valery Fedorov, admitted that “there is no single formed vision of victory in Russian society.”
In the Russian Field survey, respondents parroted propaganda phrases: the annexation of part of Ukraine and the incorporation of new territories into the state; the complete capitulation of Ukraine; the end of Ukraine as a state; the demilitarization of Ukraine; and its denazification.
These and other phrases are a generalized set of spontaneous responses.
Since the question implies the “state” context, the responses received are not unexpected. However, the Russian Field’s results generally do not look credible. Amid the predominating propaganda narratives, only 9% of respondents spoke about “achieving peace so that everyone comes out alive.”
As data from ExtremeScan and the project Chronicles show, respondents do not closely link their fate with that of the state. In focus groups, they repeat popular propaganda clichés while emotionally and passionately discussing difficult personal experiences around the war and their desire for peace.
Yes, respondents associate victory in the “state sense” with the conquest of new territories. At the same time, imperial expansion is not seen as the motivation for that, but rather a desire to push back the front line and create a buffer zone to make it harder for the Ukrainians to shell Russian territory.
To take respondents’ minds off propaganda narratives, we conducted a quantitative survey asking what personal benefit victory would bring them.
“A stable majority – 56% in the summer of 2022 and 53% in September 2023 – do not expect any personal benefit from a Russian victory.”
In people's minds, a Russian victory looks like a symbolic abstraction, a basic, core part of the emerging national identity—“Russians do not know defeat.”
Respondents often quote lines from the Bulat Okudzhava song about the Great Patriotic War: “It means the only thing we need is Victory; one for all of us — we’ll pay any price.”
On a personal level, victory means the end of bloodshed, the return of loved ones who left and were at war, the restoration of the economy and relations with other countries.
What would defeat look like?
In wartime research, care must be taken to formulate questions in a neutral and safe manner, not only because of the risks, but also to increase the authenticity of the responses. We regularly ask the question: would you support or not support Putin’s decision to withdraw troops [from Ukraine] and move to peace negotiations, despite goals going unachieved?
In this formulation, the topic of defeat sounds mild: the withdrawal of troops without goals having been achieved. On the one hand, defeat is closely connected to forecasts (and fears) that should Russia lose the war, Ukrainian troops would come to Russia. In the spring of 2023, 56% in Russia believed this, with the figure at 69% in the area along the border with Ukraine. Respondents to the qualitative study also expressed fears that the Ukrainians would continue to shell Russian territory or would come to Russia and seek revenge.
On the other hand, on the open question of how the withdrawal of troops would affect your life or that of your family, two thirds of respondents give the same positive outcomes from their descriptions of what a Russian victory would look like: “the return of soldiers from the war;” “the return of Russians who left the country;” “the bloodshed will stop;” “psychological relief;” “borders being reopened;” “economic improvements.” Only a third of respondents spoke about negative consequences, such as a “deterioration of the economic situation” and a “continued threat to Russia.”
Respondents often quote lines from the Bulat Okudzhava song about the Great Patriotic War: “It means the only thing we need is Victory; one for all of us — we’ll pay any price.”
On a personal level, victory means the end of bloodshed, the return of loved ones who left and were at war, the restoration of the economy and relations with other countries.
What would defeat look like?
In wartime research, care must be taken to formulate questions in a neutral and safe manner, not only because of the risks, but also to increase the authenticity of the responses. We regularly ask the question: would you support or not support Putin’s decision to withdraw troops [from Ukraine] and move to peace negotiations, despite goals going unachieved?
In this formulation, the topic of defeat sounds mild: the withdrawal of troops without goals having been achieved. On the one hand, defeat is closely connected to forecasts (and fears) that should Russia lose the war, Ukrainian troops would come to Russia. In the spring of 2023, 56% in Russia believed this, with the figure at 69% in the area along the border with Ukraine. Respondents to the qualitative study also expressed fears that the Ukrainians would continue to shell Russian territory or would come to Russia and seek revenge.
On the other hand, on the open question of how the withdrawal of troops would affect your life or that of your family, two thirds of respondents give the same positive outcomes from their descriptions of what a Russian victory would look like: “the return of soldiers from the war;” “the return of Russians who left the country;” “the bloodshed will stop;” “psychological relief;” “borders being reopened;” “economic improvements.” Only a third of respondents spoke about negative consequences, such as a “deterioration of the economic situation” and a “continued threat to Russia.”
“The positive outcomes of victory and defeat (i.e. Russia withdraws its troops without having achieved its goals) paradoxically coincide, and it is the country going back to how it was before the war.”
In the quantitative study, most respondents stated that the withdrawal of troops from Ukraine would not affect their own life or that of their families in any way. At the same time, we see a big difference in expectations about the impact on the life of Russia (all Russians) versus that on people’s personal lives.
Only 34% of Russians said that life in Russia would not change if Russia lost the war, while 54% said that their own lives would not change. This can be attributed to the gap between the propaganda-driven perception of the war and the perception of one’s personal place in it – “this is not our war.”
Therefore, the preferred future is not about achieving the goals of the war as declared in propaganda, but a return to the past, to February 2022, before the war started.
Only 34% of Russians said that life in Russia would not change if Russia lost the war, while 54% said that their own lives would not change. This can be attributed to the gap between the propaganda-driven perception of the war and the perception of one’s personal place in it – “this is not our war.”
Therefore, the preferred future is not about achieving the goals of the war as declared in propaganda, but a return to the past, to February 2022, before the war started.
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