SOCIETY
What Do Russians Think About Yevgeny Prigozhin?
August 24, 2023
Vladimir Zvonovsky
Professor at Samara State University of Economics
Yevgeny Prigozhin is reported dead, killed in a suspicious plane crash exactly two months after his ‘march on Moscow’. Vladimir Zvonovsky writes about what Russian people thought about him after his ‘mutiny’.
Figure 1. Awareness of the events of June 24 (Russia, N = 1,002, July 4-9)
Three weeks after the mutiny of Yevgeny Prigozhin and his Wagner group, only a third of respondents (33%) said they knew about “the military crisis that occurred in Russia on June 24.” Another 40% reported that they had “heard something” about these events, while more than a quarter (27%) had heard nothing about them. As we see, the events, which, according to some participants, could have marked the beginning of a civil war, about which the Russian president has spoken publicly, are not so well known.
Men know more than women about the rebellion (36% versus 30% among women), while youth know about the “justice march” (18%) about half as often as the average person. Meanwhile, the older age groups (43%) are well aware of it. This reflects the number of Russians who are interested in the situation at the front. In other words, Russians place the events with the Wagner group in the general context of the conflict with Ukraine.
State television – and there is no other in Russia now – according to surveys, serves as the main source of news about important events in the country for most Russians. However, only 33% of the TV audience knew about the rebellion two weeks after the incident. Among those who receive information from YouTube channels, Rutube and Telegram, awareness was significantly higher at 39-46%.
Sources of information and attitudes toward Prigozhin
The rebellion is likely not something that the Russian leadership would like to tell its citizens about on television. However,
Men know more than women about the rebellion (36% versus 30% among women), while youth know about the “justice march” (18%) about half as often as the average person. Meanwhile, the older age groups (43%) are well aware of it. This reflects the number of Russians who are interested in the situation at the front. In other words, Russians place the events with the Wagner group in the general context of the conflict with Ukraine.
State television – and there is no other in Russia now – according to surveys, serves as the main source of news about important events in the country for most Russians. However, only 33% of the TV audience knew about the rebellion two weeks after the incident. Among those who receive information from YouTube channels, Rutube and Telegram, awareness was significantly higher at 39-46%.
Sources of information and attitudes toward Prigozhin
The rebellion is likely not something that the Russian leadership would like to tell its citizens about on television. However,
“If the Russian authorities restricted information about the rebellion, fearing that the effect from it would be unfavorable, Russians themselves easily got around the problem of accessing information that is of interest to them.”
Figure 2. Awareness of the events of June 24 among societal groups (Russia, N = 1,002, July 4-9)
Those who intentionally seek out information on what is happening do not turn to television but to uncensored sources, using VPNs to bypass internet censorship. The share of VPN users who knew about the events of June 24 was 40%.
Figure 2 shows the shares of people who know about the rebellion among different groups.
About a quarter of Russians (22%) had a positive view of PMC Wagner owner Yevgeny Prigozhin, while almost every second Russian did not (47%). (The question was asked to all respondents, not just those who know about the rebellion.) Another third (35%) had no hard position relative to “Putin’s cook.” Thus, for every supporter of Prigozhin in Russia, there are more than two people who oppose him.
Figure 2 shows the shares of people who know about the rebellion among different groups.
About a quarter of Russians (22%) had a positive view of PMC Wagner owner Yevgeny Prigozhin, while almost every second Russian did not (47%). (The question was asked to all respondents, not just those who know about the rebellion.) Another third (35%) had no hard position relative to “Putin’s cook.” Thus, for every supporter of Prigozhin in Russia, there are more than two people who oppose him.
Figure 3. Attitude toward the owner of PMC Wagner Yevgeny Prigozhin (Russia, N = 1,002, July 4-9)
As expected, Prigozhin’s support is higher among men (27%) than women (18%); women are more likely than men to view Prigozhin negatively (47% and 38%, respectively).
To aggregate positive and negative attitudes into one indicator, we used an approval index that represents the ratio of the share of those who approve of the Wagner owner to the share of those who disapprove of him. If the index is greater than 1, then the share of those who approve of Prigozhin is greater than the share of those who disapprove, and vice versa. The proximity of the index to 1 indicates the approximate balance of positive and negative attitudes. Across the country as a whole, the approval index is 0.51, while it is 0.70 for men and 0.38 for women.
Attitudes toward Prigozhin radically differ depending on age. For those under 50, the approval index is very high, though it never reaches 1, topping at 0.72-0.77. Meanwhile,
To aggregate positive and negative attitudes into one indicator, we used an approval index that represents the ratio of the share of those who approve of the Wagner owner to the share of those who disapprove of him. If the index is greater than 1, then the share of those who approve of Prigozhin is greater than the share of those who disapprove, and vice versa. The proximity of the index to 1 indicates the approximate balance of positive and negative attitudes. Across the country as a whole, the approval index is 0.51, while it is 0.70 for men and 0.38 for women.
Attitudes toward Prigozhin radically differ depending on age. For those under 50, the approval index is very high, though it never reaches 1, topping at 0.72-0.77. Meanwhile,
“Among the older generations, attitudes toward Prigozhin are extremely negative”
Figure 4. Prigozhin’s approval index among various societal groups (Russia, N = 1,002, July 4-9)
with the index at 0.26 for people over 60. Obviously, this is due to the sources from which they received news about Prigozhin’s actions. Thus, among the audience of state television, for every supporter of Prigozhin, there are slightly more than three opponents (0.39). The audience of Telegram channels is less negative about him, with an index score of 0.76. As we see, the choice of mass media largely shapes views on the Wagner head.
Whereas levels of education practically do not affect attitudes toward Prigozhin, where people live affects attitudes to a large extent. Residents of Russia’s regions that are right next to the battle zone rate Prigozhin significantly higher than Russians in general (0.71 and 0.51, respectively).
For Muscovites, the approval index is close to the national average, while the share of Muscovites who found it hard to rate Prigozhin is significantly lower (27% and 35%, respectively). In other words, the capital is better informed about Prigozhin and probably considers his march on Moscow as an attempt at getting a seat at the table in Russian politics. He is highly rated by residents of the Southern Federal District (0.87), which, among other regions, includes Rostov Region – where the Wagner mercenaries captured the headquarters of the Southern Military District on June 24 – and Krasnodar Region, where they had a training camp. On the contrary, residents of the Far Eastern Federal District view Prigozhin extremely negatively.
Whereas levels of education practically do not affect attitudes toward Prigozhin, where people live affects attitudes to a large extent. Residents of Russia’s regions that are right next to the battle zone rate Prigozhin significantly higher than Russians in general (0.71 and 0.51, respectively).
For Muscovites, the approval index is close to the national average, while the share of Muscovites who found it hard to rate Prigozhin is significantly lower (27% and 35%, respectively). In other words, the capital is better informed about Prigozhin and probably considers his march on Moscow as an attempt at getting a seat at the table in Russian politics. He is highly rated by residents of the Southern Federal District (0.87), which, among other regions, includes Rostov Region – where the Wagner mercenaries captured the headquarters of the Southern Military District on June 24 – and Krasnodar Region, where they had a training camp. On the contrary, residents of the Far Eastern Federal District view Prigozhin extremely negatively.
Figure 5. Prigozhin’s approval index among different groups (Russia, N = 1,002, July 4-9)
As income rises, people’s attitudes toward Prigozhin improve. Among low-income groups they are worse than the average for Russia (0.47), whereas among high-income groups they are better (0.62). Perhaps better-off Russians are more likely to support Prigozhin as a successful businessman.
Attitudes toward the special operation and Prigozhin’s approval ratings
It would seem that people who approve of the “special operation,” during which Wagner, for example, publicized its role in the capture of Bakhmut, should also approve of the group’s leader. But that is not so. Importantly, after the rebellion and the “march of justice,” among special operation supporters the Prigozhin approval index practically does not differ from the average at 0.52. Among special operation opponents, the index is significantly lower at 0.35.
At the same time, overall the June 24 mutiny itself undoubtedly influenced attitudes toward Prigozhin. This was noted by other researchers, and our data also confirms it. Thus, among the respondents who answered that they know about the June 24 events, the approval index was 0.50; among those who had “heard something” it was 0.46; and among those who had not heard anything, the approval index rose to 0.60. This gives us grounds to say that
Attitudes toward the special operation and Prigozhin’s approval ratings
It would seem that people who approve of the “special operation,” during which Wagner, for example, publicized its role in the capture of Bakhmut, should also approve of the group’s leader. But that is not so. Importantly, after the rebellion and the “march of justice,” among special operation supporters the Prigozhin approval index practically does not differ from the average at 0.52. Among special operation opponents, the index is significantly lower at 0.35.
At the same time, overall the June 24 mutiny itself undoubtedly influenced attitudes toward Prigozhin. This was noted by other researchers, and our data also confirms it. Thus, among the respondents who answered that they know about the June 24 events, the approval index was 0.50; among those who had “heard something” it was 0.46; and among those who had not heard anything, the approval index rose to 0.60. This gives us grounds to say that
“Before June 24 a more positive image of Prigozhin had taken shape, which was subsequently transformed by reports in various mass media.”
There is no major difference in views about Prigozhin between supporters and opponents of an early withdrawal of Russian troops and a peace agreement with Ukraine. Those who favor a “war to a victorious end” are not so inclined to approve of an active combatant turning his columns on Moscow (the approval index was 0.55). But another observation deserves attention: among those who are in favor of an early withdrawal of troops, approval was slightly lower (0.46). It could be that Prigozhin earned the approval of doves thanks to his own critical assessment of the special operation, which he announced right before the start of the march. It is also possible that doves approved of Prigozhin precisely for his march on Moscow.
Of course, views on Prigozhin’s actions on June 24 play a key role in determining attitudes toward him in general. Those who evaluate the “mutiny” as “a betrayal of the interests of the country” have an almost unanimous, negative attitude toward Prigozhin (0.13); in the other camp that did not see the mutiny as a betrayal, for every opponent of Prigozhin there are more than two of his supporters (2.23).
In the mass consciousness, the march on Moscow obviously made Prigozhin not an ally, but an enemy of Vladimir Putin. Among those who see no one else but Putin as president, the Prigozhin approval index was only 0.47, while among those who would like to see someone else as president, the figure rose to 0.64.
Prigozhin as a threat to the ‘who else but Putin’ narrative?
Obviously, when practically nothing changes on the political scene, citizens who do not like such stability might have positive attitudes toward an active player that has suddenly emerged. But those who fear change frown upon that. As Machiavelli noted, for a national leader, the danger is not only people who openly oppose him, but above all those who stand next to him, accumulating support.
For this reason, Prigozhin won approval mainly among those whose assessment of the Russian president’s actions during the mutiny decreased (0.73) or did not change (0.62). Those who highly rated Putin’s actions rate Prigozhin very low, at 0.23. In other words,
Of course, views on Prigozhin’s actions on June 24 play a key role in determining attitudes toward him in general. Those who evaluate the “mutiny” as “a betrayal of the interests of the country” have an almost unanimous, negative attitude toward Prigozhin (0.13); in the other camp that did not see the mutiny as a betrayal, for every opponent of Prigozhin there are more than two of his supporters (2.23).
In the mass consciousness, the march on Moscow obviously made Prigozhin not an ally, but an enemy of Vladimir Putin. Among those who see no one else but Putin as president, the Prigozhin approval index was only 0.47, while among those who would like to see someone else as president, the figure rose to 0.64.
Prigozhin as a threat to the ‘who else but Putin’ narrative?
Obviously, when practically nothing changes on the political scene, citizens who do not like such stability might have positive attitudes toward an active player that has suddenly emerged. But those who fear change frown upon that. As Machiavelli noted, for a national leader, the danger is not only people who openly oppose him, but above all those who stand next to him, accumulating support.
For this reason, Prigozhin won approval mainly among those whose assessment of the Russian president’s actions during the mutiny decreased (0.73) or did not change (0.62). Those who highly rated Putin’s actions rate Prigozhin very low, at 0.23. In other words,
“In the mass consciousness Prigozhin is seen as, if not a rival to Putin, then a threat to his endless rule.”
Summing up, we can say that state propaganda has been aimed rather at downplaying the significance of the June 24 events, and the state media tried to talk about them less. A significant number of Russians, in turn, sought to learn more about the “mutiny” through non-state information sources and with VPNs.
Prigozhin’s actions are approved mainly by two groups of Russians. The first is the “angry patriots” who approve of the special operation in principle but are dissatisfied with the way it is going. They blame the high command, including both the defense minister and the president, for failures at the front, and they believe that making peace with Ukraine is possible only from a position of strength. The second group consists of opponents of the special operation who see in Prigozhin a person capable of providing an alternative to Putin’s endless rule.
Through state propaganda, the Kremlin managed to reduce support for Prigozhin, convincing a significant number of his hitherto supporters that he had betrayed state interests with his march on Moscow. In addition, the authorities ensured that quickly after the rebellion, Prigozhin disappeared from the public sphere, meaning a significant part of Russians simply stopped remembering him.
The presented data was collected during a nationwide survey conducted by Chronicles on July 4-9, 2023, representing all the main social, political and territorial groups of Russia’s population over 17 years old.
Prigozhin’s actions are approved mainly by two groups of Russians. The first is the “angry patriots” who approve of the special operation in principle but are dissatisfied with the way it is going. They blame the high command, including both the defense minister and the president, for failures at the front, and they believe that making peace with Ukraine is possible only from a position of strength. The second group consists of opponents of the special operation who see in Prigozhin a person capable of providing an alternative to Putin’s endless rule.
Through state propaganda, the Kremlin managed to reduce support for Prigozhin, convincing a significant number of his hitherto supporters that he had betrayed state interests with his march on Moscow. In addition, the authorities ensured that quickly after the rebellion, Prigozhin disappeared from the public sphere, meaning a significant part of Russians simply stopped remembering him.
The presented data was collected during a nationwide survey conducted by Chronicles on July 4-9, 2023, representing all the main social, political and territorial groups of Russia’s population over 17 years old.
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