The sectoral breakdown is also extremely diverse
, ranging from sea ports and energy companies to wineries, meat processing plants and even a large producer of napkins and toilet paper.
After Prosecutor General Igor Krasnov summed up the interim results of his office’s work at a meeting with Putin
on September 25, it became obvious why it was impossible to find the logic in these actions: “as part of the deoffshorization of the Russian economy, as well as the protection of the interests of state property,” Krasnov said, “over 24,000 of our claims relating to illegal loss state property, valued at more than RUB 187 billion, have been satisfied by the courts. By taking supervisory measures, we also managed to release from foreign control a number of key strategic enterprises that are essential to Russia’s economy and security.”
Thus, the real scale of private property seizures is 24,000 claims satisfied by the courts, while the dozens of cases of nationalization written up in the press are nothing more than the tip of the iceberg. Moreover, Krasnov and his subordinates are clearly not going to stop there.
It would not be an exaggeration to say, therefore, that Russia is seeing the very revision of the results of privatization that Putin promised not to allow back in 2000, when he first came to power as president. In addition, Krasnov is confident that he is acting exactly in line with Putin’s instructions received in March 2023 at a meeting
of the collegium of the prosecutor’s office. The state’s position
Economic bloc officials had claimed that the state was not taking a course toward nationalization. In fact, as recently as June, at the St Petersburg Economic Forum, Minister of Economic Development Maxim Reshetnikov, Minister of Finance Anton Siluanov and Central Bank Chair Elvira Nabiullina actively discussed
the opposite process – privatization. The fact that less than three months later, following Shokhin’s remarks, they now had to discuss nationalization and the consequences of revising 90s privatization deals came as an unpleasant surprise. Unpleasant because they are the ones responsible for the Russian economy and socio-economic (and subsequently political) stability, and must ensure, in conditions of war, that the economy can provide the army fighting in Ukraine with everything it needs.
None of them believes in the effectiveness of state management, even in “strategic” industries. Reshetnikov is at a loss: like business, he does not understand
where the “red lines” are and considers revising the results of privatization “a road to nowhere.” Putin adviser Maxim Oreshkin, who spent four years as minister of economic development before moving over to the Presidential Administration, pointed out
at the Eastern Economic Forum that the state, represented by a bureaucrat, is a bad owner: “the enterprise is located in some region, is going about its business; the bureaucrat is in Moscow, he reads a report once a quarter. The main thing for him is not to take any risk, remove himself from everything, and so on. It is clear that such management does not lead to good results.”
The problem is that Krasnov does not report to the minister of economic development, or Putin’s adviser, or even the prime minister. He has his own tasks, his own area of responsibility and his own ideas about what is good for the state and what is not.