SOCIETY
The Memory of Perestroika Remains a Serious Trauma for Russia
June 10, 2025
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Denis Volkov
Director of the Levada Center (Moscow)
Levada Center head Denis Volkov discusses how attitudes toward Mikhail Gorbachev have changed over time, what hopes people associated with his rule and why the reforms initiated by him turned out to be so painful for Russians.
The original text in Russian was published in Gorby. A slightly shortened version is being republished here with their permission.
Today, Mikhail Gorbachev is not well regarded in Russian society: only 7% of Russians say they have a positive view of him, even while every fifth Russian notes the positive role that the architect of perestroika played in history. These figures have been quite stable.
However, it was not always so. In the first years of Gorbachev’s rule, his name was synonymous with the hopes for change across broad segments of the Soviet population. Gorbachev’s popularity in those days is reflected in the memoirs of his contemporaries, as well as the first Union-wide public opinion polls.
Regular nationwide polling in Russia is a product of perestroika. It became possible with the establishment of VTsIOM in December 1987. The first steps toward creating such an organization were taken under Yuri Andropov at the June 1983 plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, where he lamented that Soviet society had not been properly studied.
This came after the successful experience of regional pollsters, which had operated from the late 1970s to the early 1980s in Leningrad, Sverdlovsk and some other Soviet cities (in the late 1980s, the regional VTsIOM network was established based on these pollsters). Under Andropov, however, things did not move beyond declarations, and the decision to create VTsIOM was made only at the height of perestroika.
Gorbachev’s approval ratings in 1988-91
The first regular public opinion polls began to be conducted in late 1988/early 1989. They showed that Gorbachev was the most popular politician in the Soviet Union (we can assume that in the first years of his rule, before these polls, public support for Gorbachev was even higher).
In one of the first surveys, Gorbachev’s name was mentioned among the “most outstanding people of all times and nations.” He was the only person alive at that time to receive a significant percentage of mentions, at 17%.
Most outstanding people of all times and nations (RSFSR, December 1989)
Today, Mikhail Gorbachev is not well regarded in Russian society: only 7% of Russians say they have a positive view of him, even while every fifth Russian notes the positive role that the architect of perestroika played in history. These figures have been quite stable.
However, it was not always so. In the first years of Gorbachev’s rule, his name was synonymous with the hopes for change across broad segments of the Soviet population. Gorbachev’s popularity in those days is reflected in the memoirs of his contemporaries, as well as the first Union-wide public opinion polls.
Regular nationwide polling in Russia is a product of perestroika. It became possible with the establishment of VTsIOM in December 1987. The first steps toward creating such an organization were taken under Yuri Andropov at the June 1983 plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, where he lamented that Soviet society had not been properly studied.
This came after the successful experience of regional pollsters, which had operated from the late 1970s to the early 1980s in Leningrad, Sverdlovsk and some other Soviet cities (in the late 1980s, the regional VTsIOM network was established based on these pollsters). Under Andropov, however, things did not move beyond declarations, and the decision to create VTsIOM was made only at the height of perestroika.
Gorbachev’s approval ratings in 1988-91
The first regular public opinion polls began to be conducted in late 1988/early 1989. They showed that Gorbachev was the most popular politician in the Soviet Union (we can assume that in the first years of his rule, before these polls, public support for Gorbachev was even higher).
In one of the first surveys, Gorbachev’s name was mentioned among the “most outstanding people of all times and nations.” He was the only person alive at that time to receive a significant percentage of mentions, at 17%.
Most outstanding people of all times and nations (RSFSR, December 1989)
Moreover, half of those polled in the RSFSR named Gorbachev “person of the year” for 1988. His closest “competitors” were Chairman of the Council of Ministers Nikolai Ryzhkov and US President Ronald Reagan (12-13% each); Yeltsin, who had already been removed from the leadership of the Moscow City Party Committee by that time, received only 4%, and Andrei Sakharov 2%.
“Yet as early as 1989, polls recorded the first signs of Gorbachev’s popularity declining. This was due in part to growing economic problems, but even more so to the first Congress of People’s Deputies, held in May-June 1989.”
At the congress, which was broadcast live on television, the country’s problems were openly discussed, with Gorbachev publicly criticized and his authority undermined. Meanwhile, his opponents, primarily from the Interregional Deputies Group, gained nationwide recognition.
The question about “person of the year” in December 1989 yielded a different breakdown of popular sympathies: Gorbachev was named by 44% of the RSFSR population (down 6 percentage points from the year before), Sakharov by 23% (up 21 percentage points), Yeltsin by 17% (up 9 percentage points) and Ryzhkov by 18% (up 5 percentage points). It was these politicians’ actions and speeches that respondents most highly rated over the past few months. Without the wide coverage of the first Congress of People’s Deputies, this would not have been possible.
The question about “person of the year” in December 1989 yielded a different breakdown of popular sympathies: Gorbachev was named by 44% of the RSFSR population (down 6 percentage points from the year before), Sakharov by 23% (up 21 percentage points), Yeltsin by 17% (up 9 percentage points) and Ryzhkov by 18% (up 5 percentage points). It was these politicians’ actions and speeches that respondents most highly rated over the past few months. Without the wide coverage of the first Congress of People’s Deputies, this would not have been possible.
Approval rating of Mikhail Gorbachev in 1989-93
Dark blue: Entirely approve;
Light blue: Do not entirely approve;
Red: Do not approve;
Gray: Hard to say;
Source: Levada Center
Dark blue: Entirely approve;
Light blue: Do not entirely approve;
Red: Do not approve;
Gray: Hard to say;
Source: Levada Center
Approval ratings demonstrate an even more revealing picture. Gorbachev’s performance in December 1989 (when the question was first asked) was approved of by about half of those surveyed (49%), while about the same percentage approved of Ryzhkov’s performance (51%). Only a slightly smaller percentage supported Sakharov (45%). Only about a quarter supported Yeltsin’s actions (27%).
The following month, the polls moved against Gorbachev: his performance was approved of by less than half of those surveyed (46%). Sakharov’s approval rating spiked to 58% (up 13 percentage points) – but this represented posthumous recognition of his authority, as Sakharov died of a heart attack on December 14, 1989. Yeltsin’s approval rating stayed the same, at 27%.
The election of Gorbachev as president of the USSR in March 1990 (note: he was elected by an extraordinary, third Congress of People's Deputies) marked the last frontier of his political career and the last peak of his popularity. The move was supported by 63% of the surveyed residents of the RSFSR, while Gorbachev’s approval rating was 50%.
The following month, the polls moved against Gorbachev: his performance was approved of by less than half of those surveyed (46%). Sakharov’s approval rating spiked to 58% (up 13 percentage points) – but this represented posthumous recognition of his authority, as Sakharov died of a heart attack on December 14, 1989. Yeltsin’s approval rating stayed the same, at 27%.
The election of Gorbachev as president of the USSR in March 1990 (note: he was elected by an extraordinary, third Congress of People's Deputies) marked the last frontier of his political career and the last peak of his popularity. The move was supported by 63% of the surveyed residents of the RSFSR, while Gorbachev’s approval rating was 50%.
“After this, the popularity of Gorbachev (and the entire Union leadership) began to decline rather quickly as Yeltsin’s rose.”
Approval rating of selected politicians in 1989-93 (% of “entirely approve” responses)
Red: Mikhail Gorbachev
Blue dots: Boris Yeltsin
Light green: Andrei Sakharov
Black: Nikolai Ryzhkov
Source: Levada Center
Red: Mikhail Gorbachev
Blue dots: Boris Yeltsin
Light green: Andrei Sakharov
Black: Nikolai Ryzhkov
Source: Levada Center
Popular expectations and hopes shifted from the Union level to that of the national republics.
For Russia, the first major event manifesting this shift was the election of Yeltsin as chair of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet in May 1990 (also not by popular vote). He was no shoo-in before the election, but the very fact of his victory, along with the symbolic status of the post of chair, immediately catapulted Yeltsin above his rivals.
Yeltsin’s election was approved of by more than 85% of those polled, while his overall approval rating in late 1990 reached a record 72% (it would never go higher).
The second key event undermining the authority of the Union center was the declaration of state sovereignty by the RSFSR in June 1990. From then on, solutions to pressing problems were expected from the Russian, not the Soviet leadership.
Gorbachev’s support as of autumn 1990 had plunged to 27% in Soviet Russia. By the beginning of 1991, the approval ratings of Yeltsin and Gorbachev were 47% and 18%, respectively, which would reach 50% and 9% by the year-end, following the failure of the August putsch. Gorbachev’s rating has fluctuated around there, in a range of 7-10%, ever since.
Hopes for perestroika
To understand the nature of Russian society’s disappointment in the figure of Gorbachev and its fascination, albeit rather fleeting, with Yeltsin, let’s look at what people were hoping for and wanted during perestroika.
The key may be a comment Gorbachev made to his wife early in the morning of March 11, 1985: “we cannot go on like this.” Media from that time offered different interpretations of how exactly the country could not go on as before.
Stanislav Govorukhin’s film This is No Way to Live, released in 1990, was a denunciation of the Soviet system, attacking it from a populist position: it talks not just about the economic problems of the time, but also about crime, the links between crime and power, the crisis of morality and ethics, and general disintegration.
For Russia, the first major event manifesting this shift was the election of Yeltsin as chair of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet in May 1990 (also not by popular vote). He was no shoo-in before the election, but the very fact of his victory, along with the symbolic status of the post of chair, immediately catapulted Yeltsin above his rivals.
Yeltsin’s election was approved of by more than 85% of those polled, while his overall approval rating in late 1990 reached a record 72% (it would never go higher).
The second key event undermining the authority of the Union center was the declaration of state sovereignty by the RSFSR in June 1990. From then on, solutions to pressing problems were expected from the Russian, not the Soviet leadership.
Gorbachev’s support as of autumn 1990 had plunged to 27% in Soviet Russia. By the beginning of 1991, the approval ratings of Yeltsin and Gorbachev were 47% and 18%, respectively, which would reach 50% and 9% by the year-end, following the failure of the August putsch. Gorbachev’s rating has fluctuated around there, in a range of 7-10%, ever since.
Hopes for perestroika
To understand the nature of Russian society’s disappointment in the figure of Gorbachev and its fascination, albeit rather fleeting, with Yeltsin, let’s look at what people were hoping for and wanted during perestroika.
The key may be a comment Gorbachev made to his wife early in the morning of March 11, 1985: “we cannot go on like this.” Media from that time offered different interpretations of how exactly the country could not go on as before.
Stanislav Govorukhin’s film This is No Way to Live, released in 1990, was a denunciation of the Soviet system, attacking it from a populist position: it talks not just about the economic problems of the time, but also about crime, the links between crime and power, the crisis of morality and ethics, and general disintegration.
“One of the first Union-wide surveys, conducted in January 1989, showed that people associated perestroika, above all, with hope for a better economy.”
For the majority, the main indicator of “real, positive change” was full shelves at stores (52%) and stable prices (51%), as well as opportunities to earn decent money (35%) and access to imported goods (18%).
Yet people also voiced ideas in line with Govorukhin’s film: for 40% of the population, success of perestroika meant restoring firm order to the country, and for 28% taking away privileges of the authorities. Rights and freedoms concerned a much smaller number of people at the time: 25% mentioned free speech, 10% unrestricted travel abroad, 10% greater freedom of religion, and 8% no more internal registration system (propiska).
Getting the economy fixed was seen as the priority by most people.
This is unsurprising given the deepening social and economic crisis unfolding in the country. In one of the following surveys, conducted in spring 1989, 58% of respondents reported a shortage of basic goods and 32% said they were running out of money. Sixty-two percent “spent a lot of time looking for products and waiting in lines.”
In autumn 1989, 73% of RSFSR residents said they “quite often” or “constantly” saw a shortage of basic food products. At the same time, 84% noted that the supply of food and industrial goods had noticeably worsened over the last 2-3 years. Recall that by this time, the country had already gradually rolled out a rationing system for distributing essential goods, yet the crisis, as the data shows, was perceived to be getting worse. Almost half of those surveyed in 1990 reckoned famine was possible in the country the following year.
In autumn 1989, two thirds of respondents said food expenditures accounted for two thirds or more of their family budget (including a quarter who said “almost all” of their family budget went toward food). The “trough” was finally reached in the mid-1990s, when two thirds of respondents said they had barely any money left over after paying for food.
A tangible improvement came only in the late 1990s.
Yet people also voiced ideas in line with Govorukhin’s film: for 40% of the population, success of perestroika meant restoring firm order to the country, and for 28% taking away privileges of the authorities. Rights and freedoms concerned a much smaller number of people at the time: 25% mentioned free speech, 10% unrestricted travel abroad, 10% greater freedom of religion, and 8% no more internal registration system (propiska).
Getting the economy fixed was seen as the priority by most people.
This is unsurprising given the deepening social and economic crisis unfolding in the country. In one of the following surveys, conducted in spring 1989, 58% of respondents reported a shortage of basic goods and 32% said they were running out of money. Sixty-two percent “spent a lot of time looking for products and waiting in lines.”
In autumn 1989, 73% of RSFSR residents said they “quite often” or “constantly” saw a shortage of basic food products. At the same time, 84% noted that the supply of food and industrial goods had noticeably worsened over the last 2-3 years. Recall that by this time, the country had already gradually rolled out a rationing system for distributing essential goods, yet the crisis, as the data shows, was perceived to be getting worse. Almost half of those surveyed in 1990 reckoned famine was possible in the country the following year.
In autumn 1989, two thirds of respondents said food expenditures accounted for two thirds or more of their family budget (including a quarter who said “almost all” of their family budget went toward food). The “trough” was finally reached in the mid-1990s, when two thirds of respondents said they had barely any money left over after paying for food.
A tangible improvement came only in the late 1990s.
“Only starting in the mid-2000s did at least half of Russia’s population start living relatively comfortably, and it bears to keep in mind that the lowest share of families living in extreme poverty, as measured by expenditures on food versus family income, was observed in 2024.”
How much of the family budget goes toward food? (% of respondents)
Gray: Less than half
Blue-gray: About half
Yellow: About two thirds
Red: Almost all of budget
Light gray: Hard to say
Source: Levada Center
Gray: Less than half
Blue-gray: About half
Yellow: About two thirds
Red: Almost all of budget
Light gray: Hard to say
Source: Levada Center
It seems that this dramatic dynamic can at least in part explain the decline in Gorbachev’s popularity at the end of perestroika, as well as the short duration of support for Yeltsin and the stable approval ratings of Putin.
Overall, Gorbachev’s perestroika satisfied the expectations and hopes of only a segment of society – those who wanted freedom of speech, freedom of conscience, free political competition and openness to the outside world.
The majority wanted something completely different from perestroika: for economic problems to be solved and their standard of living to be improved. But these problems would be solved only in the new Russia and only years later.
After the liberalization of prices by the Gaidar government in January 1992 (the Gorbachev/Ryzhkov government never dared to take this step), goods reappeared on the shelves and the threat of famine receded. Most Russian families had to wait more than a decade for relative prosperity, which came as the new market economy started to work. The experience of these difficulties led to the contradicting views of perestroika and the figure of Gorbachev that have continued to this day.
Current figures
On the one hand, the majority believes that Gorbachev’s reforms did more harm than good; on the other hand, less than half believe it would be better had everything in the country stayed as it was before perestroika – this position is extremely stable and has held up with only minor fluctuations over 35 years of polling.
Overall, Gorbachev’s perestroika satisfied the expectations and hopes of only a segment of society – those who wanted freedom of speech, freedom of conscience, free political competition and openness to the outside world.
The majority wanted something completely different from perestroika: for economic problems to be solved and their standard of living to be improved. But these problems would be solved only in the new Russia and only years later.
After the liberalization of prices by the Gaidar government in January 1992 (the Gorbachev/Ryzhkov government never dared to take this step), goods reappeared on the shelves and the threat of famine receded. Most Russian families had to wait more than a decade for relative prosperity, which came as the new market economy started to work. The experience of these difficulties led to the contradicting views of perestroika and the figure of Gorbachev that have continued to this day.
Current figures
On the one hand, the majority believes that Gorbachev’s reforms did more harm than good; on the other hand, less than half believe it would be better had everything in the country stayed as it was before perestroika – this position is extremely stable and has held up with only minor fluctuations over 35 years of polling.
“It would be better if everything had stayed as it was before perestroika”
(% surveyed)
Blue: Agree
Red dots: Disagree
Source: Levada Center
(% surveyed)
Blue: Agree
Red dots: Disagree
Source: Levada Center
Knowing what the hopes for Gorbachev’s reforms were, we can predict the responses of Russians today to an open question about perestroika (without suggested answers). The complaints boil down to two main points: one, economic problems (economic crisis, inflation, business closures, poverty, social stratification – together they account for almost 50% of all responses); and, two, the collapse of the state and its institutions (the collapse of the USSR, the collapse of the education and healthcare systems, crime, etc. – in total, just over 40%). Everything else is not so significant.
At the same time, Russians today attribute their reluctance to live in pre-perestroika conditions firstly to the fact that many people in Soviet Russia lived poorly and precariously and that there were shortages (about half of all responses), while about another third say people did not have the opportunity to make decent money.
At the same time, Russians today attribute their reluctance to live in pre-perestroika conditions firstly to the fact that many people in Soviet Russia lived poorly and precariously and that there were shortages (about half of all responses), while about another third say people did not have the opportunity to make decent money.
“Today, as 30-40 years ago, fewer respondents, about a third, mention the importance of rights and freedoms.”
Tellingly, few people question the fact that Gorbachev initiated democratic changes. This idea was prevalent back in 1990, supported by 55% of respondents (the other options received several times fewer responses). Recall that by that time, skepticism about Gorbachev was already quite high: also in 1990, only 4% of respondents assessed his economic policy positively (the majority – 65% – negatively). Public opinion held that democracy was working, but the economy was in bad shape.
Similarly, most people today acknowledge that compared to before perestroika, there are more opportunities to participate in political life, speak freely and practice religion (though in recent years confidence in this has diminished). But for most Russians, both then and now, economic prosperity is the priority, not political freedoms.
Gorbachev’s supporters today believe that perestroika ultimately led both to economic prosperity (people began to live better, shortages disappeared, the country began to develop – more than half of all responses) and to more freedom (about a quarter of all responses). Even here, economic arguments come to the fore.
The figure of Gorbachev and his legacy evoke contradictory feelings even within groups of his supporters and opponents. For example, among those who say “perestroika did more harm than good,” only half would like to go back to how things were before perestroika. And vice versa: among those who say Gorbachev “played a significant, positive role in history,” only half think perestroika did more good than harm.
It turns out that today, as 40 years ago, a significant number of Russians agree with the diagnosis of the Soviet system that Gorbachev himself made in a conversation with his wife the night before his election as general secretary: the country could not go on as it had before. However, the price of the changes initiated by Gorbachev turned out to be so high for Russia that the memory of perestroika remains a serious trauma, even for many of those who welcomed the reforms and appreciated their fruits.
Similarly, most people today acknowledge that compared to before perestroika, there are more opportunities to participate in political life, speak freely and practice religion (though in recent years confidence in this has diminished). But for most Russians, both then and now, economic prosperity is the priority, not political freedoms.
Gorbachev’s supporters today believe that perestroika ultimately led both to economic prosperity (people began to live better, shortages disappeared, the country began to develop – more than half of all responses) and to more freedom (about a quarter of all responses). Even here, economic arguments come to the fore.
The figure of Gorbachev and his legacy evoke contradictory feelings even within groups of his supporters and opponents. For example, among those who say “perestroika did more harm than good,” only half would like to go back to how things were before perestroika. And vice versa: among those who say Gorbachev “played a significant, positive role in history,” only half think perestroika did more good than harm.
It turns out that today, as 40 years ago, a significant number of Russians agree with the diagnosis of the Soviet system that Gorbachev himself made in a conversation with his wife the night before his election as general secretary: the country could not go on as it had before. However, the price of the changes initiated by Gorbachev turned out to be so high for Russia that the memory of perestroika remains a serious trauma, even for many of those who welcomed the reforms and appreciated their fruits.
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