How repression has transformed independent civil society

The report – titled “Still holding on amidst growing digital repression? Conditions for civic engagement in Russia” and authored by Stefan Ingvarsson, an analyst and project lead at the Stockholm Center for Eastern European Studies, and Ekaterina Kalinina, an associate professor at Stockholm University – states that the tightening of digital control in Russia affects not only access to information, but also the very conditions for engaging in social activity. One of the main targets has been Telegram, which in many regions has effectively replaced traditional channels for consumers of independent media. As access to information increasingly depends on encryption and other circumvention tools, the audience for independent media is narrowing to those willing to do the work to overcome technical barriers.

An equally important consequence is growing legal uncertainty, meaning activists increasingly struggle to understand what is off limits and what is still safe. This is intensified by cases where actions previously considered legal – from donations to public support for organizations – later become grounds for prosecution once those organizations are designated “extremist” or “undesirable” by the government.

This atmosphere of fear and uncertainty is reinforced by stigmatizing labels such as “extremist,” “terrorist” and “foreign agent,” which are increasingly merging into a single category in the public perception. Projects around human rights, gender issues and advocacy for ethnic groups are now particularly vulnerable.

Against this backdrop, Ingvarsson and Kalinina write, the psychology of activism is changing. Many activists are preparing for the possibility of arrest, avoiding donations, refusing to use official platforms and refraining from actions that until recently were considered routine, including public criticism of local government decisions.

Ultimately, Ingvarsson and Kalinina conclude, digital repression functions not only through bans, but also through fear, exhaustion and uncertainty. It is shrinking the space not only for political protest, but also for everyday civic participation.

What remains of protest activity

Ingvarsson and Kalinina write that a growing sense of social instability is also fueling anxiety inside Russia. Infrastructure failures, rising prices, cuts to nonmilitary spending and widening inequality are contributing to a broader sense of insecurity.

Though this discontent rarely develops into open political protest, localized demonstrations continue – usually devoted to utility issues, deteriorating infrastructure or the closure of social institutions. Typically, protesters blame local authorities rather than the federal center, though Russians increasingly associate the decline in living standards with the war.

Meanwhile, many activists inside Russia view calls for protest from abroad as detached from the reality on the ground and as increasing risks for those who remain in the country. According to interviewees cited by Ingvarsson and Kalinina, the absence of mass protests stems less from a lack of dissatisfaction than from a belief that public assemblies are unlikely to produce meaningful change but likely to generate more political prisoners.

Ingvarsson and Kalinina conclude that in the current conditions, Russians’ political expectations have fallen sharply. Many civic actors are focused on risk management and survival in an increasingly uncertain environment.

How media consumption in Russia is changing

Media consumption in Russia is becoming more pragmatic, Ingvarsson and Kalinina suggest. Independent media outlets in exile – such as Meduza, Mediazona and Important Stories – remain in demand, but Russians are turning to them less, both because of the predominance of negative coverage found there and because of reporting seen as increasingly disconnected from everyday life inside of the country.

In response, Russians are diversifying their media consumption by alternating between independent outlets, state media, neutral Telegram channels and local information sources. This approach, Ingvarsson and Kalinina write, reflects not only skepticism toward individual outlets but also fatigue with emotionally draining news.

Against this backdrop, local and regional information sources are becoming increasingly important – particularly small Telegram channels and local civic initiatives that many consider more relevant amid polarization and growing pressure on the digital sphere from the state.

Ingvarsson and Kalinina conclude that the changes in media consumption reflect not only censorship, but also a broader crisis of trust, attention and emotional composure. Relying on multiple information sources is turning into a way of navigating uncertainty.

Impact on political activity

Ingvarsson and Kalinina argue that independent civil society in Russia is not disappearing – it is just becoming less visible as many activists channel their energies toward areas considered less politically sensitive, ranging from environmental and cultural initiatives to animal welfare and community projects. Humanitarian initiatives focused on assisting vulnerable groups continue to operate, though even they are facing growing administrative pressure and increasingly tread cautiously.

The structural foundations of civic activism are changing. Foreign funding is increasingly toxic, with many initiatives turning to local, informal support networks. For a growing number of activists, civic engagement is no longer a full-time profession but “an activity pursued alongside other employment or small-scale commercial work to remain financially viable.” This, Ingvarsson and Kalinina say, is contributing to the “de-professionalization of independent civic activity and a growing dependence on personal commitment.”

Against this backdrop, independent cultural spaces are taking on greater importance, such as small festivals, bookshops and autonomous venues, as they remain among the few places where sensitive issues can still be discussed in public. Even there, however, political expression is increasingly coded, relying on “meanings conveyed between the lines,” a dynamic Ingvarsson and Kalinina compare to late Soviet-era practices.

The authors conclude that under pressure from digital control and repression, civil society is becoming increasingly focused not on immediate political change, but on preserving networks, skills and relationships that could become important in the future.

How Western governments should engage with Russian civil society

Ingvarsson and Kalinina urge European governments to move away from an approach in which support for Russian civil society is limited to declarations of solidarity and backing high-profile opposition members. Independent civic actors and journalists inside Russia remain an important source of information about developments in the country – supporting them advances both democratic values and European security interests.

Overall, the guiding principle of such engagement, Ingvarsson and Kalinina write, should be “do no harm.” In other words, it should remain cautious, low-profile and mindful of risks faced by partners inside Russia.

One of the priorities identified by Ingvarsson and Kalinina is “digital resilience.” They call for support not only for circumvention tools and secure communications technologies, but also for training in how to use them, arguing that the push for a sovereign internet in Russia should be seen as a “development with significant implications for European security.”

The report also recommends improving legal capacity, like strengthening independent legal defense, monitoring cases and documenting persecution, which Ingvarsson and Kalinina describe as one of the few lines of defense amid the mounting pressure from the state on civic activity.

Another recommendation is to expand support for independent journalism, particularly smaller, regional and decentralized channels, including those operating through Telegram. Ingvarsson and Kalinina argue that “independent distribution is becoming as important as independent content,” meaning tools and formats that allow content to circulate under increased digital censorship.

Ingvarsson and Kalinina also identify increasing isolation of independent civic actors in Russia as a priority. They argue for strengthening “risk-aware links between regions,” as well as “low-visibility, trust-based networking.”

Finally, the authors recommend supporting independent research on Russia. As access to reliable data deteriorates, preserving knowledge production is important not only for understanding developments inside of the country, but also for ensuring “evidence-grounded” policy toward Russia in the future.