Hundreds of thousands of Russians have decided to leave Russia for good or were forced to flee the country since February 24. Triggered by political rather than economic reasons, this marked the biggest exodus of Russian citizens since the collapse of the USSR. The overwhelming majority are unlikely to return to their homeland. This begs the question: does the exodus constitute a sheer loss in human capital for Russia, or is it a resource for building alternative political projects for the Russian opposition? Will Russian activists integrate in host-country societies? Will these emigrants remain politically active at all, or, exhausted by political resistance, will they turn into “common people” wherever they settle down?

Patterns of political activism

Eleven months are not enough to draw unequivocal conclusions about the benefits or harm of Russian emigration in terms of building alternative political projects. The new political emigrants resemble nomads moving from one location to another, driven by immigration restrictions and the search for new jobs. Those who left primarily for economic reasons or who were relocated by their employer will probably never get involved in political and civic activities in their new home. Those who were politicized before leaving Russia, for the most part, have not given up, although they may have changed the form of their participation. 

Of particular interest are those who grew disengaged and those who began to go through a “school of citizenship” after emigration, in line with the practices of their new surroundings. As оne of the emigrants we interviewed in Tbilisi in the summer remarked, “anyone who speaks Russian, with a Russian passport, should be ready to talk anywhere in the world.” Of course, that person implied talking about the war and emigrants’ attitudes toward it. Activism is one way to hold such conversations with dignity. 

If emigrants are politically active, it can have an impact not only on Russian domestic political processes, but also on the host societies and states. The vast majority of those who left Russia after February 2022 ended up in Turkey, Georgia, Armenia and Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan and Georgia became especially popular for those fleeing mobilization last autumn. 

Not all of these countries are liberal democracies that welcome political activism. During Putin’s visit to Kazakhstan in the autumn, several Russian anti-war activists were detained and then released after a “prophylactic chat.” Some even feared extradition to Russia. On the other hand, those who ended up in Germany or Finland can finally take advantage of opportunities to express themselves freely without fear of persecution and to have access to reliable and diverse sources of information. 

Finally, in democratic societies, emigrants can count on support from other anti-war activists, as well as the host country community. Unplanned emigration is often accompanied by a loss in social status and a decline in income. Those who fled the mobilization were generally in a highly vulnerable position economically. Civic activism usually requires free time, skills and political awareness, as well as some sort of financial safety cushion. Therefore, it is logical to ask what influences one’s decision to pursue activism. First, the very fact of emigration away from repressive regimes is a form of protest per se, a choice made after other forms of resistance have been considered ineffective or off limits. Another factor is the individual political and activist experience of an emigrant. A third factor is the political landscape of the host society.

According to surveys of emigrants conducted by our team in the spring and autumn of 2022, the traumatic encounters with the repressive side of the state, contrary to expectations, do not discourage people from engaging in activism or even make them more eager to join protest actions. 
We tracked how patterns of civic activism changed from March to September 2022 among the same respondents. 

New forms of activism 

After emigration, the forms of activism underwent significant changes. Emigrants continued to take part in volunteer initiatives, with about 22% reporting that they had in the past three months (versus 16% in the first month of emigration; see Figure 1). The share of those emigrants who took part in unsanctioned protests dropped from 40% to 26% from April to September 2022 (see Figure 2). This is largely due to the simple fact that “unsanctioned protest” is not a familiar notion in the host countries where the political regimes are gentler and peaceful protest is not criminalized. 

In Armenia and Georgia, political protest is a norm of political life, not to mention the EU countries. The share of those taking part in sanctioned demonstrations fell from 55% in April to 21% in the autumn. However, among the emigrants that we surveyed, the share of those participating in volunteer projects aimed at aiding compatriots has tripled from 10% to 32%, while the share who helped Ukrainian refugees rose from 4% to 29%. Support for Ukrainians has been criminalized and is therefore virtually impossible on Russian territory, but after leaving Russia many emigrants were able to join such endeavors and also donate to the Ukrainian army. In other words, emigrants switched from outright anti-war actions to volunteering. 

Helping Ukrainians is an important signal sent by emigrants to host-country societies. However, not all emigrants are engaged in such activities. Women in general are more likely to protest, make donations and provide various kinds of assistance to refugees. Men behave more cautiously: initially, they preferred helping their compatriots. An additional interpretation is that men are more likely to take on the role of the “breadwinner” and have less time to help refugees, which is left to their spouses. This pattern is typical in many Russian households, including relocated families of IT specialists. Finally, men of Russian origin are probably not always welcome among volunteers. There is, however, great variability in this regard from one host country to another and from network to network. In general, men became more active in the autumn compared to the early stage of emigration, which suggests that it is women who spearheaded anti-war resistance.

As the emigrants who left before the “partial mobilization” was announced are better off financially and have more social capital, this facilitates mutual support and volunteer work.

Contrary to the popular belief that there is insurmountable division between those who left and those who stayed (see more on this in Lyubov Borusyak’s article in Russia.Post), the majority of Russian emigrants maintain close ties and a high level of trust with people who remain in Russia. Every second respondent said she talks to her loved ones in Russia every day or almost every day, while 37% indicated that it was several times a month. At the same time, more than half (55%) of respondents talk about politics with their families in Russia, even though these conversations can be frustrating for both sides (see Figure 3).

Having embarked on a trip without a return ticket, emigrants still say that their “heads and hearts” remain in Russia. Undoubtedly, the majority of respondents remain emotionally attached to the country. Almost half say they feel strongly attached and only a third see their attachment to Russia as quite weak. This is not surprising given the short time spent in emigration and the fact that many Russian emigrants keep close ties with their relatives and are emotionally involved in political events related to Russia. Meanwhile, developing an attachment to a new country is often a long and complex process. The nomadic nature of emigrant movement, along with the stigmatization of Russians at least in some of the receiving countries, will make this process even more difficult.

Emigrants’ interest in political life in Russia often goes hand in hand with a rising interest in their new country’s politics. More than half of our respondents were interested in the politics of the country where they found themselves at the time of the survey. Still, interest in the Russian political agenda does not necessarily translate into engagement in the politics of the host country: a significant share (39%) indicated that they were not interested in host-country politics (see Figure 4).