Radical Russian nationalism has been fueled by white racism since the early 2000s. Radical nationalists channeled their hatred toward “ethnic outsiders,” identified primarily by their appearance. In Russia, these outsiders were mostly labor migrants, usually from Central Asia. Thus, the theme of fighting migration inevitably became commonplace for Russian nationalists. The racist component of that effort was always obvious, and rhetorically they included not only foreigners (migrants from Central Asia), but also Russian citizens from the North Caucasus. However, as early as the latter half of the 2000s the focus of racist violence shifted from “Caucasians” to “Asians,” and in recent years the Caucasus has faded in the rhetoric of the far right.

After 2014, due to the crisis within the far-right movement, the theme of fighting migration somewhat lost relevance, but starting in 2019 it has been making a comeback in the public discourse. Major political events, such as the full-scale war with Ukraine or the terrorist attack at Crocus City Hall, have undoubtedly influenced the dynamics of anti-migrant activity by the far right, although not always in obvious ways.

Vigilantism and propaganda

In 2021, the official discourse in Russia changed quite unexpectedly: in the summer and autumn an anti-migrant campaign unfolded in state media, as reflected in statements by pro-government politicians and public figures. Actively discussed were such (supposed) issues as the threat of “ethnic crime,” excessive numbers of migrants and the harm they do to the labor market.

The reason for this campaign remains unclear, especially considering that the number of foreigners in Russia had declined significantly due to pandemic-related entry restrictions. In addition, in many cases the media wrote about threats emanating not only from migrants, but also from Russian citizens – for example, from Dagestanis or from foreigners who had long ago taken Russian citizenship – which only showed the racist underpinnings of the campaign.

This campaign lit a fire under Russian nationalists. On their internet platforms, descriptions of criminal clashes between locals and foreigners increasingly appeared, as well as other examples of illegal (or seemingly illegal) activities of foreigners, which nationalists diligently searched for on the internet and used to call for action against “Caucasians” [kavkaztsi], etc.

Sometimes the incidents described in the far-right segment of the internet did not have an obvious criminal component, for example, noise made in the evening or the decision by the real estate classifieds site CIAN to prohibit discriminatory listings in which apartments would be advertised for rent “only to Slavs” or “only to citizens of the Russian Federation.”

“Gangs of uninvited guests threaten every Russian individually and all Russians collectively. It would not be an exaggeration to say that before our eyes a threat to the Russian State itself has emerged,” wrote Konstantin Malofeev.

The most active organizations in the fight against migrants were two recently established networks of nationalists: Russian Community (Russkaya obshchina; established in 2020) and Northern Man (Severnyi chelovek; established in the summer of 2022). Both support the Kremlin’s policies, including the special operation in Ukraine, both call themselves nonpolitical organizations, declaring that they do not intend to compete for political power, and both advocate conservative morality and Orthodox values. Yet the focus of their activity is fighting migration.

Since the beginning of 2023, the vigilante activity of these and other nationalists has expanded, as they have taken on the functions of supporting the police as volunteers and sometimes even replacing them. In the summer and fall of 2023, several dozen cases were recorded in which the far right took part in anti-migrant police raids, went to the scenes of incidents involving foreigners and detained people without the participation of law enforcement, at least initially.

Since the beginning of 2024, the SOVA Center has recorded 136 cases of such vigilantism. In Kaluga Region, for example, Russian Community participated in police checks of migrants at construction sites and restaurants, collaborated with the Directorate for Traffic Safety in cracking down on illegal taxis, and in Ryazan and Yekaterinburg, as well as Krasnodar Region, even patrolled the streets.

The other victims were alternative youth, political opponents (anti-fascists, anarchists and communists), LGBT+ people and those who, in the eyes of their attackers, lead a wrong lifestyle (e.g., homeless, drunk and drug users). Religiously motivated attacks are relatively rare in Russia. Muslims as a religious group are a constant target of hostility on far-right internet platforms, though they are rarely victims of attacks based on their religion. That said, in 2023 there were several attacks and public threats made against women wearing Muslim headdress.

Much of the current violence is carried out by autonomous nationalist groups. Judging by the videos and photographs published on Telegram channels, as well as data on arrests, most of the attackers are teenagers copying the aesthetics of Nazi skinheads of the early 2000s.

At this point, most of the activity of these new autonomous groups is not very radical. There are almost no murders, for example. These young neo-Nazis spray gas canisters in the faces of victims, puncture tires, break windows, damage goods at kiosks and the like – note that these types of acts were not included in the statistics provided above.
However, judging by the experience of the 2000s, as the number of acts increases and the perpetrators mature, the level of cruelty will inevitably rise. And that is already visible in group beatings.

It cannot be said that law enforcement officials are not reacting at all to these acts of violence. In 2023, some participants in attacks spread on far-right Telegram channels were detained. For example, in December 2023 cases were opened in St Petersburg against 16-year-old vocational school students detained on suspicion of at least five attacks on janitors from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Nevertheless, the authorities are clearly not keeping up with the jump in xenophobic violence perpetrated by these groups.

In 2024, the rise in racist violence by young autonomous neo-Nazi continued. As of April 15, 2024, the SOVA Center recorded 46 attacks motivated by hatred since the beginning of the year. The dynamics suggest that this year the number of such crimes will exceed the figure for 2023, although the year-on-year growth will be smaller than in 2023 versus 2022.

After the terrorist attack, an anti-migrant statement was made by representatives of the Imperial Legion (the armed wing of the Russian Imperial Movement), some members of which are fighting in Ukraine on the Russian side. The Legion called on the “Russian [russkiye] people” to unite, “to stop creating an economic basis for migration: we must buy from Russians, hire Russians... use the services of Russians,” and, most importantly, to arm themselves to fight back against the “dominance” of migrants.
Members of the so-called Espanyol detachment, made up of soccer hooligans – also fighting in Ukraine – recorded an appeal straight from the battlefield, demanding to “immediately tighten migration policy and punish those responsible for bringing terrorists into Russia.”

Nine days after the terrorist attack, the Movement of Nationalists (which, unlike the groups listed above, is against the special operation in Ukraine) called for putting up anti-migrant posters “Islamist migrants shot more than 140 unarmed Russians. Stop bringing in migrants!” or pay for advertising space for such posters. Such posters actually went up on March 30-31 in six of Russia’s regions.

In the week following the attack, there were at least four serious ethnically motivated attacks that were explicitly labeled as revenge. In addition, from March 23 to March 31, far-right Telegram channels reported at least 25 lesser street attacks using gas canisters against people of “non-Slavic appearance,” including two girls in hijabs; of these attacks, six were called “revenge for Crocus.”

Other acts of revenge included puncturing the tires of cars with license plates from Chechnya, Dagestan and Central Asian countries. On March 23, an unknown person spray-painted the gates of a mosque in the city of Shchelkovo, Moscow Region. And on March 24, a video appeared in one far-right channel with a young man throwing a bag with a pig’s head onto the territory of a mosque during prayer.

This increase in violence occurred precisely in the last week of March, meaning it might have been attributable not only to the terrorist attack – in most Russian schools this is spring break, and such attacks are usually committed by teenagers, often still in school. Quite often school breaks are accompanied by an increase in violence. In total, the number of acts of far-right violence in March almost doubled compared to February. According to SOVA Center data, vigilante activity on the part of the far right rose twofold after the terrorist attack.

Anti-migrant activity – the bread and butter of the far right – has been on the rise since 2021. From that time, excluding a pause of about six months in 2022, it has been fueled by a state-sponsored anti-migrant campaign. This campaign provides hope to political nationalists that if the theme of the “migrant threat” is integrated into official rhetoric, they will be able – if politics returns in the future – to attempt to do what the Movement against Illegal Immigration (DPNI) failed to do in the early 2000s – to create a legal national-populist party.

Relatively moderate nationalists maintain and even stress their loyalty to the authorities.

The terrorist attack at Crocus City Hall worsened existing problems. More moderate nationalists, focused on vigilantism and inciting hostility toward migrants, redoubled their efforts. The activity of their more radical brethren, who are bent on violence and vandalism, also picked up considerably. This trend has not translated into serious acts of violence – at least not yet. But radical nationalists have begun to agitate more actively on their Telegram channels.

The federal authorities have yet to make significant policy decisions regarding migrants, but the official rhetoric and law enforcement practices more than resonate with the activity of the far right.