Geopolitical shifts

“The voting results have fully confirmed your immense political prestige, and the trust [your] fellow citizens have for the policy pursued under your leadership toward stabilizing the situation in Syria as quickly as possible and strengthening its state institutions,” Vladimir Putin noted in his congratulatory telegram to Bashar Assad in May 2021, when he again triumphed in a phony presidential election, taking 95.1% of the vote (13.5 million votes).

On December 8, 2024, when the rebels marched on Damascus to take power, nobody took to the streets to protect the president. Nor could the Kremlin prop up the Syrian dictator as it had done before.

For about a decade, the official line was that Russia was fighting international terrorism in Syria. The military operation, which began in September 2015, cost Moscow $2.5 million a day on average. According to the BBC Russian service, at least 543 Russian soldiers have been killed in fighting on Syrian soil (note the Russian Defense Ministry has never disclosed Russian casualties in Syria).

However, the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, divided Russian foreign policy into “before” and “after,” and Syria was no exception. Moscow began slowly reducing its military presence as the situation seemed to be gradually stabilizing. Assad regained control over most of the country, and in May 2023, after 12 years of being shunned, he was welcomed back into the Arab League.

While reducing its military role in Syria amid the Ukraine war, the Kremlin attempted to play a political role. Moscow repeatedly called on Assad to engage in dialogue with the armed opposition and to reach an agreement with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Toward this end, in December 2022, Moscow hosted the first meeting in 11 years between the Turkish and Syrian defense ministers.

Regardless of the widespread belief that the Syrian leader was completely loyal to his Russian vis-a-vis, Assad often defied Russia's demands, insisting, to take one example, on the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Syria as a precondition for dialogue with Ankara.

“The previous authorities, despite our urgent recommendations and active assistance, failed to establish a constructive dialogue with opponents and influential regional neighbors with the aim of launching a full-fledged political process,” Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated after Assad was forced from power.

The Assad regime fell like a house of cards, putting up no resistance to the rebels.
Assad failed to take stock of recent geopolitical shifts in the Middle East, whereby Iran and Hezbollah, Tehran’s main regional proxy, had basically been eviscerated in one year by Israel. Nor did the last Syrian leader appreciate that Putin and his army had got bogged down in Ukraine and were unable to help Syria as they had back in 2015.

The new narrative

Granting Assad political asylum because of “humanitarian considerations,” Moscow did not appeal to his legitimacy as president, as it had in the case of the toppled Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych in 2014.

The Kremlin has accepted that Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a terrorist group officially prohibited in Russia, has essentially come to power in Syria. Moreover, it is worth mentioning that it was Moscow that insisted on recognizing HTS (initially Jabhat al-Nusra) as a terrorist organization in the UN Security Council.

When Moscow realized that Assad’s fall was inevitable, it changed its narrative swiftly. Russian propaganda stopped calling HTS “terrorists” – they became the “armed opposition”.

Apparently, close contacts between Moscow and the rebels were established before they entered Damascus and overthrew Assad. Otherwise, it would be impossible to explain why, during their march on Damascus, HTS militants and their allies never even approached Russian military bases. Furthermore, at dawn on December 8, 2024, upon entering the Syrian capital, the rebels attacked only the embassy of Iran, with the Russian embassy untouched.

At end-January 2025, the first Russian delegation, led by Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov, paid a visit to Damascus. Though there were no achievements to report, it became clear that both sides are interested in talking to each other.

On February 12, Putin held a phone call with the self-proclaimed president of Syria, Ahmed al-Sharaa (nom de guerre: Abu Mohammad al-Julani). D The new Syrian leader emphasized that relations between Damascus and Moscow are "strategic" – a formulation rarely heard in the Assad era.

Al-Sharaa’s working visit to Moscow on October 15 was the culmination of Russia's U-turn in Syria. The image of Putin sitting down for talks with one of yesterday's most wanted men in the world indicated that Moscow, against all odds, intends to keep its presence in this war-torn country.

Mutually beneficial

For al-Sharaa, who had been a legal target for Russia and the US-led coalition in Syria for years, any international contacts and visits abroad are an opportunity to bolster his legitimacy as (interim) president.

The talks with Putin, the head of a nuclear power and permanent UN Security Council member state, help to obscure al-Sharaa’s past as the leader of HTS. In addition, Russia’s president, unlike many Western leaders, is not known to “teach” democracy to his counterparts – a fact that al-Sharaa cannot but appreciate.

For Putin, meeting with the new Syrian leader, who is already recognized by most countries in the region, including Turkey and the Persian Gulf monarchies, is a chance to buttress his image and demonstrate that Russia, unlike Iran, has not lost in Syria with Assad’s defeat.

Putin, while welcoming al-Sharaa in the Kremlin, noted that Russia “has been guided by the interests of the Syrian people for decades.” In a broad sense, the Kremlin is stressing that Moscow's presence in the Middle East is still unshakable.

The main challenge for the new authorities in Damascus is security. The “former jihadists” are unable to maintain order and do not even fully control the country's territory (only about 70%). At the same time, the new security forces, who only yesterday were beheading their opponents, are now conflicting with local communities, especially with the Alawites in western Syria or with the Druze in the south.

To address the security challenges, the new Syrian authorities are interested in deploying Russian military patrols in certain regions of Syria, particularly in the south.

Reuters reports that al-Sharaa directly asked Putin to reinstate Russian patrols.

In exchange, Moscow can keep its two military bases: the naval base in Tartus and the Khmeimim air base in Latakia. In two weeks after al-Sharaa's visit, Russia had resumed military flights to Khmeimim.

The Russian troops would be a counterweight to the Israeli presence in southern Syria. The mere presence of Russian armed forces in Syria makes Israel more cautious when contemplating new strikes on the country.

Furthermore, the Russian contingent also helps Damascus to balance the influence of Turkey, which maintains bases in northern Syria and plans to expand its military presence in the country, as well as the US military presence in the eastern regions, which al-Sharaa calls “illegal,” unlike the Russian one.

Beyond security cooperation

Along with security issues, Damascus also counts on Moscow for economic and humanitarian support. Though Russia is unable to invest billions of dollars in the reconstruction of Syria's infrastructure and economy, unlike Saudi Arabia or Qatar, it is quite willing to cooperate in certain areas.

For instance, a Russian delegation led by Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak visited Damascus in September and offered the new Syrian government humanitarian aid and assistance in restoring the energy sector, which is still in tatters.

Following the talks between Putin and al-Sharaa, Moscow further agreed to consider the possibility of supplying wheat, medicine and food to Syria, as well as working in Syria's oil fields. A week after al-Sharaa’s visit to Moscow, the Kremlin had started a delivery of oil and condensate to Syria.

Moreover, the Russian company Goznak, which printed Syrian currency in the Assad era, is expected to issue new banknotes to replace the current ones bearing portraits of the ousted dictator.

Moscow and Damascus plan to convene a meeting of the intergovernmental commission on trade and economic cooperation.

No Assad, no worries

Several leaks suggest the new Syrian authorities are also demanding that Russia extradite Assad and return approximately $2 billion in assets the ousted leader supposedly took with him. Moscow is unwilling to agree to these conditions, as doing so would undermine Russia's image as a safe haven for leaders of states considered by the Kremlin to be Russia’s partners.

The opportunity for authoritarian leaders to escape is a very strong argument in Moscow's favor, especially in the Middle East, where virtually all states are authoritarian. Furthermore, Putin clearly derives aesthetic pleasure from the feeling that the fate of Assad, whom he had supported for so long, is now totally in his hands.

All in all, the Russian authorities are doing their best to hide Assad, not allowing him, unlike Yanukovich or the toppled Kyrgyzstani President Askar Akayev, to appear in public or give interviews. Any news reports about his fate are met with irritation in Moscow. For instance, Lavrov recently denied rumors that Assad had been poisoned.

On the other hand, Assad is not such an urgent issue for the new Syrian authorities. For now, they are focused on things like maintaining stable electricity.