President Trump’s statements toward Russia have become significantly harsher. What does this mean?

His statements have been growing harsher for some time – this began in the summer. The president made clear he was disappointed with the negotiating process.

He has come to believe that President Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin are, in many ways, the main obstacle to reaching an agreement on Ukraine. That contrasts with his position in the first months of his administration, when he saw Ukraine as the main obstacle. The trend has gathered momentum gradually.

Do President Trump’s recent statements mark a fundamental shift in his thinking? I would say no. He still wants a negotiated settlement, but he now believes greater pressure must be applied to Russia to bring it to the table with a willingness to compromise on the demands it has advanced for the past three and a half years – demands Putin set out quite clearly in his address at the Foreign Ministry in June 2024.

In July, you wrote in your column for the National Interest that it was time for Russia to declare victory. Has anything changed since then?

No. If anything, events over the past few months have confirmed that it is time for Russia to declare victory. As I argued in July, many of the goals of the “special military operation” have been achieved – not completely but to a significant extent. It is abundantly clear that Ukraine will not join NATO in the foreseeable future. It is abundantly clear that Russia will not be expelled from the territories it has occupied over the past three and a half years.

It is also clear that the rights of Russian-speaking residents of Ukraine will be protected in one way or another, especially as Ukraine addresses issues related to EU accession. In fact, many Russian speakers and ethnic Russians now live in territories under Moscow’s control. And, down the list, sanctions will be lifted after a settlement, and so forth.

So why would it be in Moscow’s interest to declare victory now? First, it has achieved most of its goals. Second, every additional day of conflict is costly in human and economic terms. Perhaps not so much over the next year or two, but over the longer term, Russia is underinvesting in the breakthrough technologies that will be key to economic competitiveness in the years ahead. As a result, Russia is falling behind other major powers, particularly China and the US. Europe’s position, meanwhile, has become more consolidated than at any time in recent years, and Europe has far greater resources than Russia when you consider population size and societal wealth. Even a country like India is making significant technological advances, particularly in information and communications technology. If the goal is to preserve Russia’s status as a great power, prolonging the conflict in Ukraine is counterproductive.

To what extent does the increased use of UAVs, along with recent drone incidents in Europe, raise the cost of prolonging the conflict?

Violations of NATO airspace underscore the risks of a prolonged conflict. From the outset – in Europe, in the US and, I think, in Russia – there was hope that the fighting could be confined to the territory of Ukraine. It is now clear that this principle is being severely tested. We are talking not only about drones entering European airspace but also about Ukrainian strikes increasingly deep into Russian territory. The risk of escalation always remains, and we should strive to minimize it.

With regard to the drones over Europe – if, of course, they are Russia’s work – they are counterproductive. They hand European leaders an argument that Russia poses a threat and that Europeans should thus spend more on defense and focus more on national security. That will require sacrifices; social programs will become less generous.

So, first, there is a real risk of escalation. Second, if these are deliberate actions by Moscow, they are counterproductive, as they generate solidarity within Europe. That, in turn, enables European leaders to continue supporting Ukraine with weapons and financing and makes them less inclined to engage in the negotiations necessary to bring this conflict to a satisfactory conclusion.

You said Trump’s recent rhetorical shift is attributable to his desire to put pressure on Russia. Do you think the same applies to his statement after meeting with Volodymyr Zelensky that Ukraine could win back some of its territory?

I think this is also part of Trump’s effort to, as he would say, gain leverage over Russia to persuade it to sit down in good faith at the negotiating table and reach a settlement. It is noteworthy that even the Ukrainians now admit that, in their view, they do not have the resources to liberate the [occupied] territories militarily. I think most European leaders share this position. What Kyiv can realistically hope for is to freeze the line of contact, acknowledge that Russia will occupy part of the territory Kyiv considers its own and postpone a final resolution of that territorial dispute.

I have not seen anything to indicate that the Trump administration has changed its position regarding the territories. Trump is saying this to make clear that he is ready to provide Ukraine with greater rhetorical support and supply weapons on the condition that NATO countries purchase those weapons and transfer them to Ukraine. By doing so, he is essentially saying the conflict will continue for some time and since its continuation is, from an objective point of view, bad for both Ukraine and Russia, it really is time to sit down at the negotiating table and try to resolve it.

Judging by statements coming out of Washington, the US administration still believes this conflict can be resolved by the end of the year or by Christmas. Do you consider this realistic, given the situation on the battlefield and the positions of both sides?

You can never know for sure, but things can happen quite quickly. In my view, the outlines of a settlement are already visible. It is abundantly clear that Ukraine will not join NATO. It is also clear that Ukraine will not drive Russia out of the territories it has acquired over the past three and a half years. The issue of discrimination against ethnic Russians and Russian speakers is close to being resolved. For Ukraine, the short-term goal is to preserve its sovereignty and independence within the territory controlled by Kyiv, and that, too, can be addressed through negotiations.

The key issue that needs to be resolved is Ukraine’s military. Putin has repeatedly spoken about demilitarizing Ukraine. However, Kyiv will insist that even with a neutral status, Ukraine cannot be completely demilitarized; it must be able to defend itself in the event of an attack. The Ukrainians, of course, mean aggression from Russia. But theoretically, Ukraine could face other threats in the future – whether from the Black Sea region or, for example, the Balkans. This issue must be resolved somehow. Again, I think there are ways to do this at the negotiating table, but that will not happen until the parties actually sit down.

Resolving the conflict in Ukraine is not a matter of signing a single document. The Ukraine issue is part of a broader question of European security. Resolving these interconnected issues will take time. Therefore, I propose that the parties agree on what could be called a framework agreement. It would define the basic principles and parameters of a future settlement, and the sides would agree that as soon as such a framework is reached, a ceasefire will come into effect and negotiations will immediately begin on all aspects that must be resolved to end the war and stabilize relations between Russia and the West in Europe.

Negotiations would proceed along several parallel tracks. Naturally, a separate channel between Russia and Ukraine will be needed to address issues such as prisoner swaps and other humanitarian aspects of the conflict. A Moscow-Washington line of communication will also be necessary to discuss broader issues of European security and strategic stability. And it is abundantly clear that without the participation of the Europeans themselves, in one form or another, it will be impossible to discuss European security. These issues are extremely complicated and cannot be resolved overnight, nor is there any need for that – they can be tackled gradually.

Specific agreements and solutions to individual problems will emerge over time. We should see this not as a one-time event, like the signing of a single peace treaty, but as a process of building new relations in Europe – new relations between Russia and the West.

If the contours of a future settlement are already visible, what, in your view, is the main obstacle?

I believe the main obstacle in the negotiations and perhaps the toughest issue of all is the status of the part of Ukraine that will remain under Kyiv’s control after the ceasefire. It seems clear that the Kremlin wants to see Ukraine loyal to Moscow, within its sphere of influence. At the same time, Ukraine and Europe are striving for a Ukraine facing Europe and the Euro-Atlantic community.

This issue essentially boils down to military potential and demilitarization. What size army does Ukraine need so that Moscow does not perceive it as a threat? It is a dilemma.

I see a possible solution, but I am not sure it can be agreed upon within a dialogue between Kyiv and Moscow alone. I believe it will emerge through broader discussions about the future architecture of European security. The restrictions Moscow would like to impose on Ukraine’s armed forces should become part of a larger agreement on border stabilization between Russia and the West – and they should be reciprocal.

To draw an analogy, this could resemble the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), adapted to current realities. After all, the CFE was established precisely to minimize the risk of miscalculation and reduce the sense of threat each side felt from the other. In this way, I believe, we could resolve the issue of Ukraine’s army size. There is no doubt that Ukraine must have the ability to defend itself. But, as I said, the question is what its quantitative and qualitative parameters should be so that Moscow does not perceive Ukraine’s actions – and especially possible joint actions with European countries and the US – as a threat.

We are seeing discussions about sending peacekeeping forces to Ukraine from some Western countries. More than 20 countries have expressed a willingness to do so, but Russia is categorically opposed. What are the possible alternatives?

Ukraine’s own armed forces. I do not believe in Ukraine joining NATO. The US administration is against it. Several other members of the alliance do not support it either. I also believe that the history of the past 25 years clearly shows that most NATO members would be uneasy about providing Ukraine with firm guarantees under Article 5 on collective defense in the event of a possible attack by Russia. It seems they do not want to take on that commitment.

Thus, the solution I see is a model of “armed neutrality”: Ukraine builds up its defense capabilities, modernizes and develops its own military-industrial complex to supply its army with the necessary weapons. It is precisely this capacity to defend itself that will serve as the main deterrent in the geopolitical realities in which Ukraine finds itself.

Monitoring the ceasefire line will be part of a larger task – stabilizing the entire border between Russia and the West. Ending the conflict in Ukraine would essentially fill the last, missing section of this line, which now stretches from the Barents Sea to the Black Sea. The same mechanisms used to ensure stability along this line in Finland or the Black Sea region would be applied to the section that runs through Ukrainian territory.

Russia insists that security guarantees should be mutual – that it should receive them too. How, in your view, could this look in practice?

Ukraine’s neutral status and certain agreements on NATO’s role in Europe. First, de facto further NATO expansion eastward, closer to Russia’s borders, would not occur. I find it hard to imagine a scenario in which Belarus would become a NATO candidate, and, frankly, the three Transcaucasian states as well. This requires formal recognition, which would significantly help allay Moscow’s concerns. And if it becomes clear that NATO as a whole is not ready for such a step in the foreseeable future, I do believe it is possible to obtain commitments from the US and several other member countries that they will not support further expansion eastward. Since NATO operates based on consensus, this means the alliance will not expand. That is one component of security guarantees for Russia.

Then will come negotiations on how to stabilize the line between Russia and the West and between Russia and NATO. It is hoped that these will lead to the creation of mechanisms like those discussed at the very end of the Cold War – to increase transparency and impose limits on the types of military units and heavy weapons that may be deployed within a certain distance of the border. This should also address Moscow’s concerns. Ultimately, then, we are talking about a settlement that provides security guarantees both to Ukraine and to Russia and becomes the cornerstone of a larger security architecture on the European continent for many years to come.

Bilateral Russia-Ukraine negotiations, judging by the latest information, are currently suspended, despite Russia’s proposal to create three separate expert groups. In your view, how effective could such an approach be? How could the level of negotiating groups be raised?

I recognize the need for a platform for negotiations between Ukraine and Russia on this conflict. Still, I believe that the greatest results on the bilateral track can only be achieved by focusing on humanitarian issues. As for economic and especially military issues, their real resolution is only possible in the context of a broader discussion on the European security architecture. Thus, without at least a fully-fledged channel between Moscow and Washington for addressing these issues, the Russia-Ukraine dialogue on them is unlikely to make progress.

Ukraine, understandably, does not believe it can ensure its security without a broader agreement on the role of Europe and the US. That is an objective reality. The same likely applies to the economic bloc, especially given Kyiv’s course toward joining the EU. Consequently, dialogue between Moscow and Washington is critical. At the next stage, I believe, the Europeans will also need to be involved. In the absence of such a multilevel system, the potential for purely bilateral Russia-Ukraine consultations remains very limited.

You mentioned that the key obstacle to negotiations between Russia and Ukraine is the status of territories that will remain under Kyiv’s control. But what legal solutions regarding Russian-controlled territories could satisfy Ukraine?

I am convinced that any initial settlement must be based on the de facto line of contact and recognition that each side controls territories that the other considers its own. Ukraine continues to cite the 1991 borders, but there will be no return to them. Russia, meanwhile, claims control over four regions within their official [Ukrainian] borders plus Crimea, but it is unlikely to obtain all of that in a settlement.

This is de facto recognition of the current state of affairs, not de jure recognition, meaning the final resolution of the territorial dispute will be the subject of future negotiations. What exactly this will look like remains unclear. My personal view is that, at a certain stage, referendums could be held to allow the dispute to be resolved based on local self-determination, but I do not see enthusiasm for this either in Kyiv or in Moscow. From the standpoint of European security, it would be better to resolve this territorial dispute once and for all than to leave it as an unhealed wound for years.

Do you see a scenario in which the US could ultimately withdraw from the negotiations and cease mediating between Kyiv and Moscow? Under what circumstances might this happen?

I do not think this will happen. I know there is a lot of talk about it in Moscow, Kyiv, European capitals and even Washington. But personally, I think it is unlikely that President Trump will back down. First, he has invested enormous resources in this – both his personal prestige and his reputation as a politician able to end this conflict. He spoke about it repeatedly during the election campaign. He identified it as one of his priorities in the first weeks after his inauguration on January 20. Of course, the task turned out to be much harder than he initially expected, and he has publicly acknowledged that.

So I think his personal reputation is at stake. He understands that very well, and he needs to find a way to end the conflict. That he has handled other crises is incredibly important to him. This is a difficult case, but I do not think he personally feels he can simply step aside. Much of what we have seen over the last few months is, in my view, typical Trump negotiating tactics – the same he has used in business to get the deals he wants.

Second, both the American public and, I believe, the US political establishment think the country should remain involved in this process. So for domestic political reasons as well, it would be very hard for Trump to pull out from the negotiations.

The real question is what methods he will use, what leverage he has, and what incentives and countermeasures he can apply to bring Moscow – and, frankly, the Europeans as well – to the negotiating table, or rather, to several tables, that could lead to a ceasefire. Clearly, that is what he is going for at this stage, and I think it can be achieved sooner than many assume. But then the groundwork will need to be laid for longer and more complicated negotiations, which should lead to a final settlement of the contentious issues between Russia and Ukraine and address broader issues of European security. Finally, Russia and the US will discuss issues of strategic stability.

What kind of instruments and levers could these be – tariffs and sanctions, or something else?

I am of the view that sanctions will have a very minor impact on Moscow. The decisive factor is the situation on the battlefield. I believe a situation is developing in which Moscow will conclude that it has already achieved most of what it wanted militarily. It finds itself in a position where it does not necessarily have anything to lose at the negotiating table and thus the rational decision would be to move toward negotiations to achieve a real result – one in which Moscow, Kyiv and Washington will play the key roles.