Politics
How Is the War in Iran Affecting US-Russia Relations?
April 1, 2026
Vasily Zharkov
Political scientist, European Humanities University
Russia’s inability to influence the war in Iran seems to confirm its status as merely a regional power, even as Washington’s refusal to take account of Moscow’s position on Middle East issues is a threat to the Kremlin’s long-term strategy, explains political scientist Vasily Zharkov in an interview.
Putin and Trump meeting in Anchorage / The White House
This is a shortened and translated version of an article originally published by Republic.
— How does all of this affect relations with Russia? As recently as six months ago, the term “the spirit of Anchorage” was being used. But recently Lavrov stated that this spirit has evaporated. Meanwhile, prowar authors are writing with bitterness that the situation in Iran has shown that a multipolar world has not materialized and that the Global South is not a real force. Dugin has written explicitly: “if we surrender Iran, we are next.” In other words, Trump has turned out to be even more dangerous than Biden, both for Russia and for the so-called Global South. What are your thoughts on this?
— Unlike Lavrov, I do not clearly understand what the “spirit of Anchorage” is. It seems to me that it might be expressed in the B-2 aircraft that flew over the tarmac when Putin stepped off the plane. If you recall the first minutes after Putin landed in Alaska and walked down that memorable carpet, which was in fact pink, not red, at that very moment US strategic bombers flew overhead. Do not think this happened by chance.
One should not forget that the August meeting in Alaska took place after the first US operation against Iran, in June 2025, which also involved these bombers.
So I do not think Trump represents some kind of advantageous partner for Russia. From the outset, Russia pursued three objectives with regard to Trump. All of this can be reconstructed from open sources.
The first was to secure Zelensky’s removal through Trump. They believed that Trump harbored resentment toward Zelensky because his first impeachment stemmed from actions taken by the Ukrainian president. However, when Putin attempted about a year ago to raise the issue of an external administration in Ukraine, Trump threatened him with new sanctions, putting an end to such discussions.
The second objective was to achieve a partial lifting of sanctions at the level of executive agreements. No one expected Congress to ever agree to lift them. The Kremlin assumed that Trump could repeal sanctions imposed by the White House. This also did not happen. On the contrary, at end-February, Trump again extended sanctions against Russia. At present, there are discussions about the possible lifting of the oil embargo for several countries, including Russia, but only for the duration of the war with Iran.
The third objective was the expectation in the Kremlin that Trump would reduce assistance to Ukraine. This has happened to some extent. However, only to some extent, because the man in the Oval Office has devised a scheme under which the US sells weapons to Ukraine and receives European money. This is no longer simply aid; it is a business project, and the US is obliged to fulfill its commitments on arms supplies.
The only thing Moscow has actually gained is the ability to speak with Trump. Under the previous administration, there was virtually no dialogue. By end-2024, relations between the two countries were close to zero; in effect, diplomatic relations had been suspended. Now, Putin and Trump speak regularly by phone and have even met once.
At present, Trump is the only Western leader who can communicate freely with the head of the Kremlin. But this does not mean that he is acting in Putin’s interests.
Trump is pursuing only his own objectives. If tomorrow it becomes advantageous for him to deal with Putin as he treated Khamenei, I assure you he will not hesitate to do it.
— How does all of this affect relations with Russia? As recently as six months ago, the term “the spirit of Anchorage” was being used. But recently Lavrov stated that this spirit has evaporated. Meanwhile, prowar authors are writing with bitterness that the situation in Iran has shown that a multipolar world has not materialized and that the Global South is not a real force. Dugin has written explicitly: “if we surrender Iran, we are next.” In other words, Trump has turned out to be even more dangerous than Biden, both for Russia and for the so-called Global South. What are your thoughts on this?
— Unlike Lavrov, I do not clearly understand what the “spirit of Anchorage” is. It seems to me that it might be expressed in the B-2 aircraft that flew over the tarmac when Putin stepped off the plane. If you recall the first minutes after Putin landed in Alaska and walked down that memorable carpet, which was in fact pink, not red, at that very moment US strategic bombers flew overhead. Do not think this happened by chance.
One should not forget that the August meeting in Alaska took place after the first US operation against Iran, in June 2025, which also involved these bombers.
So I do not think Trump represents some kind of advantageous partner for Russia. From the outset, Russia pursued three objectives with regard to Trump. All of this can be reconstructed from open sources.
The first was to secure Zelensky’s removal through Trump. They believed that Trump harbored resentment toward Zelensky because his first impeachment stemmed from actions taken by the Ukrainian president. However, when Putin attempted about a year ago to raise the issue of an external administration in Ukraine, Trump threatened him with new sanctions, putting an end to such discussions.
The second objective was to achieve a partial lifting of sanctions at the level of executive agreements. No one expected Congress to ever agree to lift them. The Kremlin assumed that Trump could repeal sanctions imposed by the White House. This also did not happen. On the contrary, at end-February, Trump again extended sanctions against Russia. At present, there are discussions about the possible lifting of the oil embargo for several countries, including Russia, but only for the duration of the war with Iran.
The third objective was the expectation in the Kremlin that Trump would reduce assistance to Ukraine. This has happened to some extent. However, only to some extent, because the man in the Oval Office has devised a scheme under which the US sells weapons to Ukraine and receives European money. This is no longer simply aid; it is a business project, and the US is obliged to fulfill its commitments on arms supplies.
The only thing Moscow has actually gained is the ability to speak with Trump. Under the previous administration, there was virtually no dialogue. By end-2024, relations between the two countries were close to zero; in effect, diplomatic relations had been suspended. Now, Putin and Trump speak regularly by phone and have even met once.
At present, Trump is the only Western leader who can communicate freely with the head of the Kremlin. But this does not mean that he is acting in Putin’s interests.
Trump is pursuing only his own objectives. If tomorrow it becomes advantageous for him to deal with Putin as he treated Khamenei, I assure you he will not hesitate to do it.
— So in this case one might recall Putin’s now-classic “they fooled us,” which has already become a meme. Trump outmaneuvered Putin. All Putin has gained is the opportunity to speak with Trump. But that is clearly very little, given the expectations the Kremlin had placed on him.
— They were trying to outmaneuver one another. In general, it is strange to reason in such terms. Trump does not owe anything to Russia or to anyone else. The initial push to restore relations did not come from the US, but from Russia. Putin specifically convened Russia’s Security Council to congratulate Trump on his inauguration. It was from the Russian side that, from end-February 2025, discussions started about a possible meeting with Trump. As we know, it took place only in August.
Just before, there had been a very serious episode: nuclear blackmail from Russia, voiced at the time by Medvedev, pushed Trump to the point where he was compelled to state that the US was fully prepared for a nuclear war with Russia. This was on August 2. No one paid attention to it globally, but it was an important signal. It was after this that Witkoff traveled to Moscow and the meeting in Anchorage took place. I do not fully understand what they agreed on there. The war has not ended. Putin did not obtain what he wanted. He reportedly said: “give me the Donbas and I will end the war.” But no one has given him the Donbas yet.
— They were trying to outmaneuver one another. In general, it is strange to reason in such terms. Trump does not owe anything to Russia or to anyone else. The initial push to restore relations did not come from the US, but from Russia. Putin specifically convened Russia’s Security Council to congratulate Trump on his inauguration. It was from the Russian side that, from end-February 2025, discussions started about a possible meeting with Trump. As we know, it took place only in August.
Just before, there had been a very serious episode: nuclear blackmail from Russia, voiced at the time by Medvedev, pushed Trump to the point where he was compelled to state that the US was fully prepared for a nuclear war with Russia. This was on August 2. No one paid attention to it globally, but it was an important signal. It was after this that Witkoff traveled to Moscow and the meeting in Anchorage took place. I do not fully understand what they agreed on there. The war has not ended. Putin did not obtain what he wanted. He reportedly said: “give me the Donbas and I will end the war.” But no one has given him the Donbas yet.
Vladimir Putin with the President of Iran Masoud Pezeshkian in 2024
Anatoly Medved / brics-russia2024.ru
Anatoly Medved / brics-russia2024.ru
— You said that Trump may get bogged down in Iran. Could you elaborate on this? If he does, how might that affect global politics, relations with Russia, with the countries of the Global South, the SCO, and so on?
— The Shanghai Cooperation Organization has clearly played no role in preventing this war. It is now evident that the SCO has proved to be an even weaker international organization than its Western peers.
Russia has effectively confirmed the status that Obama assigned to it – that of a regional power. It has no capacity to influence the course of this war.
I would call your attention to the fact that Putin initially tried to dilute the issue of Ukraine by proposing a broader set of issues on which Russia could take part. He said he had discussed with the US issues in the Middle East: a Palestine-Israel settlement, Iran, Syria and others.
But at some point, likely in June 2025, during the first military operation against Iran, Trump said: “Vladimir, go deal with your own problems in Ukraine. We are not going to listen to what you think about Iran or Israel, and so on…” And now as well, the US side is not seeking any Russian mediation with regard to Iran. It is not needed. It is clear this is a blow to Russia’s long-term strategy.
Even if Putin benefits from increased oil export revenues today, there is no guarantee prices will not fall tomorrow. Trump has started a redistribution of the market in favor of the Caribbean basin, where the US holds dominant positions. Washington has already brought Mexican and Venezuelan oil under control. As a result of this large-scale restructuring, the US likely will become the largest producer and supplier of oil.
This will mark the end of the era that began with the 1973 crisis, as Asian petrostates cede market leadership to the US. What does this mean for Russia? It is increasingly becoming a raw-material appendage of China.
— The Shanghai Cooperation Organization has clearly played no role in preventing this war. It is now evident that the SCO has proved to be an even weaker international organization than its Western peers.
Russia has effectively confirmed the status that Obama assigned to it – that of a regional power. It has no capacity to influence the course of this war.
I would call your attention to the fact that Putin initially tried to dilute the issue of Ukraine by proposing a broader set of issues on which Russia could take part. He said he had discussed with the US issues in the Middle East: a Palestine-Israel settlement, Iran, Syria and others.
But at some point, likely in June 2025, during the first military operation against Iran, Trump said: “Vladimir, go deal with your own problems in Ukraine. We are not going to listen to what you think about Iran or Israel, and so on…” And now as well, the US side is not seeking any Russian mediation with regard to Iran. It is not needed. It is clear this is a blow to Russia’s long-term strategy.
Even if Putin benefits from increased oil export revenues today, there is no guarantee prices will not fall tomorrow. Trump has started a redistribution of the market in favor of the Caribbean basin, where the US holds dominant positions. Washington has already brought Mexican and Venezuelan oil under control. As a result of this large-scale restructuring, the US likely will become the largest producer and supplier of oil.
This will mark the end of the era that began with the 1973 crisis, as Asian petrostates cede market leadership to the US. What does this mean for Russia? It is increasingly becoming a raw-material appendage of China.
— Let us take the US-Russia-China triangle. What role does each play in it? There is a view that Trump is courting Putin only to turn Russia into a US ally in its confrontation with China.
— This is John Mearsheimer’s idea. He has consistently argued that, to contain China, the US needs to build relations with Russia. Meanwhile, Europe alone is supposedly able to contain Russia – it has adequate capacity for that.
If we look at the map, China is surrounded by potential adversaries and US partners. To the east: Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines. To the south: Vietnam, which, incidentally, has long maintained very good relations with the US. To the west: India. To the north: Mongolia. Broadly speaking, all these countries are pro-American. They have, if not openly hostile, then at best a cold stance toward China. Some have territorial disputes with it; others have a history of war. The last war China fought was with Vietnam, which it lost in 1979.
China has only one ally: North Korea. Russia partially serves as a resource base for it. Thus, if Trump were to make Russia his ally, China would be left to face a highly unfavorable strategic environment along its entire perimeter. Among its neighbors, there is not a single major country other than Russia that is friendly toward Beijing. In this sense, Mearsheimer’s idea arguably has merit.
The question, however, is how far Russia’s dependence on China has already progressed. Recent developments have only deepened it. Whereas before the war Russia competed with Iran for oil supplies to China, now it may become an exclusive supplier to the Chinese market.
– In practice, has Mearsheimer’s idea failed?
— I would not say that. It has simply not yet been tried. Do not forget: there is also no strong interest on the Russian side in becoming fully dependent on China. Whether it will manage to break out of that dependence remains unclear.
At the same time, one should not overlook that Europe is pursuing its own policy toward China. Merz and Macron have both recently visited Beijing. The world today is operating in a new, bipolar system. All other actors, in one way or another, must determine where they stand. Europe leans more toward the US but maintains its own relations with China. Russia leans more toward China, yet part of the Russian elite is now quite openly contemplating closer ties with the US.
The same applies to the rest of the world. Today, US and Chinese interests collide in Latin America, Africa and Asia. Across the globe, there is an ongoing US-China confrontation. Russia and its neighbors are merely one of the arenas of this rivalry. Nothing here is predetermined.
Since Russia has for centuries been oriented toward the West, Russian culture is fundamentally European and Russia is perceived as part of Europe by the Chinese, many in Russia are not particularly willing to become a vassal of China.
— This is John Mearsheimer’s idea. He has consistently argued that, to contain China, the US needs to build relations with Russia. Meanwhile, Europe alone is supposedly able to contain Russia – it has adequate capacity for that.
If we look at the map, China is surrounded by potential adversaries and US partners. To the east: Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines. To the south: Vietnam, which, incidentally, has long maintained very good relations with the US. To the west: India. To the north: Mongolia. Broadly speaking, all these countries are pro-American. They have, if not openly hostile, then at best a cold stance toward China. Some have territorial disputes with it; others have a history of war. The last war China fought was with Vietnam, which it lost in 1979.
China has only one ally: North Korea. Russia partially serves as a resource base for it. Thus, if Trump were to make Russia his ally, China would be left to face a highly unfavorable strategic environment along its entire perimeter. Among its neighbors, there is not a single major country other than Russia that is friendly toward Beijing. In this sense, Mearsheimer’s idea arguably has merit.
The question, however, is how far Russia’s dependence on China has already progressed. Recent developments have only deepened it. Whereas before the war Russia competed with Iran for oil supplies to China, now it may become an exclusive supplier to the Chinese market.
– In practice, has Mearsheimer’s idea failed?
— I would not say that. It has simply not yet been tried. Do not forget: there is also no strong interest on the Russian side in becoming fully dependent on China. Whether it will manage to break out of that dependence remains unclear.
At the same time, one should not overlook that Europe is pursuing its own policy toward China. Merz and Macron have both recently visited Beijing. The world today is operating in a new, bipolar system. All other actors, in one way or another, must determine where they stand. Europe leans more toward the US but maintains its own relations with China. Russia leans more toward China, yet part of the Russian elite is now quite openly contemplating closer ties with the US.
The same applies to the rest of the world. Today, US and Chinese interests collide in Latin America, Africa and Asia. Across the globe, there is an ongoing US-China confrontation. Russia and its neighbors are merely one of the arenas of this rivalry. Nothing here is predetermined.
Since Russia has for centuries been oriented toward the West, Russian culture is fundamentally European and Russia is perceived as part of Europe by the Chinese, many in Russia are not particularly willing to become a vassal of China.
Yura Timoshenko / Unsplash
— It is evident that Putin’s foreign policy has, to put it mildly, reached a dead end. I am referring above all to the Russia-Ukraine conflict: neither forward nor backward, only resources and lives lost each day. But perhaps in some other area things are going relatively well for Putin?
— As I have already said, Putin does not have a strategy. It cannot be said that Russia is gaining strength and improving its position in the long term, though there are, somewhat surprisingly, people who believe this.
Russia’s foreign-policy problems are similar to China’s – it has very few allies. Its only allies are North Korea and the CSTO countries. Russia has no equal partners. China is larger and stronger, but it is not Russia’s ally; it is a consumer of cheap Russian resources. Iran has not become an ally of Russia and is unlikely to do so – even though Iran is probably comparable to Russia in terms of power, especially if it were to acquire nuclear weapons. At present, however, Russia is largely alone, in a highly unpredictable situation, and is also waging a war.
It is hard to describe such a foreign policy as successful. Russia has lost all its partners in Europe and has not acquired any in return. When the number of your allies decreases and the number of your adversaries increases, such a course can hardly be considered successful.
— What are your expectations for this year in political terms?
— The Russia-Ukraine war has demonstrated something deeply troubling – that war may become a mechanism for capital accumulation at the periphery of the world system. This is confirmed by a simple fact: the continuous expansion in the Russian segment of the Forbes billionaires list. In wartime, the Russian economy and Russian population are steadily deteriorating, while Russian oligarchs continue to get richer.
This suggests the war is fulfilling the core function of the capitalist world economy – enabling capital accumulation in the interests of a small number of beneficiaries at the expense of everyone else. This is a highly dangerous situation.
If other recently started wars have the same effect, this would signal a fundamental shift in the perception of war that emerged after 1945. War would once again become a profitable enterprise. Capital, above all at the center of the world system, would grow through the destruction of a significant part of its periphery. If this materializes, there is little positive to expect, either this year or in the foreseeable future.
— As I have already said, Putin does not have a strategy. It cannot be said that Russia is gaining strength and improving its position in the long term, though there are, somewhat surprisingly, people who believe this.
Russia’s foreign-policy problems are similar to China’s – it has very few allies. Its only allies are North Korea and the CSTO countries. Russia has no equal partners. China is larger and stronger, but it is not Russia’s ally; it is a consumer of cheap Russian resources. Iran has not become an ally of Russia and is unlikely to do so – even though Iran is probably comparable to Russia in terms of power, especially if it were to acquire nuclear weapons. At present, however, Russia is largely alone, in a highly unpredictable situation, and is also waging a war.
It is hard to describe such a foreign policy as successful. Russia has lost all its partners in Europe and has not acquired any in return. When the number of your allies decreases and the number of your adversaries increases, such a course can hardly be considered successful.
— What are your expectations for this year in political terms?
— The Russia-Ukraine war has demonstrated something deeply troubling – that war may become a mechanism for capital accumulation at the periphery of the world system. This is confirmed by a simple fact: the continuous expansion in the Russian segment of the Forbes billionaires list. In wartime, the Russian economy and Russian population are steadily deteriorating, while Russian oligarchs continue to get richer.
This suggests the war is fulfilling the core function of the capitalist world economy – enabling capital accumulation in the interests of a small number of beneficiaries at the expense of everyone else. This is a highly dangerous situation.
If other recently started wars have the same effect, this would signal a fundamental shift in the perception of war that emerged after 1945. War would once again become a profitable enterprise. Capital, above all at the center of the world system, would grow through the destruction of a significant part of its periphery. If this materializes, there is little positive to expect, either this year or in the foreseeable future.
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