Politics
The Role of the Military in Russian Politics
June 20, 2025
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Dmitry Gorenburg
CNA and Harvard University
Political scientist Dmitry Gorenburg traces the history of the military’s involvement (or lack thereof) in politics in Russia and looks at how the war in Ukraine has affected this.
Putin meeting with then-Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu in April 2022. Source: Kremlin.ru
Civil-military relations in Russia can be characterized as being subject to “political control, civilian assertiveness, a formal civilian hierarchy, institutionalized relations and internal autonomy.”
Russian political leaders have maintained clear civilian control over the armed forces. The military leadership has generally deferred to the civilian elite when it comes to major foreign policy decisions that may require the use of military force.
In terms of formal lines of authority, the president is universally accepted as the military commander-in-chief and the minister of defense is directly subordinated to him. Furthermore, in the last 20 years, the minister of defense has been a civilian, and senior military officers such as the chief of the General Staff have been clearly subordinated to him. In particular, the General Staff as an institution has deferred to the political leadership on military-related strategic decision-making.
In fact, the main division between military and civilian leaders concerns the degree of autonomy granted to the military in its internal decision-making. The effort by civilian leaders to reform the military in the period from 2009-13 generated a great deal of hostility among military officers and eventually led to the replacement of Anatoly Serdyukov by Sergei Shoigu as defense minister. More recently, the FSB has increasingly assumed an informal oversight role within the Defense Ministry.
Russian political leaders have maintained clear civilian control over the armed forces. The military leadership has generally deferred to the civilian elite when it comes to major foreign policy decisions that may require the use of military force.
In terms of formal lines of authority, the president is universally accepted as the military commander-in-chief and the minister of defense is directly subordinated to him. Furthermore, in the last 20 years, the minister of defense has been a civilian, and senior military officers such as the chief of the General Staff have been clearly subordinated to him. In particular, the General Staff as an institution has deferred to the political leadership on military-related strategic decision-making.
In fact, the main division between military and civilian leaders concerns the degree of autonomy granted to the military in its internal decision-making. The effort by civilian leaders to reform the military in the period from 2009-13 generated a great deal of hostility among military officers and eventually led to the replacement of Anatoly Serdyukov by Sergei Shoigu as defense minister. More recently, the FSB has increasingly assumed an informal oversight role within the Defense Ministry.
Senior military officials in politics: A poor track record
The most influential generals of the late Soviet period, such as marshals Nikolai Ogarkov and Sergei Akhromeyev and Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, all remained outside of politics and generally focused their energies on leading and developing the Soviet military. Defense ministers, by virtue of their position, were more likely to be involved in politics, though the extent of their influence varied.
Some, like Andrei Grechko and Dmitri Ustinov, became fairly influential in Politburo politics, while Sergei Sokolov remained a peripheral figure on the national political scene and was never included in the Politburo.
In the Yeltsin period, defense ministers came from the ranks of senior generals and largely remained aloof from political intrigue outside of their immediate sphere of authority.
Igor Rodionov, who served in 1996-97, and Igor Sergeyev, who served in 1997-01, were not involved in politics during their time as head of the Defense Ministry. While Pavel Grachev, who served from 1992 to 1996, did not engage in political intrigue related to the roles of senior officials, he was involved in two political decisions to use military force: first against the Congress of People’s Deputies during the October 1993 constitutional crisis and then in launching the First Chechen War in 1994.
The subsequent failure of the military in the First Chechen War not only resulted in Grachev’s removal in 1996 but also created a perception that the Russian military was incompetent. Meanwhile, some generals got involved in politics in the 1990s after retiring from the active military, most notably Alexander Lebed, who ran for president in 1996 and, after coming in third in the first round, played a key role in securing Yeltsin’s reelection.
The most influential generals of the late Soviet period, such as marshals Nikolai Ogarkov and Sergei Akhromeyev and Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, all remained outside of politics and generally focused their energies on leading and developing the Soviet military. Defense ministers, by virtue of their position, were more likely to be involved in politics, though the extent of their influence varied.
Some, like Andrei Grechko and Dmitri Ustinov, became fairly influential in Politburo politics, while Sergei Sokolov remained a peripheral figure on the national political scene and was never included in the Politburo.
In the Yeltsin period, defense ministers came from the ranks of senior generals and largely remained aloof from political intrigue outside of their immediate sphere of authority.
Igor Rodionov, who served in 1996-97, and Igor Sergeyev, who served in 1997-01, were not involved in politics during their time as head of the Defense Ministry. While Pavel Grachev, who served from 1992 to 1996, did not engage in political intrigue related to the roles of senior officials, he was involved in two political decisions to use military force: first against the Congress of People’s Deputies during the October 1993 constitutional crisis and then in launching the First Chechen War in 1994.
The subsequent failure of the military in the First Chechen War not only resulted in Grachev’s removal in 1996 but also created a perception that the Russian military was incompetent. Meanwhile, some generals got involved in politics in the 1990s after retiring from the active military, most notably Alexander Lebed, who ran for president in 1996 and, after coming in third in the first round, played a key role in securing Yeltsin’s reelection.
“Under Putin, defense ministers have wielded greater political influence, yet none have come from the ranks of the military.”
Monument to Marshal Zhukov erected in Moscow by decision of President Boris Yeltsin. The monument was unveiled in 1995, on the eve of the 50th anniversary of the victory in the Great Patriotic War.. Source: Wiki Commons
The longest-serving and most influential ministers have instead come from other silovik ministries, such as Sergei Ivanov, who made his career in the FSB, and Shoigu, who led the Emergency Situations Ministry. Both men were outsiders to the military who used their position as defense minister to advance their political careers.
Ivanov moved on to become first deputy prime minister and later chief of staff of the Presidential Administration. Shoigu became secretary of Russia’s Security Council. The other two Putin defense ministers, Serdyukov and the recently appointed Andrei Belousov, were technocratic managers with no ambitions for national political influence.
Serdyukov was explicitly brought in as a “bulldozer” to break the resistance of senior officers to the government’s efforts to reform the military. Belousov was appointed to ensure the military and defense industry were financially prepared to fight a long war of attrition in Ukraine.
On the rare occasions when senior military officials have intervened on the national political scene, it has not gone well for them. The best-known case in Soviet times was Georgy Zhukov’s role in the removal of Lavrentiy Beria in 1953, followed by his support for Khrushchev against the “anti-Party group” in 1956-57. This culminated in Zhukov’s removal from office and political life in general later in 1957, as Khrushchev came to see him as too powerful and therefore potentially dangerous.
Dmitry Yazov’s participation in the August 1991 coup attempt against Gorbachev backfired, as the military became divided, with many units and individual soldiers refusing to carry out the coup-plotters’ orders.
Ivanov moved on to become first deputy prime minister and later chief of staff of the Presidential Administration. Shoigu became secretary of Russia’s Security Council. The other two Putin defense ministers, Serdyukov and the recently appointed Andrei Belousov, were technocratic managers with no ambitions for national political influence.
Serdyukov was explicitly brought in as a “bulldozer” to break the resistance of senior officers to the government’s efforts to reform the military. Belousov was appointed to ensure the military and defense industry were financially prepared to fight a long war of attrition in Ukraine.
On the rare occasions when senior military officials have intervened on the national political scene, it has not gone well for them. The best-known case in Soviet times was Georgy Zhukov’s role in the removal of Lavrentiy Beria in 1953, followed by his support for Khrushchev against the “anti-Party group” in 1956-57. This culminated in Zhukov’s removal from office and political life in general later in 1957, as Khrushchev came to see him as too powerful and therefore potentially dangerous.
Dmitry Yazov’s participation in the August 1991 coup attempt against Gorbachev backfired, as the military became divided, with many units and individual soldiers refusing to carry out the coup-plotters’ orders.
“These experiences have served to strengthen subsequent military leaders’ reluctance to engage in political affairs.”
Prigozhin's rebellion passing through Rostov-on-Don in June 2023. Source: Wiki Commons
The most prominent post-Soviet example of military leaders getting involved in politics is the Wagner Group rebellion in June 2023. While Wagner itself was a paramilitary outfit, it did have strong links to the Russian military; and while its leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, was not a military figure, he did have connections to a number of senior Russian generals, most notably Sergei Surovikin, who was at the time the commander of Russia’s aerospace forces and had previously commanded the Russian forces fighting in Ukraine.
Surovikin was widely reported to have known in advance about Prigozhin’s plans and to have at least refrained from taking action to thwart them. He was subsequently removed from his leadership role and briefly detained as part of an investigation, but in the end he was not prosecuted and was ultimately reassigned to a relatively insignificant role.
Surovikin was widely reported to have known in advance about Prigozhin’s plans and to have at least refrained from taking action to thwart them. He was subsequently removed from his leadership role and briefly detained as part of an investigation, but in the end he was not prosecuted and was ultimately reassigned to a relatively insignificant role.
“No key military unit or their commander acted to stop Wagner’s march on Moscow. Nor did they come out in support of the rebellion. This neutrality was likely a major factor in persuading Prigozhin to negotiate his way out of the standoff.”
Though at this time there is no clear evidence to this effect, the punishment meted out to Surovikin may have further reinforced the general reluctance of Russian military figures to engage in political intrigue.
Recent efforts to weaken the power of the military
The Prigozhin rebellion may have influenced Putin's recent decisions to weaken the power of the Russian military – efforts that began in April 2024, soon after his reelection, with the arrest of Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov.
This was quickly followed by the removal of Shoigu as defense minister. Since then, at least 10 senior generals and defense officials, including three former deputy defense ministers, the head of the Defense Ministry’s Main Personnel Directorate and the deputy commander of the Leningrad Military District, have been arrested for fraud and corruption, with arrests continuing into autumn 2024.
The political leadership's campaign to remove powerful defense officials serves to weaken the Defense Ministry.
Though there is no obvious connection between the arrested military and defense officials and Wagner, Prigozhin or their supporters, it would not be surprising if Russia’s political leadership had decided to respond to the case of military units marching on Moscow – with very little sign of a coordinated military response – by eliminating some of the more powerful defense officials.
It is perhaps indicative that several currently serving deputy defense ministers have connections to the FSB.
The concurrent replacement of the long-serving and politically influential Shoigu by the relatively powerless technocrat Belousov is another sign that Putin seeks to undermine the independent power of the Defense Ministry in the aftermath of the Prigozhin rebellion.
Significant in this regard is the fact that the new defense minister did not arrive with his own team; instead it has been appointed for him, with deputies who are connected either to Putin directly (such as his relative Anna Tsivileva – see Russia.Post about her here) or to members of the security services (such as Pavel Fradkov, the son of Mikhail Fradkov, who previously headed the Foreign Intelligence Service, or SVR, and served as prime minister).
The rent flows that previously went to powerful individuals around Shoigu have been divided among three groups, all of whom are civilians and none of whom have any previous direct connections to the Russian military. All this suggests that Putin aims to increase his personal oversight of the Defense Ministry, though it remains unclear whether this is to rein in the ministry politically or to increase its effectiveness given the military’s poor performance in the war against Ukraine (or perhaps both)
Recent efforts to weaken the power of the military
The Prigozhin rebellion may have influenced Putin's recent decisions to weaken the power of the Russian military – efforts that began in April 2024, soon after his reelection, with the arrest of Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov.
This was quickly followed by the removal of Shoigu as defense minister. Since then, at least 10 senior generals and defense officials, including three former deputy defense ministers, the head of the Defense Ministry’s Main Personnel Directorate and the deputy commander of the Leningrad Military District, have been arrested for fraud and corruption, with arrests continuing into autumn 2024.
The political leadership's campaign to remove powerful defense officials serves to weaken the Defense Ministry.
Though there is no obvious connection between the arrested military and defense officials and Wagner, Prigozhin or their supporters, it would not be surprising if Russia’s political leadership had decided to respond to the case of military units marching on Moscow – with very little sign of a coordinated military response – by eliminating some of the more powerful defense officials.
It is perhaps indicative that several currently serving deputy defense ministers have connections to the FSB.
The concurrent replacement of the long-serving and politically influential Shoigu by the relatively powerless technocrat Belousov is another sign that Putin seeks to undermine the independent power of the Defense Ministry in the aftermath of the Prigozhin rebellion.
Significant in this regard is the fact that the new defense minister did not arrive with his own team; instead it has been appointed for him, with deputies who are connected either to Putin directly (such as his relative Anna Tsivileva – see Russia.Post about her here) or to members of the security services (such as Pavel Fradkov, the son of Mikhail Fradkov, who previously headed the Foreign Intelligence Service, or SVR, and served as prime minister).
The rent flows that previously went to powerful individuals around Shoigu have been divided among three groups, all of whom are civilians and none of whom have any previous direct connections to the Russian military. All this suggests that Putin aims to increase his personal oversight of the Defense Ministry, though it remains unclear whether this is to rein in the ministry politically or to increase its effectiveness given the military’s poor performance in the war against Ukraine (or perhaps both)
“The rapid turnover of senior generals after failures in the Ukraine war represents another aspect of personnel policy that has served to weaken the military’s potential political influence.”
At least seven senior generals have been killed by Ukrainian forces during the war, including several deputy commanders of combined arms armies and the deputy commander of the Southern Military District. In addition, Putin has replaced at least eight senior military commanders due to poor performance in the war. This turnover in the ranks of the senior military leadership leads to instability in the command structure and in the military’s patronage networks. These factors, in turn, are likely to weaken the cohesion of the military as a potential political actor, as patronage networks are generally necessary in personalistic regimes to create the level of trust necessary for concerted political action.
Patriarch Kirill gifting Defense Minister Andrei Belousov an icon. May 2024. Source: VK
Factors strengthening the military as a political actor
Though the recent general trend in Russia is weakening the political role of the military, there are a few factors that may help to strengthen it, especially in the medium to long term. First, while the replacement of poorly performing commanders is likely to weaken cohesion in the short term, the promotion of more competent military leaders will strengthen the capabilities of military leadership over time. If the Russian government is able to harness this potential, it may lead to a more effective future military, which will increase the prestige of the armed forces and of their senior leaders. If this, in turn, is combined with success on the battlefield, these generals may turn into public figures with their own political weight. Over time, the result could be a more politically influential military leadership.
A second, related factor is the possibility that veterans of the Russia-Ukraine war could organize and become politically active, much like Afghan War veterans in the early 1990s. Some of the most vocal criticism of the Russian government since its invasion of Ukraine has come from so-called “angry patriots” and voenkory, some of whom were closely linked to the Prigozhin rebellion. If these attitudes become prevalent among members of the officer corps, they could result in anti-government mobilization from the right.
Though the recent general trend in Russia is weakening the political role of the military, there are a few factors that may help to strengthen it, especially in the medium to long term. First, while the replacement of poorly performing commanders is likely to weaken cohesion in the short term, the promotion of more competent military leaders will strengthen the capabilities of military leadership over time. If the Russian government is able to harness this potential, it may lead to a more effective future military, which will increase the prestige of the armed forces and of their senior leaders. If this, in turn, is combined with success on the battlefield, these generals may turn into public figures with their own political weight. Over time, the result could be a more politically influential military leadership.
A second, related factor is the possibility that veterans of the Russia-Ukraine war could organize and become politically active, much like Afghan War veterans in the early 1990s. Some of the most vocal criticism of the Russian government since its invasion of Ukraine has come from so-called “angry patriots” and voenkory, some of whom were closely linked to the Prigozhin rebellion. If these attitudes become prevalent among members of the officer corps, they could result in anti-government mobilization from the right.
“Third, the military leadership has been developing connections with Russian Orthodox Church leaders.”
The ROC leadership has come to play an important role in justifying the Putin regime’s war by arguing that Russia is waging a holy war “to protect Russia’s traditional spiritual and moral values… to rectify an injustice [and] to protect a neighboring population from harm.” This matches the rhetoric used by the Russian government.
Furthermore, the support from senior ROC clergy could help provide legitimacy and moral authority to military leaders who might consider getting involved in politics. The growing alliance between military and religious leaders has the potential to become a nexus of power in the future.
For now, these factors are unlikely to overcome the Russian military’s aversion to involvement in politics and the institutional barriers that the state has deliberately put in place to prevent that. However, they may strengthen the military’s potential as a political force, should circumstances push it toward political involvement.
As the FSB takes on a greater role in overseeing the Russian military under Belousov, the military may, in the event of a regime transition, seize the opportunity to push back against control by the FSB and other security services – especially if such a transition weakens the security services’ broader position within the Russian political system.
Furthermore, the support from senior ROC clergy could help provide legitimacy and moral authority to military leaders who might consider getting involved in politics. The growing alliance between military and religious leaders has the potential to become a nexus of power in the future.
For now, these factors are unlikely to overcome the Russian military’s aversion to involvement in politics and the institutional barriers that the state has deliberately put in place to prevent that. However, they may strengthen the military’s potential as a political force, should circumstances push it toward political involvement.
As the FSB takes on a greater role in overseeing the Russian military under Belousov, the military may, in the event of a regime transition, seize the opportunity to push back against control by the FSB and other security services – especially if such a transition weakens the security services’ broader position within the Russian political system.
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