Politics
Russia-Ukraine Ceasefire Talks: Progress Toward Peace or Charade?
May 5, 2025
- Nikolay MitrokhinАcademic Researcher, Research Center for East European Studies at the University of Bremen (Germany)
Political scientist Nikolay Mitrokhin provides an overview of the latest zigs and zags in the Russia-Ukraine peace process, which is buoyed by rising hopes for a ceasefire, on the one hand, and the reality of ongoing attacks and sabotage, on the other hand.
The original article in Russian was published in Republic. We are republishing a fragment here with their permission.
Saudi Arabia hosted US-Russia talks in March. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio is second from the right, and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov second from the left. Source: YouTube
In long-drawn-out peace talks, Russia and Ukraine, with the mediation of the US, are working on ceasefires. This is not going so well, especially if you consider ongoing Russian air and missile strikes and Ukrainian sabotage. Still, with hostilities in the Black Sea reduced to a minimum, some reduction in combat on land was also observed in late April.
The Russian army, having retaken all populated villages and towns in Kursk Region (but not the whole region up to the border), launched fewer serious attacks along the entire front line. In particular, it stopped (possibly temporarily) attacks by armored columns in the last week of April. This significantly slowed the pace of the Russian advance, which in late April seemed to be the slowest in a year and a half.
Negotiations
The initially promising negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, mediated by the US, the EU, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, have not exactly reached a dead end, but they are moving in twisted ways whose logic is not always clear from the outside. Amid continued optimism on the part of the main actors, key figures periodically make statements seemingly retracing to their original positions.
The Russian army, having retaken all populated villages and towns in Kursk Region (but not the whole region up to the border), launched fewer serious attacks along the entire front line. In particular, it stopped (possibly temporarily) attacks by armored columns in the last week of April. This significantly slowed the pace of the Russian advance, which in late April seemed to be the slowest in a year and a half.
Negotiations
The initially promising negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, mediated by the US, the EU, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, have not exactly reached a dead end, but they are moving in twisted ways whose logic is not always clear from the outside. Amid continued optimism on the part of the main actors, key figures periodically make statements seemingly retracing to their original positions.
“As a result, it remains unclear whether progress has been made or this is a grand imitation of negotiations that is dragging on.”
President Putin meeting with Trump's special envoy Steve Witkoff. St Petersburg, April 11, 2025. Source: Kremlin.ru
After the announcement of US proposals to Moscow and Kyiv, which included the possibility of the US recognizing Crimea as Russian, Trump envoy Steven Witkoff met with Putin.
The result of the meeting, where a wide range of international issues was discussed, was Putin’s statement on the possibility of direct negotiations between Moscow and Kyiv. Probably, one of the steps toward this, from the Russian side, was the proposal by Putin for a three-day ceasefire on May 8-10, when the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II will be celebrated. This would be very convenient for the Kremlin, lest the large-scale celebrations be overshadowed by Ukrainian raids or sabotage.
Trump has also flagged the possibility of a personal meeting with Putin in May.
For his part, Zelensky has rejected the idea of Ukraine recognizing the Russian annexation of Crimea, as well as the overwhelming majority of terms declared by the Russians.
Is Moscow ready for real peace negotiations?
On April 29, the Telegram channel Yozh (@ejdailyru), run by journalist Ekaterina Vinokurova, who usually reflects the position of the cohead of the Russian Presidential Administration Sergei Kiriyenko and his deputies, published an interesting post: “twoYozh sources say the initiative to declare a ceasefire on May 9 came from Kirill Dmitriev and Katerina Tikhonova. They were supported by presidential aide [Yuri] Ushakov and Defense Minister [Andrei] Belousov.”
However, it was not supported by Sergei Lavrov and the military command, including the General Staff, which is reeling from the recent assassination of a high-ranking general in Moscow. According to a Yozh source, “opponents believe the initiative for a ceasefire will not find understanding either in the White House or in the EU. Therefore, it is meaningless. But Putin did not agree with them.”
Dmitriev is said to have thought the initiative would please Trump and take down the tension that has built up in the contacts between Moscow and Washington.
The Yozh post appeared as Putin, Lavrov and Zelensky, on April 28-29, continued to go back-and-forth about the format of a new ceasefire and the prospects for ending the war. Putin, having proposed the three-day ceasefire on April 28, was countered by Zelensky, who renewed his call for a 30-day ceasefire. Even a short-term ceasefire could set in motion Trump’s plan, where the key point is a suspension of hostilities.
This marks Zelensky’s second attempt to outmaneuver Putin on this issue, as in response to Putin’s unexpected Easter ceasefire proposal, Zelensky proposed a 30-day pause in the war. (The Russian side rejected this.)
Meanwhile, we do not know how Putin’s position in talks with Witkoff actually corresponds to the terms for an end to the war voiced, for example, by Lavrov in an interview with the Brazilian daily O Globo on April 28.
The result of the meeting, where a wide range of international issues was discussed, was Putin’s statement on the possibility of direct negotiations between Moscow and Kyiv. Probably, one of the steps toward this, from the Russian side, was the proposal by Putin for a three-day ceasefire on May 8-10, when the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II will be celebrated. This would be very convenient for the Kremlin, lest the large-scale celebrations be overshadowed by Ukrainian raids or sabotage.
Trump has also flagged the possibility of a personal meeting with Putin in May.
For his part, Zelensky has rejected the idea of Ukraine recognizing the Russian annexation of Crimea, as well as the overwhelming majority of terms declared by the Russians.
Is Moscow ready for real peace negotiations?
On April 29, the Telegram channel Yozh (@ejdailyru), run by journalist Ekaterina Vinokurova, who usually reflects the position of the cohead of the Russian Presidential Administration Sergei Kiriyenko and his deputies, published an interesting post: “twoYozh sources say the initiative to declare a ceasefire on May 9 came from Kirill Dmitriev and Katerina Tikhonova. They were supported by presidential aide [Yuri] Ushakov and Defense Minister [Andrei] Belousov.”
However, it was not supported by Sergei Lavrov and the military command, including the General Staff, which is reeling from the recent assassination of a high-ranking general in Moscow. According to a Yozh source, “opponents believe the initiative for a ceasefire will not find understanding either in the White House or in the EU. Therefore, it is meaningless. But Putin did not agree with them.”
Dmitriev is said to have thought the initiative would please Trump and take down the tension that has built up in the contacts between Moscow and Washington.
The Yozh post appeared as Putin, Lavrov and Zelensky, on April 28-29, continued to go back-and-forth about the format of a new ceasefire and the prospects for ending the war. Putin, having proposed the three-day ceasefire on April 28, was countered by Zelensky, who renewed his call for a 30-day ceasefire. Even a short-term ceasefire could set in motion Trump’s plan, where the key point is a suspension of hostilities.
This marks Zelensky’s second attempt to outmaneuver Putin on this issue, as in response to Putin’s unexpected Easter ceasefire proposal, Zelensky proposed a 30-day pause in the war. (The Russian side rejected this.)
Meanwhile, we do not know how Putin’s position in talks with Witkoff actually corresponds to the terms for an end to the war voiced, for example, by Lavrov in an interview with the Brazilian daily O Globo on April 28.
“If the terms outlined by Lavrov actually reflect Moscow’s position, the peace negotiations have made no progress.”
Lavrov reiterated that Kyiv must have a neutral, nonaligned status; Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions must be internationally recognized as Russian; Ukraine must be “demilitarized” and “denazified”; Ukraine must scrap laws restricting the Russian language, culture and church; and the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant must remain under Russian control.
Perhaps the Yozh post about the two sides in Putin’s entourage on the issue of a ceasefire, where Lavrov (who has essentially been removed from negotiations with the US and Ukraine in favor of Ushakov and Dmitriev) is a hawk, is supposed to make foreign negotiators believe that Putin’s position is more realistic and motivated by a desire to achieve peace at some point rather than continue the war under previous slogans.
It remains to be seen what the final price of this peace will be and whether Trump will really decide to use US sanctions and other instruments of pressure in full to effect it. For now, all hopes rest on a May meeting between Trump and Putin.
Retaking of Kursk and the Sumy front
On April 26, Chief of the Russian General Staff Valery Gerasimov reported to Putin that the Ukrainian army had been defeated in Kursk Region. A fragment of the briefing was posted online as a video. Among other things, Gerasimov finally acknowledged the involvement of North Korean soldiers and special forces in Kursk, which the Russian authorities for some reason had denied for four months, despite all the evidence to the contrary.
In reality, according to voenkory (Russian war bloggers), Russia has not fully retaken Kursk Region, as close to the border, in the southeast of Sudzhansky District, there are still remnants of the Ukrainian army, which control individual forests, ravines and heights.
All the populated areas of the region have been liberated, however, including the Gornalsky monastery located close to the border. To grasp the price of retaking Kursk, take the battle for the monastery, consisting of about five small buildings: the fighting lasted 10 days after the first group of Russian paratroopers managed to enter the monastery area.
In addition, on April 29 unpleasant new details emerged about the March operation, called Potok (“flow”), where Russian forces crawled through a gas pipeline to get behind Ukrainian defenses outside of Sudzha: most of the Akhmat special forces fighters from the Aida group who took part in the operation have ended up in the hospital with serious lung damage, as reported by Apti Alaudinov, deputy head of the Military-Political Directorate of the Russian Armed Forces and commander of Akhmat.
Fighting on the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia fronts
Perhaps the Yozh post about the two sides in Putin’s entourage on the issue of a ceasefire, where Lavrov (who has essentially been removed from negotiations with the US and Ukraine in favor of Ushakov and Dmitriev) is a hawk, is supposed to make foreign negotiators believe that Putin’s position is more realistic and motivated by a desire to achieve peace at some point rather than continue the war under previous slogans.
It remains to be seen what the final price of this peace will be and whether Trump will really decide to use US sanctions and other instruments of pressure in full to effect it. For now, all hopes rest on a May meeting between Trump and Putin.
Retaking of Kursk and the Sumy front
On April 26, Chief of the Russian General Staff Valery Gerasimov reported to Putin that the Ukrainian army had been defeated in Kursk Region. A fragment of the briefing was posted online as a video. Among other things, Gerasimov finally acknowledged the involvement of North Korean soldiers and special forces in Kursk, which the Russian authorities for some reason had denied for four months, despite all the evidence to the contrary.
In reality, according to voenkory (Russian war bloggers), Russia has not fully retaken Kursk Region, as close to the border, in the southeast of Sudzhansky District, there are still remnants of the Ukrainian army, which control individual forests, ravines and heights.
All the populated areas of the region have been liberated, however, including the Gornalsky monastery located close to the border. To grasp the price of retaking Kursk, take the battle for the monastery, consisting of about five small buildings: the fighting lasted 10 days after the first group of Russian paratroopers managed to enter the monastery area.
In addition, on April 29 unpleasant new details emerged about the March operation, called Potok (“flow”), where Russian forces crawled through a gas pipeline to get behind Ukrainian defenses outside of Sudzha: most of the Akhmat special forces fighters from the Aida group who took part in the operation have ended up in the hospital with serious lung damage, as reported by Apti Alaudinov, deputy head of the Military-Political Directorate of the Russian Armed Forces and commander of Akhmat.
Fighting on the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia fronts
“Overall, the situation on the battlefield, even though the Easter ceasefire was not entirely successful, looks much calmer than at the beginning of April.”
Perhaps the reason is bad weather with periodic snowfall, which turns the Donetsk black soil into mud.
Meanwhile, foliage is returning, meaning Russian infantry can move through forest belts with less risk. Overall, the Russian army seems to have orders to forget about mass attacks in new sections of the front line and to finish the “backlog” in the most problematic or promising areas. In the last two weeks of April, only two serious column attacks appeared on the internet (April 17 and April 22).
Ukrainian subversion
The April 25 assassination in Balashikha, a Moscow suburb, of the deputy head of the Main Operational Directorate of the Russian General Staff, Lieutenant General Yaroslav Moskalik, whose car was blown up, is another instance of sabotage and arson carried out by agents of Ukrainian special forces inside Russia.
According to data published on April 16 by the Telegram channel Yesli byt' tochnym (@tochno_st) based on information from Russia’s Supreme Court, a record number of individuals were convicted in Russia in 2024 for terrorism (articles 205.0-205.6 of the Criminal Code) – 868 versus 730 in 2023.
Meanwhile, foliage is returning, meaning Russian infantry can move through forest belts with less risk. Overall, the Russian army seems to have orders to forget about mass attacks in new sections of the front line and to finish the “backlog” in the most problematic or promising areas. In the last two weeks of April, only two serious column attacks appeared on the internet (April 17 and April 22).
Ukrainian subversion
The April 25 assassination in Balashikha, a Moscow suburb, of the deputy head of the Main Operational Directorate of the Russian General Staff, Lieutenant General Yaroslav Moskalik, whose car was blown up, is another instance of sabotage and arson carried out by agents of Ukrainian special forces inside Russia.
According to data published on April 16 by the Telegram channel Yesli byt' tochnym (@tochno_st) based on information from Russia’s Supreme Court, a record number of individuals were convicted in Russia in 2024 for terrorism (articles 205.0-205.6 of the Criminal Code) – 868 versus 730 in 2023.
Aftermath of the assassination of Moskalik. April 25, 2025. Source: VK
Among them were 48 teenagers and six women with children under three years of age. Almost half of the total convictions (368), however, were for “justifying terrorism” (Article 205.2/2), a charge brought against political opponents of the regime. Eighty-nine individuals were convicted for “financing terrorism” (Article 205.1/1.1) – mostly because they had donated money to the Ukrainian army. Eighty-seven others were convicted for actually “participating in the activities of a terrorist organization” (Article 205.5/2) and another 84 for “failing to report a crime” (Article 205.6). The overwhelming majority of those convicted are Russian citizens (696).
Details of the Moskalik assassination and the identity of the perpetrator (officially reported to be a citizen of Ukraine, born in Sumy, who had been living in Russia since 2015) were quickly made public by the Russian authorities.
The assassin had rented an apartment in the same building as Moskalik for six months. Three days before the assassination, he took a box with an explosive device and a surveillance system to his car (recently bought for the attack), which had been parked near the entrance to the building, and then hurried to catch a plane to Istanbul. The bomb went off at the perfect moment, when the only person near the car was Moskalik, who monitored battlefield developments in Ukraine. According to some reports, he compiled operational briefings that went to Putin.
This marks the second successful assassination by the Defense Intelligence of Ukraine, or GUR, of high-ranking Russian military officials in four months (on December 17, Igor Kirillov, who headed the Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Protection Troops in the Ministry of Defense, and his assistant were killed). The Russian political and especially the military elite is likely now sweating, as seemingly none of them can be protected outside of their places of work.
Russia has proven unable to deal with this problem. Moreover, the Ukrainian authorities (for example, the head of the defense committee in the Rada, Roman Kostenko) promise to hunt down Russian military officials even after a peace is concluded.
Details of the Moskalik assassination and the identity of the perpetrator (officially reported to be a citizen of Ukraine, born in Sumy, who had been living in Russia since 2015) were quickly made public by the Russian authorities.
The assassin had rented an apartment in the same building as Moskalik for six months. Three days before the assassination, he took a box with an explosive device and a surveillance system to his car (recently bought for the attack), which had been parked near the entrance to the building, and then hurried to catch a plane to Istanbul. The bomb went off at the perfect moment, when the only person near the car was Moskalik, who monitored battlefield developments in Ukraine. According to some reports, he compiled operational briefings that went to Putin.
This marks the second successful assassination by the Defense Intelligence of Ukraine, or GUR, of high-ranking Russian military officials in four months (on December 17, Igor Kirillov, who headed the Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Protection Troops in the Ministry of Defense, and his assistant were killed). The Russian political and especially the military elite is likely now sweating, as seemingly none of them can be protected outside of their places of work.
Russia has proven unable to deal with this problem. Moreover, the Ukrainian authorities (for example, the head of the defense committee in the Rada, Roman Kostenko) promise to hunt down Russian military officials even after a peace is concluded.
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