Belousov was known as an economic expert, having founded the Center for Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-Term Forecasting (CMASF, now one of the leading think tanks for economic policy). Throughout his intellectual career, he consistently advocated a strong state with an active industrial policy. He entered government service only in 2006, at the age of 47, joining the Economic Development Ministry. Over the following two decades, Belousov spent most of his time working in close proximity to Putin. He headed a key department in the government when Putin was prime minister, and from 2013, he served as Putin’s economic aid before joining – as a first deputy prime minister – the government of Mikhail Mishustin to oversee the economy.

There is something in Belousov’s career trajectory that resembles that of Elvira Nabiullina. However, whereas Nabiullina belonged to the “liberal” camp, Belousov is a patriotically minded technocrat of a dirigiste persuasion, deeply religious and distinguished by his personal loyalty to Putin. Acquaintances have quoted Belousov as saying that “the Mother of God speaks through Putin.” Such details were likely included in the briefing on Belousov prepared for Putin. His closeness to the “princesses” – Putin’s daughters – may also have played a role in his appointment as defense minister.

There is another important factor to note. Like Nabiullina, Belousov has not been implicated in corruption and is relatively modest in his personal lifestyle. An investigation published immediately after his appointment as defense minister, based on correspondence from his hacked email account, revealed only a EUR600,000 villa in Italy, though it could not be found in Italian property registries. A company owned by his son received contracts from the Ministry of Industry and Trade, Rostec, Rosatom and Roscosmos, where Belousov sits on the supervisory boards. However, these contracts were not big: the company’s annual revenue amounted to just over RUB20 million, which, compared to other representatives of the Putin elite, is negligible.

Despite his personal loyalty to Putin, this may have implied a lower degree of controllability of Belousov – possibly for which reason, his appointment to the Defense Ministry was accompanied by the delegation of two specially assigned deputies, Pavel Fradkov and Anna Tsivileva, while oversight over his actions and decisions as minister was handed to Dmitri Medvedev (as first deputy chair of the Military-Industrial Commission), Shoigu (as secretary of Russia’s Security Council) and Alexei Dyumin (as Putin’s aid overseeing the military-industrial complex).

Nevertheless, on the whole Belousov appears to have been perceived by Putin’s inner circle as a competent, high-level “technical executor,” tasked with solving a specific problem and lacking a “clan,” or power base, of his own. This apparently outweighed some of Belousov’s “peculiarities,” which are uncharacteristic for most figures in the upper ranks of the Putin system.

Becoming a political actor

Throughout his career in the state apparatus, Belousov remained a highly nonpublic figure. His rare appearances in the media suggest he is aware of the wide range of problems and challenges facing Russia and has his own strategic vision of how they should be addressed. However, implementing this vision objectively requires a different economic model, and in his role as defense minister (unlike his previous position as first deputy prime minister), Belousov has acquired the authority and opportunities to move the country toward such a model and to build a “broad coalition” that could serve as the basis for implementation.

One indication of this is the Defense Ministry’s role in nationalization. After Igor Krasnov was appointed by Putin to the Supreme Court last autumn, reports that the Prosecutor General’s Office was demanding more nationalizations temporarily ceased. For some businessmen, this brought a sense of relief and fueled hopes that common sense had prevailed. Yet this was just bureaucratic games. According to informed sources, Mishustin concluded that, as prime minister, he could not remain on the sidelines of such an important process, and he initiated a procedure for the government to review nationalization requests. There were many; the government reviewed them, but once it had done so, the process resumed (see here and here). It turned out that the bulk of nationalization requests originates from the Defense Ministry. These concern strategic assets deemed necessary for national security, though this definition is so broad that even an airline ticket booking system has been classified as strategic.

Meanwhile, the Defense Ministry, even though it initiates nationalizations, cannot itself manage nationalized assets – which creates a basis for an alliance with Rostec and its CEO Sergei Chemezov, who is one of Putin’s closest associates.

The Defense Ministry is the key customer for Rostec, and to lobby the interests of the military-industrial complex, it is logical for Chemezov to form a coalition with Belousov. However, an important distinction should be noted: Chemezov views nationalization differently from Putin’s Ozero “friends.” The Rotenberg brothers, the Kovalchuks and others see it as an opportunity to grab the nationalized assets for themselves. This is how the Rotenbergs have managed to gain control of parts of the chemicals industry (though not only that – their most recent trophy is Moscow’s Domodedovo Airport), while the Patrushev family has moved into the agriculture sector. Chemezov, by contrast, cannot benefit in this way: he heads a state holding company, meaning such a redistribution of property does not translate into an increase in his resources and power. For Chemezov, nationalization without privatization makes it easier for him to request government money for these assets and to extract rent from them.

Patriot in chief?

Within the “patriotic” camp, there have long been calls to “restore order in the country” and mobilize the country for war. A now-permanent anti-corruption campaign is the Kremlin’s response. Still, it is obvious that clans continue to exist, competing for rent and fighting over assets, while the “supreme leader” remains absorbed in geopolitical abstractions. For the “patriotic” camp, Belousov could become an attractive consolidating figure – something that was hardly anticipated at the time of his appointment as defense minister.

Attitudes toward Belousov have largely been shaped by the perception that he is a loner without his own “clan” or even a team. As a result, he was not taken seriously as an independent figure, let alone as a political actor. This gave him an advantage: other influential players did not see him as a threat.
In reality, Belousov is not as straightforward as he may appear. His extensive bureaucratic experience, low public profile and the resources at his disposal clearly distinguish him from previous would-be leaders of the “honest patriots.” Igor Girkin had little beyond media resources. General Ivan Popov had soldiers who believed in him and followed him, but once he was cut off from them and transferred to Syria, everything was gone. Yevgeny Prigozhin was, in essence, a trusted operative tasked with carrying out “dirty work” – running troll factories and private military companies and recruiting convicts for the Ukraine war. His rapid rise in the media in 2022-23 “went to his head,” and Prigozhin, a gambler by nature, lost the ability to assess his situation realistically.

A key distinction of Belousov is his programmatic, strategic thinking. He is an ideological person with his own views on the world, which have not changed. Over 20 years in the state apparatus, Belousov has built not a clan but an “ecosystem” of people who share his views. An important element of this ecosystem is the abovementioned ASI, established in 2011 at Belousov’s initiative and under his supervision. One of ASI’s most notable achievements was the significant improvement in Russia’s rank in the World Bank’s Doing Business ranking, achieved through close work with regional administrations to improve the technical conditions for doing business (connection to power grids, construction permits, etc.) and through the creation of a broad network of contacts across the country.

As defense minister, Belousov has, by virtue of his position, acquired a much broader base: the army and the military-industrial complex. These are, of course, large and complicated structures with their own interests, yet in less than two years, Belousov has managed to establish constructive working relationships with both. Because he is well organized (though not a gifted orator) and focused on getting things done, those who are trying to do the same thing (rather than siphoning off government money) are able to work with Belousov.

Belousov has also managed to establish communication with military bloggers, whom he does not greatly irritate. More importantly, it appears he has built relationships with one of the pillars of the FSB: military counterintelligence. General Viktor Goremykin, who comes from there, is one of the few Shoigu deputies to have retained his position under Belousov. Note that within the FSB, military counterintelligence is traditionally regarded as the most ideologically driven and the least corrupt branch.

This forms the basis for Belousov’s political ambitions, which he has always had, even if they were not particularly visible. Even when heading the CMASF, Belousov stood out from other experts. Most confine themselves to assessments or recommendations, leaving implementation to officials and politicians. Belousov, even then, said he was prepared not only to defend his ideas but also to implement them – which is why he entered government service. His guiding principle has always been the so-called developmental state, where the interests of both business and individuals are subordinated to the (higher) interests of the state. In the current circumstances, he may get the opportunity to realize it.

Over the past 25 years, Putin has relied on “friends” and their clans. However, their growing appetites amid a shrinking pie risk destabilization. It is possible that Putin may come to prefer a scenario in which he continues, from the heights, to focus on geopolitics, while the practical management of affairs on the ground, in the role of prime minister (and thus constitutional successor), is entrusted to the loyal Belousov, devoted to him and his family.