Economy
How the War in Iran Is Affecting Russian Energy
February 11, 2026
- Maxim BlantEconomic commentator, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
The current conflagration in the Middle East has brought short-term benefits to Russia in the form of soaring oil and gas prices, as well as renewed interest from several countries in importing energy from Russia. Yet the war, whenever it ends, looks set to create new long-term problems for the Kremlin, argues economic analyst Maxim Blant.
This is a shortened and translated version of an article originally published in Republic.
Major geopolitical events are currently unfolding in the Middle East, with the oil and gas markets taking center stage. The main difference between the current war in the Persian Gulf and last year’s “little, victorious war” (for everyone), which lasted only 12 days, is that Iran, as it fights back against US and Israeli attacks, has attacked every country in the region that it considers a US ally. Moreover, it has not limited itself to military targets, hitting airports and energy infrastructure as well.
In addition, the leadership of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps warned that no oil would leave the Persian Gulf and that Iran would attack all ships attempting to pass through the Strait of Hormuz.
Despite statements by US military commanders that shipping in the strait remains unobstructed, there have been no volunteers willing to test the resolve of the Iranian military. Thus, the export of oil from a region critical to the global energy market, along a route that accounts for approximately a fifth of global supplies, has effectively been paralyzed.
When markets opened for the first time since the start of the war, on March 2, prices predictably soared. Brent crude surged to $82 per barrel, the following day reaching a high of $85. These levels surpassed those in June 2025 when the US and Israel bombed Iranian nuclear facilities.
A somewhat different picture is seen in Urals crude, which is used as the benchmark for the taxes that Russian oil companies pay. In June 2025, Urals approached $80 per barrel, but now it has not gone above $67 (as of this writing). Considering that spot prices – at which oil is loaded from Russian ports and which ultimately determine taxes and duties – are significantly lower than quotes on exchanges, money from oil sales remain below that assumed in Russia’s federal budget. Moreover, the market is extremely volatile, with intraday price fluctuations reaching 5-6%.
Major geopolitical events are currently unfolding in the Middle East, with the oil and gas markets taking center stage. The main difference between the current war in the Persian Gulf and last year’s “little, victorious war” (for everyone), which lasted only 12 days, is that Iran, as it fights back against US and Israeli attacks, has attacked every country in the region that it considers a US ally. Moreover, it has not limited itself to military targets, hitting airports and energy infrastructure as well.
In addition, the leadership of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps warned that no oil would leave the Persian Gulf and that Iran would attack all ships attempting to pass through the Strait of Hormuz.
Despite statements by US military commanders that shipping in the strait remains unobstructed, there have been no volunteers willing to test the resolve of the Iranian military. Thus, the export of oil from a region critical to the global energy market, along a route that accounts for approximately a fifth of global supplies, has effectively been paralyzed.
When markets opened for the first time since the start of the war, on March 2, prices predictably soared. Brent crude surged to $82 per barrel, the following day reaching a high of $85. These levels surpassed those in June 2025 when the US and Israel bombed Iranian nuclear facilities.
A somewhat different picture is seen in Urals crude, which is used as the benchmark for the taxes that Russian oil companies pay. In June 2025, Urals approached $80 per barrel, but now it has not gone above $67 (as of this writing). Considering that spot prices – at which oil is loaded from Russian ports and which ultimately determine taxes and duties – are significantly lower than quotes on exchanges, money from oil sales remain below that assumed in Russia’s federal budget. Moreover, the market is extremely volatile, with intraday price fluctuations reaching 5-6%.
Oil pumps, in southern Russia.
Gennadiy Kolodkin / World Bank
Gennadiy Kolodkin / World Bank
Still, at this stage, Russia currently appears to be the main beneficiary of the war in the Persian Gulf. Oil prices, though not yet at the levels Moscow would prefer, are objectively higher than a month ago. Most importantly, India – which is critically dependent on supplies from the Persian Gulf – is, according to Bloomberg, trying to negotiate a green light to purchase Russian crude (RP: It was received subsequently). Recall that the sharp reduction in Russian oil purchases by Indian refineries led to a record amount of unloaded oil on tankers at sea, to around 140 million barrels worth nearly $7 billion.
The opportunity to unload these tankers, stop paying freight and finally receive payment for the oil will allow Russian exporters to somewhat improve their fragile finances.
Russian LNG exporters are benefiting even more from the war between the US and Israel and Iran. Following an Iranian drone strike, QatarEnergy – the giant Qatari state gas company – halted LNG production. As a result, gas prices in Europe soared from $380 to $780 per 1,000 cubic meters in just two days, a level last seen in 2022. And since Europe only planned fully to phase out Russian gas by early 2027, Gazprom now has an opportunity to reap rewards in the meantime.
Markets remain in a state of near-total uncertainty. Neither Trump nor his administration has provided any coherent information on the timing of the operation or even its objectives. At the same time, it is premature to speak of a full-scale energy crisis, and the chances of stabilization are growing with each day. As early as March 1, eight OPEC+ countries agreed to increase production quotas by just over 200,000 barrels per day starting April 1. A few days later, OPEC’s main antagonist, the International Energy Agency, announced its readiness to help stabilize the global oil market on the back of its members’ 1 billion barrels in strategic reserves.
As for Iran’s attempts to blockade the Strait of Hormuz, they are unlikely to succeed. First, Trump wrote in a post on his Truth Social network that US warships would, if necessary, escort tankers and other merchant vessels and that a US company would insure them, providing financial guarantees for “a very reasonable price.” Second, China, which relies on the Gulf for a significant share of its energy, has called on all parties to the conflict to ensure safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz for all merchant vessels, particularly tankers and gas carriers. Furthermore, Bloomberg, citing senior executives at Chinese state-owned energy companies, reports that Beijing has demanded that Iranian authorities stop attacks on major energy exporters such as Qatar, from which China until recently received 30% of its LNG imports.
Tehran is unlikely to be able to ignore for long the demands of its main trading partner, which buys, or rather bought before the war, 80% of Iranian oil. This is especially true given that the war came amid a serious economic crisis in Iran, which erupted into mass protests earlier this year. Finally, the Persian Gulf monarchies – suffering the most serious economic losses from this war – are unlikely to tolerate Iranian attacks and the inability to export their energy resources for long.
According to Axios, the UAE, which has suffered more attacks from Iran than even Israel, has considered retaliatory strikes against Iranian missile sites. Qatar’s Foreign Ministry has stated that Iran has crossed every red line and that its actions will not go unanswered.
The FT, among others, has reported that the goal of Iran’s attacks on its wealthy neighbors is to force them to pressure the US to end the war. However, pressuring Trump to stop the bombing may prove harder than expected, if not impossible. In any case, Iran’s actions to fight back are not mutually exclusive: Iran can pursue a diplomatic campaign to squeeze Trump politically while seeking to end the war through military means.
As for Russia, even now – alongside the obvious financial benefits – there are also significant costs. Rosatom, for example, has halted construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant and is unlikely to resume it in the foreseeable future. Russian grain exporters – Iran is the third-largest buyer of Russian grain – have stopped shipments due to higher freight costs and payment issues.
The end of the war in the Gulf does not bode well for the Kremlin. Putin’s unequivocal support for the current Iranian regime puts him at odds with the Trump administration and marks him as a possible enemy. Once the global energy market stabilizes, one can expect an even more vigorous hunt for Russian “shadow fleet” tankers – a hunt that, unlike the Iranian campaign, both the UK and EU countries would gladly take part in.
The hitherto chummy relations between Russia and the Arab countries within OPEC+ will also disappear – especially if the latter actively participate in the war against Iran. Moreover, if the regime in Tehran changes, the likelihood of a redistribution of the global oil market – like what happened in Venezuela recently – will go up, and Russia’s interests in that process will be the last thing on anyone’s mind.
As for Vladimir Putin, his paranoia is likely to intensify. The demise of two authoritarian rulers of major oil-exporting countries within two months already looks like a trend – that the current US leadership considers the elimination of a foreign leader, through kidnapping or assassination, a perfectly acceptable means of achieving its goals.
The opportunity to unload these tankers, stop paying freight and finally receive payment for the oil will allow Russian exporters to somewhat improve their fragile finances.
Russian LNG exporters are benefiting even more from the war between the US and Israel and Iran. Following an Iranian drone strike, QatarEnergy – the giant Qatari state gas company – halted LNG production. As a result, gas prices in Europe soared from $380 to $780 per 1,000 cubic meters in just two days, a level last seen in 2022. And since Europe only planned fully to phase out Russian gas by early 2027, Gazprom now has an opportunity to reap rewards in the meantime.
Markets remain in a state of near-total uncertainty. Neither Trump nor his administration has provided any coherent information on the timing of the operation or even its objectives. At the same time, it is premature to speak of a full-scale energy crisis, and the chances of stabilization are growing with each day. As early as March 1, eight OPEC+ countries agreed to increase production quotas by just over 200,000 barrels per day starting April 1. A few days later, OPEC’s main antagonist, the International Energy Agency, announced its readiness to help stabilize the global oil market on the back of its members’ 1 billion barrels in strategic reserves.
As for Iran’s attempts to blockade the Strait of Hormuz, they are unlikely to succeed. First, Trump wrote in a post on his Truth Social network that US warships would, if necessary, escort tankers and other merchant vessels and that a US company would insure them, providing financial guarantees for “a very reasonable price.” Second, China, which relies on the Gulf for a significant share of its energy, has called on all parties to the conflict to ensure safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz for all merchant vessels, particularly tankers and gas carriers. Furthermore, Bloomberg, citing senior executives at Chinese state-owned energy companies, reports that Beijing has demanded that Iranian authorities stop attacks on major energy exporters such as Qatar, from which China until recently received 30% of its LNG imports.
Tehran is unlikely to be able to ignore for long the demands of its main trading partner, which buys, or rather bought before the war, 80% of Iranian oil. This is especially true given that the war came amid a serious economic crisis in Iran, which erupted into mass protests earlier this year. Finally, the Persian Gulf monarchies – suffering the most serious economic losses from this war – are unlikely to tolerate Iranian attacks and the inability to export their energy resources for long.
According to Axios, the UAE, which has suffered more attacks from Iran than even Israel, has considered retaliatory strikes against Iranian missile sites. Qatar’s Foreign Ministry has stated that Iran has crossed every red line and that its actions will not go unanswered.
The FT, among others, has reported that the goal of Iran’s attacks on its wealthy neighbors is to force them to pressure the US to end the war. However, pressuring Trump to stop the bombing may prove harder than expected, if not impossible. In any case, Iran’s actions to fight back are not mutually exclusive: Iran can pursue a diplomatic campaign to squeeze Trump politically while seeking to end the war through military means.
As for Russia, even now – alongside the obvious financial benefits – there are also significant costs. Rosatom, for example, has halted construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant and is unlikely to resume it in the foreseeable future. Russian grain exporters – Iran is the third-largest buyer of Russian grain – have stopped shipments due to higher freight costs and payment issues.
The end of the war in the Gulf does not bode well for the Kremlin. Putin’s unequivocal support for the current Iranian regime puts him at odds with the Trump administration and marks him as a possible enemy. Once the global energy market stabilizes, one can expect an even more vigorous hunt for Russian “shadow fleet” tankers – a hunt that, unlike the Iranian campaign, both the UK and EU countries would gladly take part in.
The hitherto chummy relations between Russia and the Arab countries within OPEC+ will also disappear – especially if the latter actively participate in the war against Iran. Moreover, if the regime in Tehran changes, the likelihood of a redistribution of the global oil market – like what happened in Venezuela recently – will go up, and Russia’s interests in that process will be the last thing on anyone’s mind.
As for Vladimir Putin, his paranoia is likely to intensify. The demise of two authoritarian rulers of major oil-exporting countries within two months already looks like a trend – that the current US leadership considers the elimination of a foreign leader, through kidnapping or assassination, a perfectly acceptable means of achieving its goals.
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