ECONOMY
What Is the Putin Consensus and What Might Undermine It?
June 17, 2025
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Vladislav Inozemtsev
Сofounder and expert at the Center for Analysis and Strategies in Europe (CASE) in Nicosia, Cyprus
Economist Vladislav Inozemtsev argues that Russians do not expect the government to make their lives better – rather they are content with the status quo, meaning the regime’s task is to keep things roughly how they are. The real risk to the regime, he reckons, comes from a possible misreading of the situation and its own poorly judged decisions.
The original text in Russian was published in the Moscow Times and is being republished here with small changes and with their permission.
For years, discussions of the domestic situation in Russia have involved various kinds of “trades”: political freedoms in exchange for material wealth; a sense of geopolitical greatness for autarky and isolation; and so on. All these arguments, however, are based on a dangerous misconception: they suggest that without benefits and privileges, the population could become discontent, ultimately leading to the collapse of the existing order.
This is why many analysts attach such importance to economic indicators and developments on the front line, even though neither has any real impact on the regime’s stability.
I propose an alternative hypothesis, which challenges the prevailing ideas about the foundations of the current government’s stability and the risks it may face.
Precious inertia
After achieving significant improvements in prosperity, along with relative “orderliness” of everyday life and the construction of a pseudo-ideological framework, the authorities gained an exceptionally high level of public trust – and with it, a kind of carte blanche to do whatever they want as long as it does not result in a deterioration in the conditions of the majority of Russians.
For years, discussions of the domestic situation in Russia have involved various kinds of “trades”: political freedoms in exchange for material wealth; a sense of geopolitical greatness for autarky and isolation; and so on. All these arguments, however, are based on a dangerous misconception: they suggest that without benefits and privileges, the population could become discontent, ultimately leading to the collapse of the existing order.
This is why many analysts attach such importance to economic indicators and developments on the front line, even though neither has any real impact on the regime’s stability.
I propose an alternative hypothesis, which challenges the prevailing ideas about the foundations of the current government’s stability and the risks it may face.
Precious inertia
After achieving significant improvements in prosperity, along with relative “orderliness” of everyday life and the construction of a pseudo-ideological framework, the authorities gained an exceptionally high level of public trust – and with it, a kind of carte blanche to do whatever they want as long as it does not result in a deterioration in the conditions of the majority of Russians.
Russians protesting in Czechia against the war in Ukraine. March 2022. Source: Wiki Commons
In other words, people do not demand positive change – they are content with the status quo, and to earn their support, it is enough for the government to maintain things more or less as they are. This is confirmed, in particular, by the 2014–21 period, when the economy was stagnant for seven years and real disposable incomes did not grow. Even so, no major public dissatisfaction with the authorities was observed.
The trigger for destabilization was not even the launch of the “special military operation” in February 2022, but rather the “partial mobilization” months later. The latter marked the first and only event in years showing that no one, at least no male citizen, could consider themselves safe from a sudden intrusion into their lives, potentially with the most tragic consequences. The public reaction, including the emigration of over a million people, was unambiguous and reportedly caused Putin deep disappointment.
The trigger for destabilization was not even the launch of the “special military operation” in February 2022, but rather the “partial mobilization” months later. The latter marked the first and only event in years showing that no one, at least no male citizen, could consider themselves safe from a sudden intrusion into their lives, potentially with the most tragic consequences. The public reaction, including the emigration of over a million people, was unambiguous and reportedly caused Putin deep disappointment.
“The Russian leader’s subsequent actions indicate it is society’s inertia that he values above all else.”
Despite widespread online rumors about the inevitability of new waves of mobilization ahead of each spring or autumn draft, none came.
Instead, a mercenary army was formed. People were recruited with increasingly generous financial incentives, including soaring signing bonuses. By 2024, when regions were competing to buy cannon fodder for the war, society had once again calmed down, realizing that those who did not want to go to war would generally not be forced to do so.
Indifference, not support
But is the much-discussed “tightening of the screws” since early 2022 not a destabilizing force? How is society responding to the unprecedented restrictions on freedom imposed during this period? Why is there no visible reaction?
Again, if we assume that Russians at one time “agreed” to give Putin their freedom in exchange for something – sausage, order, national greatness – it is hard to explain such passivity. Yet if we accept that indifference is the default state of the population, one that requires no special effort to sustain, it becomes entirely understandable.
The idea that people stay silent as long as it is not them being targeted simply does not work here – and not only because of fear.
The mobilization demonstrated that when the regime targeted “everyone,” it took a spontaneous mass action – not even a formal protest – for the regime to get the message that it should not go knocking on everyone’s door. The authorities went after journalists, “foreign agents,” LGBT persons and other categories of citizens, none of whom are of much concern to the majority and some of whom actively irritate it.
Instead, a mercenary army was formed. People were recruited with increasingly generous financial incentives, including soaring signing bonuses. By 2024, when regions were competing to buy cannon fodder for the war, society had once again calmed down, realizing that those who did not want to go to war would generally not be forced to do so.
Indifference, not support
But is the much-discussed “tightening of the screws” since early 2022 not a destabilizing force? How is society responding to the unprecedented restrictions on freedom imposed during this period? Why is there no visible reaction?
Again, if we assume that Russians at one time “agreed” to give Putin their freedom in exchange for something – sausage, order, national greatness – it is hard to explain such passivity. Yet if we accept that indifference is the default state of the population, one that requires no special effort to sustain, it becomes entirely understandable.
The idea that people stay silent as long as it is not them being targeted simply does not work here – and not only because of fear.
The mobilization demonstrated that when the regime targeted “everyone,” it took a spontaneous mass action – not even a formal protest – for the regime to get the message that it should not go knocking on everyone’s door. The authorities went after journalists, “foreign agents,” LGBT persons and other categories of citizens, none of whom are of much concern to the majority and some of whom actively irritate it.
“In other words, the modern Russian political system draws its strength not from the support of the majority, as is often claimed, but from its indifference.”
A line waiting to cross into Georgia from Russia at the Upper Lars border crossing, September, 2022. Archives
This majority is not dependent on the state enough to worry about a lack of economic growth and instead looks for individual survival strategies in shifting conditions. It is not overly concerned about the war in Ukraine – so long as those who want to play “Russian roulette” with big money on the line are the ones doing the fighting.
Most people simply seek the comfort of knowing that their everyday life is not under immediate threat. External circumstances do not bother them until they personally encounter a clear and present danger.
Conclusions
This interpretation explains the failure of Russia’s liberal opposition, which is less a result of state persecution than of the glaring inadequacy of its own agenda. A cursory glance is enough to see that this agenda appeals to a narrow set of minorities, from intellectuals and LGBT persons to businesspeople, human rights activists, anti-corruption campaigners and those hoping for a Ukrainian victory in the war.
The government has labeled many of these groups traitors, extremists or undesirables, or all three. As a result, their members have either emigrated or chosen to keep their heads down. Neither outcome has elicited any reaction from the broader public, which firmly believes that it has nothing to do with elements deemed by the government to be dangerous and that it will not be “next.”
Until anti-Putin forces offer the majority a genuinely appealing alternative to inertia, nothing will change.
The second conclusion is that the current regime cannot carry out mobilization-style campaigns, whether they are war-related or not. One example is the Kremlin’s fruitless effort to raise birth rates.
No matter what the authorities do – introduce “maternity capital” payments, wage moral crusades against LGBT persons, ban abortions, send priests to schools, promote “traditional values” – nothing works. Most people know that they are being pressured but that their lives are not changing for the worse – they are simply diverging from what they had envisioned.
Against this backdrop, silent resistance, judging by official statistics, is only growing. The more pressure the authorities apply, the more the resistance will intensify. The same applies to other key regime projects. Just look at import substitution: oftentimes the Chinese sticker has not been fully removed from “Russian innovations.”
Most people simply seek the comfort of knowing that their everyday life is not under immediate threat. External circumstances do not bother them until they personally encounter a clear and present danger.
Conclusions
This interpretation explains the failure of Russia’s liberal opposition, which is less a result of state persecution than of the glaring inadequacy of its own agenda. A cursory glance is enough to see that this agenda appeals to a narrow set of minorities, from intellectuals and LGBT persons to businesspeople, human rights activists, anti-corruption campaigners and those hoping for a Ukrainian victory in the war.
The government has labeled many of these groups traitors, extremists or undesirables, or all three. As a result, their members have either emigrated or chosen to keep their heads down. Neither outcome has elicited any reaction from the broader public, which firmly believes that it has nothing to do with elements deemed by the government to be dangerous and that it will not be “next.”
Until anti-Putin forces offer the majority a genuinely appealing alternative to inertia, nothing will change.
The second conclusion is that the current regime cannot carry out mobilization-style campaigns, whether they are war-related or not. One example is the Kremlin’s fruitless effort to raise birth rates.
No matter what the authorities do – introduce “maternity capital” payments, wage moral crusades against LGBT persons, ban abortions, send priests to schools, promote “traditional values” – nothing works. Most people know that they are being pressured but that their lives are not changing for the worse – they are simply diverging from what they had envisioned.
Against this backdrop, silent resistance, judging by official statistics, is only growing. The more pressure the authorities apply, the more the resistance will intensify. The same applies to other key regime projects. Just look at import substitution: oftentimes the Chinese sticker has not been fully removed from “Russian innovations.”
“The majority does not want to exert itself. That is the essence of today’s so-called ‘consensus’.”
Where are the enemies?
Who, then, poses a threat to the existing order? Paradoxically, the most likely answer is Putin himself and his entourage.
Every new tightening of the screws inevitably expands the number of people affected by restrictive or repressive measures. Those accustomed to scrolling Instagram or Facebook now have to deal with official bans of those platforms. VPNs provide a workaround (as with YouTube). But what happens if the internet is made genuinely “sovereign” in a few years and such workarounds become useless?
For some, the Russian reality remained tolerable because they were preparing their children to study abroad. All of sudden, taking an English-language exam is now equated with supporting “undesirables.”
It is unclear where the red lines lie or what will happen next. Already, government websites do not users to register using non-Russian email addresses. A bill is in the works to block incoming calls from foreign numbers. What will be next – exit visas?
As the Russian opposition has failed to identify a message that resonates with the majority, the state likewise may misjudge the moment when the majority decides its own red line has been crossed.
Fifteen years ago, in an article for the French monthly Le Monde diplomatique, I argued Russia is an individualized society where each person chooses their own strategy for success or survival and is prepared, to some extent, to accept responsibility for the consequences.
Over the years, the authorities, especially under Putin, have devalued the strategy of collective action, which helped prevent any opposition movement from coalescing.
In today’s passive and inert society, collective action has almost no chance of emerging, let alone succeeding. Yet mass action that requires neither coordination nor leadership remains possible – for example, compare the scale of the protests in 2011-12 or 2018 with the raw numbers of those who fled the 2022 mobilization.
Anti-Putin dissidents are not capable of reviving collective action. But mass action may well erupt again – not because of the opposition, but because of the Kremlin’s own poorly judged decisions.
The future of Russian society, held hostage by the Kremlin, depends on whether and when those decisions are made.
Who, then, poses a threat to the existing order? Paradoxically, the most likely answer is Putin himself and his entourage.
Every new tightening of the screws inevitably expands the number of people affected by restrictive or repressive measures. Those accustomed to scrolling Instagram or Facebook now have to deal with official bans of those platforms. VPNs provide a workaround (as with YouTube). But what happens if the internet is made genuinely “sovereign” in a few years and such workarounds become useless?
For some, the Russian reality remained tolerable because they were preparing their children to study abroad. All of sudden, taking an English-language exam is now equated with supporting “undesirables.”
It is unclear where the red lines lie or what will happen next. Already, government websites do not users to register using non-Russian email addresses. A bill is in the works to block incoming calls from foreign numbers. What will be next – exit visas?
As the Russian opposition has failed to identify a message that resonates with the majority, the state likewise may misjudge the moment when the majority decides its own red line has been crossed.
Fifteen years ago, in an article for the French monthly Le Monde diplomatique, I argued Russia is an individualized society where each person chooses their own strategy for success or survival and is prepared, to some extent, to accept responsibility for the consequences.
Over the years, the authorities, especially under Putin, have devalued the strategy of collective action, which helped prevent any opposition movement from coalescing.
In today’s passive and inert society, collective action has almost no chance of emerging, let alone succeeding. Yet mass action that requires neither coordination nor leadership remains possible – for example, compare the scale of the protests in 2011-12 or 2018 with the raw numbers of those who fled the 2022 mobilization.
Anti-Putin dissidents are not capable of reviving collective action. But mass action may well erupt again – not because of the opposition, but because of the Kremlin’s own poorly judged decisions.
The future of Russian society, held hostage by the Kremlin, depends on whether and when those decisions are made.
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