ECONOMY
Digging into Russia’s Supposed Windfall from Iran-Related Soaring Oil Prices
April 13, 2026
- Maxim Blant
Economist
Against the backdrop of the Iran war, prices for Russian oil have risen to 13-year highs. Yet owing to other factors, including Ukrainian strikes on energy infrastructure, the Kremlin has proven unable to take full advantage of the situation, argues economist Maxim Blant.
In early April, Bloomberg, citing data from Argus Media, reported a 13-year high for the loading price of Russia’s benchmark Urals crude at the Baltic port of Primorsk. On April 2, it reached $116.05 per barrel, nearly double the $59 per barrel assumed in Russia’s 2026 budget. Prior to the announcement of a ceasefire in the Iran war, Russian oil had been rising sharply. According to official calculations by the Ministry of Economic Development – which form the basis for the taxes and duties Russian oil companies will pay in April – the average price of Urals for March stood at $77 per barrel.
Russian analysts thus estimate federal oil and gas revenues at around RUB1 trillion (plus or minus RUB50 billion). On the one hand, this is 50% higher than March’s RUB617 billion; on the other hand, in March the Russian budget collected 43% less in oil and gas revenues than a year earlier and fell short, by RUB234 billion or more than a third, of the amount projected by the Ministry of Finance. Overall, in the first quarter planned revenues were off RUB570 billion. Meanwhile, the April trillion is roughly in line with what the budget received in April 2025 (RUB1.09 trillion).
The problem is that, beginning in the final 10 days of March, Russia’s largest refineries and – even more importantly – its port infrastructure in the Baltic and Black seas have come under regular strikes by Ukrainian drones. Following the first attacks on the key Baltic ports of Primorsk and Ust-Luga, Russian oil exports plunged 43% week over week in March 22-29. Though the loading price at Baltic ports rose $11 per barrel in the period, export revenues dropped from $2.45 billion to $1.44 billion.
On April 2, when shipments from Primorsk were partially restored, the price hit a 13-year high. Yet on the same day, Reuters, citing industry sources, wrote that Russian oil companies were preparing to cut production and could declare force majeure due to an inability physically to ship oil and petroleum products out of Baltic ports.
The attacks continued into the first week of April. On the night of April 5, a strike hit Primorsk, setting on fire a pipeline supplying oil to the terminal. A day later, an attack on the port of Novorossiysk forced the shutdown of a terminal handling a fifth of Russia’s seaborne oil exports. On the night of April 7, the port of Ust-Luga again came under drone attack, though operations resumed the following day.
Even the few tankers that do leave Russian ports in the Baltic, Novorossiysk or Murmansk can at any moment become targets for Ukrainian naval drones or the coast guards of European countries. The latter – unlike the US – are in no hurry to suspend or ease sanctions on Russia’s “shadow fleet.” Reports of vessels carrying Russian oil being stopped have become more frequent. The upshot: there are fewer and fewer parties willing to transport and insure these shipments, with the costs continuing to rise.
Russian analysts thus estimate federal oil and gas revenues at around RUB1 trillion (plus or minus RUB50 billion). On the one hand, this is 50% higher than March’s RUB617 billion; on the other hand, in March the Russian budget collected 43% less in oil and gas revenues than a year earlier and fell short, by RUB234 billion or more than a third, of the amount projected by the Ministry of Finance. Overall, in the first quarter planned revenues were off RUB570 billion. Meanwhile, the April trillion is roughly in line with what the budget received in April 2025 (RUB1.09 trillion).
The problem is that, beginning in the final 10 days of March, Russia’s largest refineries and – even more importantly – its port infrastructure in the Baltic and Black seas have come under regular strikes by Ukrainian drones. Following the first attacks on the key Baltic ports of Primorsk and Ust-Luga, Russian oil exports plunged 43% week over week in March 22-29. Though the loading price at Baltic ports rose $11 per barrel in the period, export revenues dropped from $2.45 billion to $1.44 billion.
On April 2, when shipments from Primorsk were partially restored, the price hit a 13-year high. Yet on the same day, Reuters, citing industry sources, wrote that Russian oil companies were preparing to cut production and could declare force majeure due to an inability physically to ship oil and petroleum products out of Baltic ports.
The attacks continued into the first week of April. On the night of April 5, a strike hit Primorsk, setting on fire a pipeline supplying oil to the terminal. A day later, an attack on the port of Novorossiysk forced the shutdown of a terminal handling a fifth of Russia’s seaborne oil exports. On the night of April 7, the port of Ust-Luga again came under drone attack, though operations resumed the following day.
Even the few tankers that do leave Russian ports in the Baltic, Novorossiysk or Murmansk can at any moment become targets for Ukrainian naval drones or the coast guards of European countries. The latter – unlike the US – are in no hurry to suspend or ease sanctions on Russia’s “shadow fleet.” Reports of vessels carrying Russian oil being stopped have become more frequent. The upshot: there are fewer and fewer parties willing to transport and insure these shipments, with the costs continuing to rise.
Crude oil supertanker AbQaiq. Source: Wiki Commons
Igor Sechin, head of Rosneft, has complained: “systematic pressure on key buyers of Russian energy is being exerted through sanctions against the tanker fleet and mass refusals to insure vessels, leading to insurance premiums rising dozens of times. The situation is compounded by increased risks of detention or outright seizure of ships.” As a result, according to Sechin, the cost of transporting oil has risen from a prewar $2 per barrel to $20.
In effect, the only relatively safe route for seaborne exports of Russian energy is Far Eastern ports to China. Due to transport constraints, however, redirecting all volumes of oil and petroleum products there is physically impossible. Thus, the windfall from high prices – for both exporters and the budget – has been partially offset by declining production and export volumes.
Nor is this the only problem facing Russia’s oil sector, as Ukrainian drones have targeted the largest refineries in the European part of the country as well. Since late March, operations have been halted at the Kirishi refinery of Surgutneftegas in Leningrad Region, the Saratov refinery of Rosneft and the Norsi refinery of Lukoil. Kirishi is the second-largest refinery in Russia and the largest in western Russia, while Norsi is the country’s fourth-largest refining facility.
To prevent a fuel crisis amid increased demand during the spring sowing campaign, the government has imposed a full ban on gasoline exports, which, according to analysts’ estimates, could provide an additional 6,000-7,000 tons of fuel per day. However, refinery shutdowns and repairs cast doubt on these figures. Moreover, even still-operating plants are being forced to cut output due to difficulties exporting fuel oil, a major refining product – Russia produces an excess of fuel oil, yet there is now simply nowhere to send it. All this serves as a reminder that the Iran war is not confined to the Persian Gulf and that problems with exporting oil are not limited to the Gulf Arabs.
As for the oil earnings windfall for the Russian budget and oil companies, note that it depends not only on prices but also on the volume of oil and petroleum products that Russian exporters are able to supply. There is also a third factor: the ruble exchange rate, which at present can hardly be described as favorable either for the budget or for exporters.
In effect, the only relatively safe route for seaborne exports of Russian energy is Far Eastern ports to China. Due to transport constraints, however, redirecting all volumes of oil and petroleum products there is physically impossible. Thus, the windfall from high prices – for both exporters and the budget – has been partially offset by declining production and export volumes.
Nor is this the only problem facing Russia’s oil sector, as Ukrainian drones have targeted the largest refineries in the European part of the country as well. Since late March, operations have been halted at the Kirishi refinery of Surgutneftegas in Leningrad Region, the Saratov refinery of Rosneft and the Norsi refinery of Lukoil. Kirishi is the second-largest refinery in Russia and the largest in western Russia, while Norsi is the country’s fourth-largest refining facility.
To prevent a fuel crisis amid increased demand during the spring sowing campaign, the government has imposed a full ban on gasoline exports, which, according to analysts’ estimates, could provide an additional 6,000-7,000 tons of fuel per day. However, refinery shutdowns and repairs cast doubt on these figures. Moreover, even still-operating plants are being forced to cut output due to difficulties exporting fuel oil, a major refining product – Russia produces an excess of fuel oil, yet there is now simply nowhere to send it. All this serves as a reminder that the Iran war is not confined to the Persian Gulf and that problems with exporting oil are not limited to the Gulf Arabs.
As for the oil earnings windfall for the Russian budget and oil companies, note that it depends not only on prices but also on the volume of oil and petroleum products that Russian exporters are able to supply. There is also a third factor: the ruble exchange rate, which at present can hardly be described as favorable either for the budget or for exporters.
Strait of Hormuz. Source: European Space Agency (ESA)
Plans by the Ministry of Finance to revise the so-called fiscal rule and intervene in the local foreign-exchange market in April with purchases of hard currency to replenish the National Wealth Fund were changed at the last minute. The fiscal rule will not be revised this year and will not be implemented at least until July. The ruble, which had begun to weaken, quickly recouped its March losses, strengthening from RUB87 to RUB78 versus the dollar.
On April 7, the US and Iran agreed to a proposal by Pakistan for a two-week ceasefire. A condition was Iran’s reopening of the Strait of Hormuz – Tehran has promised to make shippers pay Iran and Oman for transit and have the IRGC manage traffic – though for the market such details are of secondary importance. The price of Brent crude has come down 15% to around $95 per barrel as of this writing, even though shipping through the strait has yet to resume (update: the US has promised to blockade ships entering or exiting Iranian ports after US-Iran peace talks in Pakistan stalled – RP).
The war in the Persian Gulf, in the view of International Energy Agency chief Fatih Birol, has brought the world to the brink of the most severe energy crisis ever. If a lasting peace emerges, restoring what has been destroyed will not take long, and the world will go back to normal, while Russia – without ever fully enjoying the fruits of the energy crisis – will go back to its own war, in which it is suffering increasingly painful losses, including economically.
On April 7, the US and Iran agreed to a proposal by Pakistan for a two-week ceasefire. A condition was Iran’s reopening of the Strait of Hormuz – Tehran has promised to make shippers pay Iran and Oman for transit and have the IRGC manage traffic – though for the market such details are of secondary importance. The price of Brent crude has come down 15% to around $95 per barrel as of this writing, even though shipping through the strait has yet to resume (update: the US has promised to blockade ships entering or exiting Iranian ports after US-Iran peace talks in Pakistan stalled – RP).
The war in the Persian Gulf, in the view of International Energy Agency chief Fatih Birol, has brought the world to the brink of the most severe energy crisis ever. If a lasting peace emerges, restoring what has been destroyed will not take long, and the world will go back to normal, while Russia – without ever fully enjoying the fruits of the energy crisis – will go back to its own war, in which it is suffering increasingly painful losses, including economically.
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